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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Purpose
Senior Japanese government officials have declared that
improving university-industry cooperation is essential for Japan's
economic revival.' Several researchers have pointed to problems
associated with intellectual property ("IP") as factors hindering
effective collaboration.2 In addition, Japanese government and
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1998. His research compares university-industry cooperation in Japan, the United
States, and other countries-particularly with respect to biomedical technologies,
the ownership and transfer of intellectual property rights, and the role of startup
companies.
The Author would like to thank the many persons in Japanese universities,
government laboratories, government offices, and private companies who
contributed information incorporated in this Article. He is grateful to Professors
Akira Goto, Sadao Nagaoka, Sachiko Shudo, and John Walsh for helpful
comments on drafts of this Article. He is indebted to the Abe Fellowship Program
of the Japan Center for Global Partnership for enabling him to begin technology
transfer research in Japan in 1997, and for continuing support for this research
from the University of Tokyo and the Japanese Ministry of Education.
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I See Koji Omi, Structural Reform of the Japanese Economy: A Science and
Technology Driven Initiative, Speech at the Royal Institute of International Affairs
(May 1, 2002) ("mo activate R&D in Japan, reform of the nation's university sys-
tem is essential."), available at http://www.omi.or.jp.
2 See Mariko Yoshihara & Katsuya Tamai, Lack of Incentive and Persisting Con-
straints: Factors Hindering Technology Transfer at Japanese Universities, in INDUSTRIAL-
IZING KNOWLEDGE: UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY LINKAGES IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES
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business leaders note that one of the greatest barriers to
collaboration is the "gap" between systems of collaboration and IP
management in universities and industry. 3 Heretofore, however,
there has been no systematic analysis of ownership of inventions
arising in Japanese universities and non-university government
research institutes ("GRIs"). Nor, to the Author's knowledge, has
anyone analyzed how the laws and policies determining
ownership of inventions made in Japanese universities and GRIs
have hindered public-private research cooperation and adversely
affected certain high-technology industries, particularly the
biomedical industry.
In addition, this Article analyzes related aspects of public-
private research cooperation, including industry-sponsored
research and the mobilization of human resources for projects
relevant to industry. It draws upon the Author's more than five
years of experience in a major Japanese university research center
and his separate studies on Japanese biomedical startup companies
and innovation in Japanese pharmaceutical companies. It also
draws upon his compilation of available statistical data on
university-industry cooperation and anecdotal case examples.
Finally, it draws upon his experience in biomedical research,
science policy and technology transfer in the U.S. National
Institutes of Health ("NIH"). This background information,
together with the analysis of the legal and institutional framework
of the Japanese technology-transfer system that forms the core of
348, 352-353 (Lewis M. Branscomb et al. eds., 1999) (detailing the failure of Japa-
nese universities to contribute to overall innovation and research and develop-
ment ("R&D")); Christopher Health, Commercializing University Inventions in Japan,
12 ZEITSCHRIFr FUER JAPANISCHES REcHT 1, 20 (2001) (examining the discrepancy
between frequent commercialization of university research in the United States
and the relative paucity of such commercialization in Japan). See also Robert
Kneller, Intellectual Property Rights and University-Industry Technology Transfer in
Japan, 26 Sct. & PUB. POL'Y 113, 115 (1999) [hereinafter Kneller, Intellectual Property
Rights], available at http://www.nsftokyo.org/rm99-08.html (Report No. RM99-
08) (positing that publicly funded Japanese inventions face obstacles to commer-
cialization). A longer version is available in Robert Kneller, Intellectual Property
Rights and University-Industry Technology Transfer in Japan, in INDUSTRIALIZING
KNOWLEDGE: UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY LINKAGES IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 307,
310-321 (Lewis M. Branscomb et al. eds., 1999).
3 See San gaku kan renkei samitto kakudai [Industry-University-Government Sum-
mit Meeting], NIKKEI KEIZAI SHINBUN, Nov. 23, 2001, at 13 (noting the results of a
summit meeting of business leaders, including the Minister of State for Science
and Technology Policy, where more collaboration between industry and academia
is expected to bridge the "gap" in collaborative research and patents) (on file with
author).
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this Article, provides evidence that the system has harmed Japan's
technical and economic progress, at least in biomedicine and
perhaps in other high-technology fields.
Taken together, the U.S. and Japanese systems probably
embody the entire possible spectrum of technology-transfer
systems: state ownership, university or research institute
ownership, and individual inventor ownership. Thus, the U.S. and
Japanese experiences, viewed over the past thirty years, provide
insights into the strengths and weaknesses of the entire spectrum
of possible technology-transfer systems-bearing in mind that the
larger institutional and social context also influences system
efficacy. As many countries consider reforms to improve
university-industry cooperation, this comparative perspective may
be valuable. In particular, it provides a cautionary warning to any
country that has adopted, or might consider adopting, a system of
"public" ownership of publicly financed IP.
However, the legal framework of Japanese technology transfer
is undergoing profound changes. This Article describes these
changes, the unresolved issues, and the possible benefits and
problems that will result.
Finally, having interviewed and advised Japanese startup
companies and potential investors in these companies, the Author
is aware of how uncertain foreign investors are of Japanese
technology-transfer procedures and how this uncertainty is one
factor inhibiting investment in academic-based Japanese startup
companies. Therefore, he hopes that this Article will clarify this
issue for such investors and promote mutually beneficial
transnational cooperation involving Japanese startup companies.
1.2. Importance of Technology Transfer and Analytical Framework
In the United States in 1999, 64 billion USD of research and
development ("R&D") was performed outside of industry
laboratories, mostly in universities and GRIs. This accounted for
26% of the 244 billion USD of total R&D performed that year in the
United States. Japan's total R&D activity (15.2 trillion yen or about
95 billion USD in 1998)4 was second only to that of the United
4 For this and subsequent conversions of Japanese yen to U.S. dollars (USD),
the Author used the OECD purchasing power indices (160 yen/USD in 1999)
instead of market exchange rates (approximately 120 yen/USD in 1999). The
former are more stable than the latter and provide a more accurate approximation
of purchasing power in most R&D fields. NAT'L Sci. BD., 2 NAT'L Sci. FOUND.,
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States. Twenty-nine percent of this actvity occurred outside of
industry laboratories. In Germany, the United Kingdom, and
France non-industry R&D accounts for 31%, 34%, and 38%,
respectively, of total R&D.5 The discoveries that emerge from
universities and GRIs usually are not ready for public or
commercial use, even though some may have the potential to be
developed into useful products or services. More development is
often needed -especially in the case of inventions arising in certain
fields such as biomedicine. However, most universities and GRIs
are not able to commercialize early-stage discoveries. The private
sector can, but there must be an effective system to transfer
information to industry, and there must be incentives for industry
to develop and commercialize discoveries originating in academic
laboratories -the term that this Article uses henceforth to refer
collectively to universities, GRIs, and academic medical centers.
At the same time, university-industry cooperation should
enhance rather than undermine the basic goals of universities:
namely education and curiosity-driven expansion of knowledge to
be made available to the public. The fundamental goal of
technology transfer is to ensure the development of early-stage
discoveries for the public benefit, while enhancing the basic goals
of academic laboratories. The central issue underlying this Article
is what types of legal frameworks provide the foundation for
effective technology transfer and public-private R&D cooperation.
Important mechanisms of cooperation and technology transfer
in both the United States and Japan include: (1) publication of
information; and (2) employment and transfers of R&D personnel.6
However, these modes of transfer usually do not involve direct
interaction between industry and academic research centers.
Direct interactions usually occur under the following mechanisms:
1) consultation or advisory agreements between individual
academic researchers and companies;
2) material transfer agreements of unpatented technologies for
SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS A4-2 (2002), available at http://www.nsf.
gov/ sbe/ srs/ seindO2/pdfstart.htm.
5 Id. at A4-80 (2002).
6 Akira Goto & Akiya Nagata, Technology Opportunities and Appropriating the
Returns from Innovation: Comparison of Survey Results from Japan and the United
States, NAT'L INST. SC. AND TECH. POL'Y ("NISTEP") REPORT No. 48 (1997) (in Japa-
nese), available at http://wakame.econ.hitu.ac.jp/-sample/kyoukan/EN..goto.
htm.
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early-stage or non-commercial research;
3) licenses or assignments of existing technologies;
4) collaborative or sponsored research agreements to develop new
information or technologies; and
5) formation of start-up companies, usually financed by private
venture capital or government grants.
Only these direct mechanisms, in particular the latter three,
permit contractual guarantees that:
a) IP rights will be transferred to industry;
b) the recipients of technology will make best efforts to
develop the technologies; and
c) the academic centers will share in future commercial
benefits.
Concerning the transfer of IP rights, transfers of exclusive
rights are often essential if a company is to take the risk to develop
early-stage academic discoveries. This is particularly true in
industries such as biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, where
much development work is necessary before a new product can be
marketed and yet the final product can be easily copied. Exclusive
IP rights are one way to prevent copying by competitors.
Exclusive IP rights can also be important for university startup
companies to obtain private funding to develop early-stage,
commercially risky academic discoveries. Therefore, in the case of
promising academic inventions requiring expensive development,
especially by startup companies, one or more of the latter three
forms of technology transfer (licenses, assignments, collaborative
research-sponsored agreements, or the formation of startup
companies) must usually be used to ensure that appropriate
incentives exist for academic researchers, academic
administrations, and private investors to take the necessary steps
to ensure that such inventions are developed.
Appropriate incentives are the key to making the technology
transfer process work effectively, especially:
1) incentives for academic researchers to be aware of the
commercial potential of their discoveries and to (a)
cooperate with offices that are responsible for managing
and commercializing their discoveries, or (b) initiate
effective steps on their own to ensure that the commercial
potential of their discoveries is realized, while preserving
the primacy of their academic obligations;
2) incentives for officials in academic institutions to try to ensure
that discoveries with commercial or public health potential
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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are effectively developed, again while preserving the
primacy of academic objectives and values; and
3) incentives for private companies to work with academic
officials and researchers to ensure that discoveries with
commercial or public health potential are effectively
developed.
The main focus of this Article is the legal framework for
technology transfer and how it shapes incentives to make
technology transfer occur effectively. The Article will emphasize
the laws and regulations governing ownership and transfer of IP
rights under mechanisms mentioned above -especially how these
laws influence incentives to ensure that promising academic
discoveries are developed into beneficial products and services.
Of course, effectiveness of academic-industry cooperation de-
pends upon other factors besides the laws governing ownership
and transfer of IP rights, such as:
" national expectations about the fundamental purpose of
academic research;
" national R&D budgets, funding mechanisms, and project
selection criteria;
" career incentives for academic and industry researchers;
" the sociology of academic and corporate R&D;
* corporate business strategies and management practices;
and,
• capital markets and various tax laws.
This Article will address these factors briefly to the extent that
they influence the effectiveness of the technology-transfer systems
in Japan and the United States.
1.3. Article Organization
Section 2 of this Article provides an overview of the U.S. sys-
tem of academic-industry cooperation. This provides a compara-
tive framework for the analysis of the Japanese system in Section 3,
as well as the conclusions in Section 4. However, readers who are
familiar with the U.S. system, or who are short of time, may skip
Section 2. Both Sections 2 and 3 analyze technology transfer, first
from the perspectives of universities and academic medical centers,
and then from GRIs. The subsections will discuss: first, sponsored
research agreements with private companies; second, assignments
and licenses, particularly of government-funded inventions; third,
consulting and other outside work; and fourth, formation of
[24:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol24/iss2/2
2003] UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY COOPERATION IN JAPAN 335
startup companies. Appendix 1 describes the methods used to es-
timate in Table 1 the amount of funding under the various mecha-
nisms to support R&D in universities. Appendix 3 briefly dis-
cusses technology transfer via Material Transfer Agreements
("MTAs").
2. OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. SYSTEM
2.1. U.S. Universities
2.1.1. Sponsored Research Agreements
For the purposes of this Article, "sponsored research" encom-
passes terms such as "contract research," "commissioned re-
search," "collaborative research agreements," and "joint research."
The basic concept is that a company supports academic research by
providing various resources (such as money, research personnel,
data, equipment, and proprietary medicines), and in return, re-
ceives from the academic institution: (1) information; and (2) in
some instances, academic research personnel and/or IP rights in
discoveries arising from the research it supports.
2.1.1.1. IP Considerations
In the United States, there are relatively few constraints on the
freedom of universities and academic medical centers (henceforth
collectively referred to as "universities") to negotiate such agree-
ments with companies. As a general rule, U.S. universities own all
work products of their employees, with the exception of copy-
rightable non-software works where ownership sometimes re-
mains with the Authors. This is a result of two factors:
1) Universities are increasingly asserting standard employers'
rights to require their faculty and all other employees to as-
sign their work products. With respect to potentially pat-
entable inventions, this process was begun by the Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology ("MIT") in the 1930s and is
now a standard practice.7 With respect to copyrightable
7 Henry Etzkowitz, Knowledge as Property: The Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology and the Debate over Academic Patent Policy, 32 MINERVA 383, 383421 (1994)
(discussing how MIT began the process of asserting employer rights over em-
ployee work products historically). See also Robert Kneller, Technology Transfer: A
Review for Biomedical Researchers, 7 CLINICAL CANCER RESEARCH 761, 762 (2001)
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works, the Copyright Act of 1976 enabled universities to
apply the "work-for-hire" doctrine8 and thus claim author-
ship over many of their employees' written works.9 Today,
most universities assert ownership over work-related com-
puter programs, laboratory research data, and other work
products that rely substantially on university resources, or
on grants or contracts to the university from outside
sources.10
2) The 1980 Bayh-Dole amendments to U.S. patent law" and
the 1987 implementing regulations,12 permit universities to
claim worldwide ownership rights over inventions made
under U.S. government grants and contracts. Prior to these
amendments, there was no uniform policy regarding IP
rights to discoveries made with U.S. government support.
In general, however, IP rights vested in the government
unless the funding agency waived its rights, 13 and funding
agencies could only issue nonexclusive licenses absent
special justification. 14  Under the Bayh-Dole Act and
Regulations, the U.S. government retains some residual
[hereinafter Kneller, Technology Transfer] (discussing employers' contractual right
to require assignment of their employees' work product), available at
http://clincancerres.aacrjournals.org/cgi/content/full/7/4/761.
8 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
9 ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY MANAGERS, INC. (AUTM), AUTM
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PRACTICE MANUAL IV, § 2.3.9.E. (1994) (discussing owner-
ship issues for academic institutions and noting that if the work-for-hire doctrine
is considered to rule in relationship to a scholarly work, there must be a written,
signed transfer to the faculty member).
10 See Jerome H. Reichman, Overlapping Proprietary Rights in University-
Generated Research Products: The Case of Computer Programs, 17 COLUM.-VLA J. L. &
ARTS 51, 51-125 (1992) (providing an overview of development of U.S. proprietary
rights with an emphasis on commercial university research). See also TECHNOLOGY
LICENSING OFFICE, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY ("MIT"), GUIDE TO
THE OWNERSHIP, DISTRIBUTION AND COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF MIT TECHNOL-
OGY (1999) (outlining MIT's intellectual property rights policy), available at
http://web.mit.edu/tlo/www/guide.toc.html.
11 Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (1994).
12 37 C.F.R. § 401 (2002).
13 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents
and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1671, 1671-
1695 (1996) (discussing the history of the government-owned patent policy in the
United States). See also Kneller, Technology Transfer, supra note 7, at 762 (describing
technology transfer procedures).
14 45 C.F.R. § 6.3 (repealed) with respect to licensing of Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare inventions.
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rights over such inventions, the funding agencies must
approve assignments by universities, and certain
restrictions apply to exclusive licenses.15 Nevertheless,
since 1980, universities have enjoyed substantial control
over the fruits of federally funded R&D conducted by their
employees -funding that accounts for 58% of the total R&D
budget of U.S. universities.16 Since the late 1970s, patenting
and licensing by universities have increased dramatically. 17
Two additional aspects of the Bayh-Dole regulations18 have re-
inforced the tendency of universities to require assignment of all of
their employee's inventions, even though Bayh-Dole does not re-
quire such assignment:
a) the comprehensive reporting requirements; and
b) the cumbersome procedures for inventors to retain owner-
ship.
Universities must establish procedures to ensure that univer-
sity employees inform their universities of government-funded in-
ventions soon after they are made and of any public disclosures of
such inventions. Universities must report this information to the
funding agencies and inform the agencies in a timely manner
whether they will apply for U.S. and foreign patents. 19 If a univer-
sity decides not to apply for patents, these rights devolve to the
funding agency-not to the individual inventors. After consulta-
tion with the university, the funding agency may grant requests for
the inventors to retain rights.20 The Author's experience working
in technology transfer at NIH suggests that expeditious procedures
for funding agencies to waive their rights so that inventors can re-
tain ownership still have not been worked out. Therefore, the
stringent Bayh-Dole reporting requirements, coupled with cum-
15 Kneller, Technology Transfer, supra note 7, at 765-768. See discussion infra §
2.1.2. Licensing.
16 NAT'L SCl. BD., supra note 4, at A5-2.
17 See David Mowery et al., The Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act on U.S. University
Research and Technology Transfer, in INDUSTRIALIZING KNOWLEDGE: UNIvERSrrY-
INDUSTRY LINKAGES IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 269, 275 (Lewis M.
Branscomb et al. eds., 1999) ("The Bayh-Dole Act is contemporaneous with a
sharp increase in U.S. university patenting and licensing activity."); Kneller, Tech-
nology Transfer, supra note 7, at 762 (analyzing the past and present scope of tech-
nology transfer in universities).
18 37 C.F.R. § 401 (2002) (implementing 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000)).
19 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(c), (f) (2002).
20 35 U.S.C. § 202(d) (1994).
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bersome procedures to allow inventors to retain rights, has led all
major U.S. research universities to require assignment of all poten-
tially patentable inventions by their employees, at least those made
with U.S. government funds.21
As a result of ownership of IP vesting in universities, universi-
ties are relatively free to negotiate transfers of IP arising from the
use of the corporate-sponsored research funds, even when these
funds are mixed with government funds. Because industry-
sponsored contract research amounts to only about 7% of the total
university R&D budget (and only 12% of the federal
contribution),22 most universities apply the Bayh-Dole technology
management procedures, discussed infra under "Licensing," even
to inventions that do not arise under government funding. In
particular, even in the case of inventions arising solely under
industry sponsorship, universities often will not assign such
inventions to the sponsors, although they will negotiate exclusive
licenses and frequently let the sponsors manage patent
prosecution.
Most universities have established technology management or
technology licensing offices ("TLOs"),23 which have become the fo-
cal point of their technology transfer activities, although some uni-
versities maintain separate offices to deal with sponsored research
contracts.
2.1.1.2. Mobilizing Human and Material Resources
Universities can use corporate funds to employ a wide range of
research personnel including secretaries, technicians, Ph.D. stu-
21 Some universities have elected not to assert the maximum number of pos-
sible rights. For example, the University of Wisconsin lets faculty own inventions
that do not arise under U.S. government-funded projects. Also, points of debate
remain, for example, whether graduate students can retain ownership of their in-
ventions, particularly if their stipends are paid by a source other than the univer-
sity or government grants. Universities' policies on this issue vary. Finally, the
way in which universities assert ownership over inventions varies. Some univer-
sities require new employees to sign a formal agreement prospectively assigning
to the university all rights, title, and interest in any future work-related inven-
tions. Others wait until they receive notification from the inventor and then re-
quest the inventor to execute an assignment agreement. For an informative sur-
vey of intellectual property ("IP") management by U.S. universities, see Jerry
Thursby et al., Objectives, Characteristics, and Outcomes of University Licensing: A
Survey of Major U.S. Universities, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 59,59-72 (2001).
22 NAT'L Sci. BD., supra note 4, at A-312.
23 See infra note 189 for the origin of this abbreviation.
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dents, and postdoctoral researchers. 24 Even tenured faculty mem-
bers in science and engineering departments in most U.S. universi-
ties are expected to draw part of their salaries from research grants
or contracts from industry, government, or private foundations 25-
i.e., from "soft-money" sources.26 In addition, universities are free
to demand that companies pay the indirect costs associated with
the research they support. The percentage of such overhead costs
varies from university to university, but is often above 50% of di-
rect project costs.27 In most prestigious private universities, faculty
members are expected to pay for a significant proportion of over-
head costs (including libraries, computer facilities, security, main-
24 Support for Ph.D. students and postdoctoral researchers is often desig-
nated as "fellowships," "traineeships," "research assistantships," "teaching assis-
tantships," "work-study," and so on, yet less than 40% of science and engineering
Ph.D. students in the United States are self-supported. NAT'L SCL 13D., supra note
4, at 6-28 to 6-41. In the major research universities, this percentage is lower and
support usually covers tuition plus living expenses. E-mail from Jon Miller, Fac-
ulty Member, Northwestern University, to Author (Oct. 10, 2001) (on file with au-
thor).
25 For example, in a major state university, medical school faculty who are
M.D.s cover a quarter of their salaries on average from grants and contracts, while
non-M.D.s cover 40-50% of their salaries from such sources. For engineering fac-
ulty, the figure is about 40% when factoring in summer months. For biology,
chemistry, and physics faculty, salaries are guaranteed for the normal academic
year, but they must draw 100% of their summer-month salaries from outside
sources. E-mail from Fawwaz Ulaby, Vice-President for Research, University of
Michigan, to Author (Sept. 25, 2001) (on file with author).
26 This does not mean that science and engineering faculty can arbitrarily
designate a portion of their grant funds as personal compensation. Grant and
contract payments from government and industry are almost always made to the
university, not to individual researchers. Generally, for assistant professors and
recently promoted associate professors in similar departments in equivalently
ranked universities, salaries are approximately equivalent nationwide. Even for
more senior faculty, whose salaries are decided at the institution or department
level on the basis of teaching, scholarship, and service, outside research support is
not directly factored into most faculty compensation formulas. See H. Roland
Weistroffer et al., A Merit Pay Allocation Model of College Faculty Based on Perform-
ance Quality and Quantity, 20 ECON. EDuc. REV. 41, 41-49 (2001). However, outside
research support usually leads to an increase in graduate students, scholarly out-
put, and management responsibilities, all of which can justify increased compen-
sation. Furthermore, success in obtaining "soft money" is often regarded as an
indication of level of scholarship and productivity, and annual salary increments
(as well as promotions) often reflect success in obtaining "soft money," particu-
larly peer-reviewed grants from respected institutions such as NIH, National Sci-
ence Foundation ("NSF"), and the Howard Hughes Medical Research Foundation.
27 Overhead rates are often established or verified by government auditors,
since government agencies must also pay overhead when they fund research in
universities.
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tenance, and utilities) from "soft money."
2.1.2. Licensing
This Subsection deals with transfers of existing technologies as
opposed to those that may arise in the course of cooperative re-
search. In addition to licenses, it covers assignments -complete
transfers of ownership rights. As noted in Section 2.1.1.1, the right
of universities to own and license work-related inventions of their
employees derives from the employer-employee relationship and
the Bayh-Dole law and regulations.
The Bayh-Dole regulations also set forth specific obligations re-
lated to licenses of university inventions made with government
support:
1) Universities and other nonprofit organizations may not as-
sign U.S. rights to such inventions without approval of the
funding agency. 28 Consequently, assignments are rare and
exclusive license rights are usually the strongest rights that
are transferred.
2) Inventors must receive a share of royalty income.29
3) The balance of any royalties, after payment of administra-
tive expenses, must be used for the support of scientific re-
search and education.30
4) Universities must make efforts "reasonable under the cir-
cumstances" to attract small business licensees and to give
licensing preference to small businesses.31
5) An exclusive licensee of the U.S. rights to an invention must
agree to manufacture substantially in the U.S. products
made using the invention.32
6) Universities must report annually to the funding agencies
on the development status of inventions including royalties
28 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(k)(1) (2002).
29 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(k)(2) (2002).
30 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(k)(3) (2002).
31 37 C.F.R. §§ 401.7, 401.14(k)(4) (2002). The following are criteria to qualify
for "small business" status: independent ownership and operation (i.e., not affili-
ated with a larger organization); total employees (including those of any affiliates)
not exceeding 500; not dominant in its field of operation; principal place of busi-
ness located in the United States; at least 51% owned (or in the case of a company
whose stocks are publicly traded, at least 51% of its voting stock owned) by U.S.
citizens or permanent resident aliens. 13 C.F.R. § 121.4 (2002).
32 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(i) (2002).
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received and date of first commercial sale.33
7) The government must receive a nonexclusive, nontransfer-
able, irrevocable royalty-free license in order to practice the
invention throughout the world or to have the invention
practiced on its behalf.34
8) The government can require third-party licensing if the
university, or its licensee, is not taking effective steps to de-
velop the invention or such action is necessary to meet
health or safety needs.35 The government has never fully
exercised these "march-in rights." To do so would be diffi-
cult and would require many procedural steps designed to
protect the interests of universities and their licensees.
9) U.S. patent applications must acknowledge the government
support and the government's residual rights.36
Details concerning these obligations and the process and strat-
egy of licensing by university TLOs, are set forth in a separate pub-
lication by the Author available online.37 This publication also con-
tains summary statistics on the extent of university technology
transfer. More detailed licensing statistics are available in publica-
tions by the Association of University Technology Managers
("AUTM").38
It is often considered good practice for universities to include
"due diligence" or "technical benchmark" conditions in exclusive
licenses to encourage licensees to make best efforts to develop the
university inventions. For example, an exclusive license may
automatically expire after one year unless the licensee pays an an-
nual renewal fee, which often increases each year. In the case of
pharmaceutical-related inventions, it is common to have technical
conditions such as:
* the exclusive licensee must develop two analogs of the par-
ent compound with greater bioavailability (for example,
solubility) within one year of license execution; or
* within three years of execution, the licensee must complete
33 37 C.F.R. §§ 401.8, 401.14(h) (2002).
34 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(b) (2002).
35 37 C.F.R. 33 401.6, 401.14(j) (2002).
36 37 C.F.R. §3 401.6, 401.14(f)(4) (2002).
37 Kneller, Technology Transfer, supra note 7, at 762-69.
38 See, e.g., ASSOCIATJON OF UNIvERsrTY TECHNOLOGY MANAGERS, INC. (AUTM),
AUTM LIcENsING SuRVEY: FY 1998 (1999) (collecting data related to the licensing
activity of universities and research institutions).
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animal testing necessary to apply for Food and Drug Ad-
ministration ("FDA") approval to begin human trials.
If these conditions are not met, the license can automatically
terminate. In practice, however, universities usually will renegoti-
ate such conditions if they believe that their licensees are making
good faith efforts to develop the technologies -not simply denying
access to competitors. Also, it is difficult for a licensor to litigate
successfully to terminate a license on the grounds that technical
benchmark conditions have not been met.
Nevertheless, licensees sometimes argue that a decision to sus-
pend development of a licensed technology may be made on the
basis of sound business considerations after many years of in-
house R&D, and it would be unfair if the university could then li-
cense the same technology to a competitor.39 Therefore, licensees
sometimes complain that their inability to obtain outright assign-
ments of university IP puts early-stage university discoveries at a
disadvantage in relation to in-house discoveries.
However, the most significant controversies today surrounding
university patenting and licensing are not whether universities
have sufficient leeway and incentives to manage and commercial-
ize their inventions, but rather whether they have too much free-
dom to act entrepreneurially. It has been suggested that universi-
ties are patenting too many early-stage technologies and then
licensing their rights exclusively to private companies. These pri-
vate companies (often startup companies from the universities)
may then charge sublicensees excessively high royalties, or charge
excessively high prices for their products and services. Addition-
ally, the universities may themselves demand excessively high
royalties from exclusive licensees. Even if universities and their
exclusive licensees do not behave avariciously, the explosion of IP
claims to early-stage discoveries whose usefulness is often limited
to research (i.e., "research tools") may dissuade some university
laboratories or companies from pursuing research in a particular
area, either because they are afraid of infringement suits or because
they believe that the transaction costs of negotiating licenses with
numerous IP owners would be too costly. Even if they are willing
39 Such concerns are raised most often by pharmaceutical and biotechnology
companies. They assert that at the start of a long, risky development project in a
particular therapeutic area, they tend to give priority to lead compounds discov-
ered in-house, even though there may be equally promising compounds in-
licensed (or available for in-licensing) from universities.
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to endure these transaction costs, the price of the final product may
be burdensome for end users because high royalties have to be
paid to use the many patented technologies incorporated in the fi-
nal product (i.e., "royalty stacking").
In addition, it has been suggested that an increased emphasis
on patenting, stock options in startup companies, and the prospect
of high license royalties or large industry funding for sponsored
research may shift the focus of research to more applied, commer-
cially relevant fields and may also lead university researchers to be
more secretive -thus distorting core academic goals and values.
This Article cannot address these issues in depth. However, a
recent study suggests that while patenting of early-stage inven-
tions by universities has contributed to a sharp rise in patent appli-
cations and has made the landscape of often overlapping patent
claims much more complex. It is rare for either commercial or aca-
demic research to be blocked by such claims,40 except in a few ar-
eas, notably genetic testing, where a significant number of clinical
laboratories and geneticists report foregoing development of a new
genetic test because the genetic sequence or a similar test is already
patented or licensed.41 Also, a number of recent steps by private
companies, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"), and
government funding agencies are reducing the likelihood that IP
issues will stymie innovation.
42
40 John P. Walsh et al., Working Through the Patent Problem, 299 SciL 1021, 1021
(2003) ("[A]ilmost none of our respondents reported worthwhile projects being
stopped because of issues of access to IP rights to research tools."). For a more
complete analysis, see John P. Walsh et al., Science, Technology, and Economic
Policy Board of The National Academies, The Patenting of Research Tools and
Biomedical Innovation (2001), at http://www7.nationalacademies.org/step/
walsh_ presentation.ppt.
41 Mildred K. Cho et al., Effects of Patents and Licenses on the Provision of Clini-
cal Genetic Testing Services, 5 J. MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 3, 3-8 (2003). See also Jon
Merz, Disease Gene Patents: Overcoming Unethical Constraints on Clinical Laboratory
Practice, 45 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 324, 326-28 (1999) (finding that disease gene pat-
ents are used to monopolize medical services exclusively for large clinical labora-
tories); Oversight Hearing on Gene Patents and Other Genomic Inventions Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th
Cong., 2d Sess. (2000) (statement of Jon Merz, Assistant Professor of Bioethics,
University of Pennsylvania), at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/merz0713.htm.
42 Id. For example, the pharmaceutical company Merck is funding gene se-
quencing and identification research (largely at Washington University) and mak-
ing the results public. NIH and the Department of Energy ("DOE") require that
all information obtained from high throughput sequencing under the Human Ge-
nome Project be deposited immediately into public databases. Both of these steps
diminish the chance that patents can be obtained on the genes identified by these
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The Principles and Guidelines on Obtaining and Disseminating
Biomedical Research Resources, issued in 1999 by the NIH, address
the concern that universities are issuing too many exclusive li-
censes for government-financed discoveries, thereby restricting ac-
cess for both private companies and other academic researchers. 43
These guidelines strongly recommend that universities license non-
exclusively inventions made under NIH funding whose main utility
is as "research tools." If an exclusive license to a private company
is necessary in order to ensure development of a research tool, then
the university should negotiate license terms that obligate the li-
censee company to make the final product readily available to the
university research community.44
As for the other concerns, there is little clear evidence that the
focus of university R&D has shifted significantly towards applied
research, probably because peer-reviewed, government-funded
support for basic research continues to be the dominant form of
R&D support.45 There is evidence to suggest that concerns about
IP have increased secrecy,46 although the alternative may be even
more secrecy if professors protect their commercially valuable dis-
coveries by treating them as secrets. Also, a recent study suggests
that the main reason biomedical researchers withhold data relates
projects. The United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") has issued
stricter guidelines on how to satisfy the utility and written description require-
ments of U.S. Patent Law. 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1099 Gan. 5, 2001), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/utilexmguide.pdf. It is
also encouraging the formation of patent pools to reduce the burden of stacked
royalties and transaction costs. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., PATENT POOLS: A
SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS? (2000), at
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/patpoolcover.html.
43 NAT'L INST. HEALTH, THE PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES ON OBTAINING AND
DISSEMINATING BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH RESOURCES (1999), available at
http://www.nih.gov/od/ott/Rtguide-final.html/.
44 For an analysis of these guidelines, see Kneller, Technology Transfer, supra
note 7, at 766-67.
45 Mowery et al., supra note 17; David Blumenthal et al., Relationships Between
Academic Institutions and Industry in the Life Sciences- An Industry Survey, 334 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 368, 372 (1996) ("Although it is a substantial complement to federal
support, industrial sponsorship remains small as compared with NIH funding.");
JERRY THURSBY & MARIE THURSBY, WHO IS SELLING THE IVORY TOWER? SOURCES OF
GROWTH IN UNIVERSITY LICENSING 18-19 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 7718, 2000), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w7718.v5.pdf.
46 David Blumenthal et al., Academic-Industry Research Relationships in Genet-
ics: A Field Apart, 16 NATURE GENETICS 104, 106-07 (1997); David Blumenthal et al.,
Withholding Research Results in Academic Life Science: Evidence from a National Sur-
vey of Faculty, 277 J. AM. MED. ASS'N. 1224,1226-27 (1997).
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more to the effort needed to produce the requested information
and the need to protect the work of graduate students and junior
faculty than the need to protect IP rights or to honor the require-
ments of an industrial sponsor.47
2.1.3. Consulting
There has been a long tradition of U.S. university faculty con-
sulting for private industry. However, the Author is not aware of a
systematic study of the frequency and type of consulting arrange-
ments between university faculty and industry, much less their
impact on industrial innovation and university research and edu-
cation. Available data suggest that a large proportion of senior
biomedical university researchers engage in consulting, although
the nature of the consulting ranges from an occasional paid lecture
to more than forty paid consulting days per year in addition to a
directorship position and equity ownership.48
University policies vary concerning what types of consulting
relationships are acceptable as well as policies on disclosure and
approval. One recent study that examined consulting and conflict-
of-interest policies in ninety-seven universities found considerable
variation concerning disclosure obligations and prohibited activi-
ties.49 The Author's own review of a much more limited number of
policies relating specifically to consulting seemed to show stricter
4 Erik Stokstad, Data Hoarding Blocks Progress in Genetics, 295 Sci. 599, 599
(2002).
48 Howard Hughes Medical Institute ("HMMI") is one of the few institutions
that requires pre-approval of all consulting agreements. In 2000, 56% percent of
HMMI's 346 investigators were engaged in at least one type of consulting rela-
tionship. Thomas R. Cech & Joan S. Leonard, Conflicts of Interest-Moving Beyond
Disclosure, 291 Sci. 989, 989 (2001). A study of University of California- San Fran-
cisco ("UCSF") biomedical researchers required to disclose financial interests in
companies planning to sponsor their research gives some clues as to the nature of
such relationships. Among 488 disclosures by UCSF researchers (mostly principal
investigators or other senior researchers) between 1980 and 1999, about 32% in-
volved an occasional speaking engagement, 33% paid consulting, and 32% held a
paid position on a Scientific Advisory Board of a Board of Directors. Elizabeth A.
Boyd & Lisa A. Bero, Assessing Faculty Financial Relationships with Industry: A Case
Study, 284 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2209, 2209-14 (2000). Since this distribution is only
for consulting on behalf of prospective research sponsors, it may be more biased
towards "high involvement" activities than the distribution for consulting rela-
tionships as a whole. The UCSF study found that 14% of the disclosures reported
equity ownership in the prospective sponsor. Id.
49 Mildred K. Cho et al., Policies on Faculty Conflicts of Interest at U.S. Universi-
ties, 284 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2203, 2203-08 (2000).
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limits and more uniformity than suggested by the ninety-seven
universities' study, although the Author can make no claims as to
the representativeness of his sample.s0 Based on this small sample,
the Author's knowledge of policies in other universities, and the
above referenced study of policies in ninety-seven universities, the
following seem to be commonly true regarding consulting:
" One day per week is the maximum time a faculty member
can devote to outside consulting;
* Consulting activities must be reported at least annually to
at least the department head (this usually occurs after the
relationship has begun);
" Engaging in research sponsored by a company with which
the faculty member has a paid consulting position is pro-
hibited;
" Holding a senior management position in a company is
usually prohibited unless the faculty member takes a leave
of absence from the university or departs from full-time
status;
" Transfer or compromise of IP that ought to belong to the
university is prohibited in the course of consulting activi-
ties;
" Limits on the amount of income that can be earned via con-
sulting are rare (but Johns Hopkins does require permission
for regular outside income) - some universities even bar
collecting data on the amount of outside income; and
50 For this review, the Author reviewed the policies of two private and two
state universities trying to choose one institution from each category with a repu-
tation of being relatively permissive, and likewise, one institution from each cate-
gory with the a reputation of being relatively restrictive concerning consulting
and faculty ties with industry. Thus, he reviewed the conflict-of-interest and con-
sulting policies of MIT, Johns Hopkins University (including those specific to the
medical school), the University of California, and the University of Washington,
available at http://www.mit.edu/afs/athena.mit.edu/org/p/jhursearch.jhu.edu/
ott/Inventors/conflict.asp/; http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/research/poli-
cies_conflict.html, http://www.ucop.edu/ott/consult.html; and http://www.cs.
washington.edu/faculty/facsenate/, respectively. Among these four policies, the
Johns Hopkins University conflict-of-interest and consulting policy was unique in
not specifically excluding any types of activities, but instead requiring that a rela-
tively wide range of activities be approved at the department head level and
sometimes also by the Medical School's Conflict of Interest Committee. Only
MIT's policies specifically addressed graduate students participating in consulting
and other outside activities. The University of Washington's policies had more
absolute prohibitions against certain activities (e.g., holding a line management
position in an outside company) than did the others.
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* It is rare to have more stringent obligations, including dis-
closure requirements, concerning consulting relationships
in companies that have an interest in the outcome of clinical
trials.
On the other hand, the policies often vary with respect to the
following issues, with some institutions not even requiring notifi-
cation:
" the extent to which university facilities can be used in sup-
port of consulting activities;
• the ability of faculty members and the graduate students
whom they supervise to work in the same outside com-
pany;
• the need for consulting activities to be approved in ad-
vance, and the level of approval required (department
heads, dean, provost, etc.);
" stock ownership; and,
• membership on scientific advisory boards.
The main purpose in discussing these issues is to lay the basis
for the later discussion of consulting and startup company forma-
tion by Japanese universities. As will be shown, the current official
Japanese policies regarding outside work are, on the surface, not
extremely different from the "typical" U.S. guidelines.
In summary, it appears that consulting is an important factor in
a two-way exchange of information between universities and in-
dustries, although to the Author's knowledge, this exchange has
not been carefully analyzed. Also, consulting has probably greatly
facilitated the formation of startup companies and their viability,
although this process also has not been thoroughly analyzed. Fi-
nally, consulting has given rise to complex and serious conflict-of-
interest issues, some of which will be discussed below.
2.1.4. Start-up Companies
For the purpose of this paper, startup companies are consid-
ered to be recently formed independent companies based upon
university discoveries. Usually such companies are exclusive li-
censees of patents or copyrights owned by a university, and their
business plans are based upon the development or commercializa-
tion of these or related technologies. University faculty or recent
graduate students often assume an important role as founders, ad-
visors or lead scientists.
Currently 350 to 400 startup companies are formed from U.S.
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academic institutions each year. About 3000 have been formed
since 1980, of which about 68% are still operational.51 In biomedi-
cine and biotechnology, there were approximately 1300 companies
in 1999, 300 of which had publicly traded stock.5 2 The vast major-
ity of these biotechnology companies probably had close links at
their founding with academic institutions.
The vast majority of investment capital for startups comes from
private sources (angel investors, venture capital funds, and estab-
lished companies). Particularly in drug development and other
biomedical fields, venture capital-financed startup companies play
a vital role in developing university discoveries to the point where
they become attractive to larger, more established companies.
However, in order for biomedical startups to attract private in-
vestment, they need clear, exclusive, and transferable IP rights to
their core technologies.
Governments, and sometimes, universities themselves, provide
more limited alternative sources of "capital." Most universities can
now take a limited equity stake (usually not more than 10 percent)
in some of their startups in lieu of up-front royalties when the uni-
versities exclusively license core technologies to these startups. In
addition, some universities have investment funds, which they can
use to direct investment in their startups. Under the U.S. govern-
ment's Small Business Innovative Research ("SBIR") Program,
startups and other small businesses can receive peer-reviewed,
competitively allocated, project-specific research support of up to
$750,000.53 SBIR funds often help to bridge the gap between aca-
demic research funding, primarily from government agencies such
as NIH, National Science Foundation ("NSF"), and the Department
of Defense, and private investment.
2.1.5. Conflicts of Interest
The main constraints on industry support for university R&D
arise from concerns about conflicts of interest on the part of corpo-
rate-funded university researchers - and the related need to pre-
51 AssociATIoN OF UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY MANAGERS ("AUTM"), AUTM LI-
CENSING SURVEY: FY 2000 SURVEY SUMMARY 14-15 (2002).
52 ERNST & YOUNG, CONVERGENCE: THE BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY REPORT 14
(2000), available at http://www.ey.com/industry/health.
53 Federal agencies with annual R&D budgets exceeding $100 million must
set aside 2.5% of these budgets to Small Business Innovative Research ("SBIR")
grants. 15 U.S.C. § 638 (2003).
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serve academic freedom, scientific objectivity, and the primacy of
academic goals.
A full discussion of conflict-of-interest principles and practices
is beyond the scope of this Article.54 A number of federal agencies
have regulations that establish minimal financial disclosure and
basic procedural requirements for universities and medical centers
applying for grants or contracts. For example, regulations issued
in 1995 by the U.S. Public Health Service ("PHS"') require that any
institution submitting an application for a grant or contract to a
PHS agency, such as the NIH, have first obtained a report from
each prospective investigator listing the investigator's "significant
financial interests" that (a) would reasonably appear to be affected
by the research for which PHS funding is sought, or (b) are in enti-
ties that would reasonably appear to be affected by the research.
"Significant financial interests" include salary or consulting fees
from companies totaling over $10,000 annually, stock holdings
over $10,000, patents, and royalties. If the institution receives the
award, it must report to the funding agency the existence of any
conflicting interest and assure the agency that the conflict "has
been managed, reduced, or eliminated."55 Other agencies have
similar disclosure policies.56 All of these federal regulations or
guidelines leave universities considerable discretion regarding
how to manage conflicts of interest and commitment. The Associa-
tion of American Universities has recently issued more compre-
hensive model guidelines.5 7
In order to avoid conflicts of interest that might endanger hu-
mans participating in biomedical research, the Association of
54 See Peter J. Harrington, Faculty Conflicts of Interest in an Age of Academic En-
trepreneurialism: An Analysis of the Problem, the Law and Selected University Policies,
27 J. C. & U. L. 775 (2001) (offering a recent analysis of conflicts of interest law in
an academic setting).
55 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.601-50.607 (2001), particularly §§ 50.603, 50.604(c)(1),
50.604(g) (2001). Identical regulations can be found at 45 C.F.R. §§ 94.2-94.6
(2002).
56 For example, the startup's "Investigator Financial Disclosure Policy" sets
forth similar requirements for NSF-funded researchers. 60 Fed. Reg. 35,820 (1995).
Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") regulations require that when companies
submit clinical trial data to the FDA for marketing approval of new drugs, they
must list all clinical investigators who conducted the clinical trials. They must
also disclose the financial interests of all academic (and other non-employee)
clinical investigators in the outcome of the trials. 21 C.F.R. § 54 (2002).
57 See ASS'N OF AM. UNIV., REPORT ON INDIVIDUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FINAN-
CIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST (2001) (outlining the Association's model guidelines),
available at http://www.aau.edu/ research/COI.01.pdf.
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American Medical Colleges has issued model guidelines.5 8 In what
appears to be the most strict recommendation so far by a major
academic association, the American Society of Gene Therapy re-
cently required that "all investigators and team members directly
responsible for patient selection, the informed consent process
and/or clinical management in a [human] trial not have equity,
stock options or comparable arrangements in companies sponsor-
ing the trial."59 Draft interim guidance issued by the PHS does not
call for the exclusion of persons with such interests from participat-
ing in clinical trials. But it does call for Institutional Review Boards
("IRBs") to review any financial arrangements between universities
and companies sponsoring clinical research sponsors, for conflict-
of-interest committees to review relationships between sponsoring
companies and individual clinical researchers, and for IRBs to con-
sider informing prospective research subjects of such relation-
ships.60 However, policies still vary considerably from institution
to institution.61 This is an area of active debate and changes in in-
stitutional policies.62
Patients (or their next of kin) have filed suits alleging harm as a
result of participating in clinical studies in which the academic re-
searchers had financial interests in the outcome that were not dis-
58 See ASS'N OF AM. MED. COLL., PROTECTING SUBJECTS, PRESERVING TRUST,
PROMOTING PROGRESS-POLICY AND GUIDELINES FOR THE OVERSIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL
FINANCIAL INTERESTS IN HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH (2001) (outlining the Associa-
tion's model guidelines), available at http://www.aamc.org/members/coitf/first
report.pdf.
59 Am. SOC'Y OF GENE THERAPY, POLICY OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF GENE
THERAPY ON FINANCIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN CLINICAL RESEARCH (2000), available
at http://www.asgt.org/policy/index.html.
60 U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., DRAFT INTERIM GUIDANCE, FINANCIAL RELATION-
SHIPS IN CLINICAL RESEARCH: ISSUES FOR INSTITUTIONS CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS AND
IRBs TO CONSIDER WHEN DEALING WITH ISSUES OF FINANCIAL INTEREST AND HUMAN
SUBJECT PROTECTION (2001), available at http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/human
subjects/finreltn/finguid.htm.
61 See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH: HHS DIREC-
TION NEEDED TO ADDRESS FINANCIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, Report No. GAO-02-89
(2001) (examining that differing conflict-of-interest policies of five universities),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0289.pdf; Harrington, supra note
54.
62 Jocelyn Kaiser, Proposed Rules Aim to Curb Financial Conflicts of Interest, 295
Sc. 246, 246,(2002) (presenting the debate in the medical community following the
implementation of new conflict-of-interest guidelines); Jerome P. Kassirer, Finan-
cial Conflict of Interest: An Unresolved Ethical Frontier, 27 AM. J. L. & MED. 149, 149-62
(2001); Kneller, Technology Transfer, supra note 7, at 766-68 (discussing NIH guide-
lines to increase access to "research tools" and restraints on publication).
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closed to the patients.63 However, there appear to be no cases to
date where the alleged cause of action is based on a violation of the
PHS or similar regulations.
2.2. U.S. Government Research Institutes
2.2.1. Sponsored Research Agreements
In 2000, GRIs, such as the NIH intermural laboratories, per-
formed 19 billion USD of R&D as compared with 30 billion USD in
universities. 64 In addition, 9 billion USD of federally funded R&D
was performed in Federally Funded Research and Development
Centers ("FFRDCs"). In some FFRDCs, discoveries are managed
by the administering organization under the terms of the Bayh-
Dole Law and Regulations. In others, the contract between the U.S.
government and the administering organization calls for discover-
ies to be managed as if they arose in a GRI.65 Since the 1960s, GRI
researchers have been required to assign work-related inventions
to the relevant government department,66 but until the mid-1980s,
these departments issued few licenses.67 The 1986 Federal Tech-
nology Transfer Act68 ("FTTA') gave individual GRIs authority to
apply for patents and license inventions by their employees. In
addition, the FTTA gave the laboratories authority to enter into
sponsored research agreements with private companies, under
which the companies could obtain IP rights to inventions arising
under the sponsored research. The FTTA designates such agree-
ments as "Cooperative Research and Development Agreements"
63 Harrington, supra note 54, at 797.
64 NAT'L Sci. BD., supra note 4, at A4-4.
65 For example, discoveries made in the Department of Defense's Lincoln
Laboratory (administered by MIT) and NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory (ad-
ministered by California Institute of Technology ("Caltech")) are subject to Bayh-
Dole and are managed by those respective universities' TLOs. However, tech-
nologies arising from DOE's Oak Ridge National Laboratory (administered by
Lockheed Martin Corporation) and DOE's Los Alamos National Laboratory (ad-
ministered by the University of California) are treated as if they arose in a GRI
and are subject to the Federal Technology Transfer Act (see text immediately be-
low). For a list of FFRDCs and their administering organizations, see http://
www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/nsfO2317/start. htm.
66 37 C.F.R. § 501 (2002); 45 C.F.R. § 7.3 (2002).
67 Kneller, Technology Transfer, supra note 7, at 769; See generally Eisenberg, su-
pra note 13, at 1698-1705 (arguing that allowing universities to retain patent rights
encourages commercial technology transfer).
68 15 U.S.C. § 3710a-d (2000).
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("CRADAs"). At least in the case of NIH and other laboratories
within the United States, PHS companies rarely, if ever, receive as-
signments of ownership in government inventions. Instead, the
PHS Model CRADA grants CRADA collaborators "an exclusive
option to elect an exclusive or nonexclusive commercialization li-
cense which is substantially in the form of the appropriate model
PHS license agreement."69
In this respect, corporate research sponsors obtain from GRIs
rights to inventions similar to those from universities. However,
additional restrictions apply to CRADAs that are not present in
sponsored research agreements with universities. The FTTA re-
quires that the government retain a nonexclusive, irrevocable,
paid-up license to any CRADA inventions, including those made
solely by employees of the CRADA partner.70 CRADA opportuni-
ties must be advertised in the Federal Register prior to execution,
unless the laboratory can demonstrate that only one company
could be a suitable partner for the particular research project. In
addition, individual laboratories may impose their own restric-
tions. The NIH is reluctant to use CRADA funds to pay part of the
salaries of permanent professional employees, although CRADA
funds are often used to hire postdoctoral-level researchers and
technicians. Thus, CRADAs are not a source of soft-money salary
support for tenured or tenure-track researchers -at least in NIH's
intramural laboratories. Also, the CRADA partner has only 30
days (plus an additional 30 days upon written request) to review
proposed publications of CRADA data in order to prepare patent
applications and to make sure that confidential information is not
divulged.7' There is no equivalent limitation in the Bayh-Dole Law
or Regulations.
The FTTA only allows research sponsors to receive assign-
ments or licenses to "inventions" - defined by the Bayh-Dole
amendments and other technology-transfer laws as "any invention
or discovery, which is or may be patentable or otherwise protected
under this title." 72 Copyright protection is not available for any
work of the U.S. government-defined as a work prepared by an
69 U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., MODEL COOPERATIVE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
AGREEMENT § 7.1 [hereinafter Model CRADA], available at http://www.ott.od.nih.
gov.
70 15 U.S.C. § 3710a(b)(A) (2000).
71 Model CRADA, supra note 69, at § 8.7.
72 35 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2000); 37 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) (2002).
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officer or employee of the U.S. government as part of that person's
official duties.73 Therefore, companies collaborating with GRIs are
not able to receive copyright to works produced under the research
they support in GRIs, although they often can receive copyright to
works produced in universities.
Unlike the Bayh-Dole Law and Regulations, the FTTA imposes
explicit obligations on GRIs to give preference to U.S. business
units when selecting CRADA partners. First, it obligates GRIs to
"give special consideration to small businesses," which as noted
above are defined as companies whose principal place of business
is in the United States and which are mostly owned by U.S. citizens
or permanent resident aliens.74 Second, it obligates GRIs to give
preference to business units located in the United States that agree
that products embodying or made using CRADA inventions will
be manufactured substantially in the United States. Before enter-
ing into a CRADA with a foreign-controlled organization, GRIs
should also take into consideration whether that foreign country
allows U.S. companies to enter into CRADA-like agreements with
its GRIs.75
2.2.2. Licensing
The above discussion concerning sponsored research agree-
ments has already introduced the main points regarding licensing
from GRIs. The 1986 FTTA76 is important because it gives individ-
ual laboratories the right to manage IP and resulting royalties.
However, the Bayh-Dole Law and Regulations77 place important
obligations on licenses by GRIs. Some of these obligations are
similar to those they place on licenses of federally funded univer-
sity inventions:
1) Exclusive licenses are subject to the irrevocable, royalty-free
right of the U.S. government to practice or have practiced
the invention on its behalf.78
2) Preference should be given to small businesses in the grant-
ing of exclusive licenses.79
73 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 105 (2000).
74 15 U.S.C. § 3710a(c)(4)(A) (2000). See also discussion supra note 31.
7 15 U.S.C. § 3710a(c)(4)(B) (2000).
76 See 15 U.S.C. § 3710a-d, supra note 69.
77 37 C.F.R. §§ 401, 404 (2002).
78 Id. at § 404.7(a)(2), (b)(2).
79 Id. at § 404.7(a)(1)(iv).
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However, in the following respects, the Bayh-Dole Regulations
place stricter requirements on the licensing of inventions from
GRIs:
1) The applicant must submit a development or marketing
plan when applying for either an exclusive or nonexclusive
license.80 The license must obligate the licensee to carry out
this development plan and make the benefits of the inven-
tion reasonably accessible to the public.81 Also, the licensee
must report periodically on its utilization of the invention.82
2) An exclusive or nonexclusive license that grants the right to
use the invention in the United States will normally be
granted only if the licensee agrees that any products em-
bodying the invention, or produced using the invention,
will be manufactured substantially in the United States.83
Taken together with the restrictions on entering into
CRADAs with non-U.S. business units, discussed in the
previous subsection, this amounts to more stringent restric-
tions on the transfer of GRI technologies to non-U.S. busi-
nesses or to businesses that will manufacture outside the
United States, instead of applying transfer of university
technologies. This issue is relevant to Japan's recent adop-
tion of the "Japan manufacturing preferences" discussed in
Section 3.4.
3) Sublicenses of either exclusive or nonexclusive licenses re-
quire approval of the federal agency.84 In contrast, univer-
sities do not need to approve sublicenses.
4) Absent special justification, exclusive licenses can be
granted only after publication of the licensing opportunity
in the Federal Register.85 Then, there must also be a Federal
Register notice identifying the invention and the prospec-
tive exclusive licensee, followed by opportunity for written
objections. 86 Finally, the federal agency must determine
that an exclusive license is necessary to attract the private
80 Id. at § 404.5(a)(1).
81 Id. at § 404.5(b)(5).
82 Id. at § 404.5(b)(6).
83 Id. at § 404.5(2).
84 Id. at § 404.5(b)(4). The regulations pertaining to universities let the uni-
versities themselves decide whether sublicenses require university approval.
85 Id. at § 404.7(a)(1).
86 Id. at § 404.7(a)(1)(i).
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investment needed to develop the invention and that the
public interest is best served by granting an exclusive li-
cense.87
Details of the evolution of technology transfer from GRIs and
summary statistics showing the extent of licensing from some of
the major GRIs are in another publication available online.88 Since
1994, the NIH and the other U.S. PHS laboratories have had a
clearly articulated policy to issue exclusive licenses only if they are
necessary to ensure sufficient incentives to develop PHS inven-
tions-although inventions arising under CRADAs are exempt
from this policy.89
2.2.3. Conflicts of Interest
The FTTA requires agencies to establish standards of conduct
to avoid conflicts of interest with respect to CRADAs. In addition,
various federal laws set forth conflict-of-interest and ethics policies
applicable to CRADAs. An analysis of these policies is beyond the
scope of this paper, except to note the following: at least in the
case of the NIH, key NIH scientists involved in a prospective
CRADA must disclose their financial interests. Before the CRADA
is approved, the designated ethics counselor of their institute(s)
must certify either that a conflict of interest does not exist or that
possible conflicts have been considered and appropriate waivers
made. In general, stock holdings valued below $5000 are consid-
ered waivable.90 Outside activities drawing upon work-related
skills, including outside employment, service on a board of direc-
tors, and consultation agreements, must be preapproved by ethics
counselors.91 Generally, it is not permitted to be involved in a
87 Id. at § 404.7(a)(1)(ii).
88 Kneller, Technology Transfer, supra note 7, at 769-70.
89 Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Technology Transfer, Pub-
lic Health Service ("PHS'), NIH, to various directors at NIH, PHS, and the Office
of Technology Transfer (referencing Amended Information and Information
Memorandum No. OTT-94-305, "Procedures for Making Determinations Regard-
ing the Grant of Exclusive or Partially Exclusive Licenses") (Aug. 10, 1995) (on file
with author).
90 See NATL INST. HEALTH, NIH POLICY MANUAL 2300-735-1, AVOIDING CON-
FLICTS OF INTEREST 10 (1998) (noting only financial interests in excess of $5,000 cre-
ate a conflict of interest), available at http://ethics.od.nih.gov.
91 See NAT'L INST. HEALTH, NIH POLICY MANUAL 2300-735-4, OUTSIDE WORK
AND RELATED ACTIVITIES wITH OUTSIDE ORGANIZATIONS 6-13 (1998) (discussing
permissibility of, and protocol, concerning NIH employees' activities with outside
organizations), available at http://ethics.od.nih.gov.
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CRADA with a company in which one is engaged in such outside
activities.92 Thus, conflict-of-interest rules governing researchers
who have financial interests in companies sponsoring collaborative
research are generally stricter in the case of GRIs than universities.
2.3. Salient Features of the U.S. System
In summary, under the U.S. system, the research institutions
themselves have ownership rights and they themselves manage
technology development. Regulations are targeted to ensure:
* complete reporting;
" residual government rights in government-funded inven-
tions;
* that inventors share in royalties;
* a preference for licensing to small businesses;
* a U.S. manufacturing preference for government-funded
inventions; and
* in the case of GRI inventions, fair access to government-
funded discoveries.
The scope of sponsored research and licensing involving pri-
vate companies is substantial. The most controversial issues today
concern issues of:
* conflicts of interest and conflicts of commitment;
• the preservation of academic freedom and scientific objec-
tivity;
" protection of human research subjects;
* the appropriate balance between commercial and curiosity-
motivated research;
• the appropriate balance between exclusive and nonexclu-
sive licenses;
* the appropriate balance between licenses to faculty startup
companies and licenses to established companies; and
* the concern that multiple and sometimes overlapping IP
rights, particularly in early-stage inventions, might hinder
technology development.
92 See NAT'L INST. HEALTH, NIH POLICY MANUAL 2300-735-1, supra note 90, at
10 (delineating conflict-of-interest rules).
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3. THE JAPANESE SYSTEM
3.1. Japanese Universities
3.1.1. Background
Japanese national universities, which account for at least 75%
of university R&D and include Japan's most prestigious universi-
ties,93 have no independent administrative or financial status.
They are branches of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports,
Science and Technology ("MEXT"), and thus their laboratories are
Japanese government laboratories. With a few exceptions, all of
their faculty and administrators are civil servants. Faculty salaries
are fixed nationwide based primarily on number of years in ser-
vice. Advanced degrees and number and quality of publications
have only a small effect on salaries. Soft-money supplementation
of the salaries of civil servants, including all full-time academic re-
searchers in national universities, is forbidden. Until recently, op-
portunities to use soft money to pay salaries or stipends for secre-
taries, technicians, graduate students, and postdoctoral researchers
were severely limited, and restrictions still exist, as described be-
low. The administrative staffs of national universities are career
MEXT bureaucrats who usually spend two years in one adminis-
trative office and then rotate to another, sometimes in a different
university. Often they do not develop in-depth knowledge of, or
loyalty towards, the particular research center in which they hap-
pen to be stationed. Therefore, in terms of administration, finance,
and personnel, Japanese national universities are significantly dif-
ferent from U.S. universities.
Constraints on technology transfer from nonuniversity GRIs
have traditionally been even greater. However, significant reforms
have recently occurred in the GRIs that have become "independent
administrative entities."94 Many of these quasi independent GRIs
have leapfrogged national universities in terms of openness to co-
operation with industry.
The national universities themselves are scheduled to become
93 See Kneller, Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 2 ("[Mlost highly regar-
ded universities are National Universities,.. . Most of the National Universities
have graduate schools, and they account for approximately 75% of total R&D ex-
penditures.").
94 Japanese: doku-ritsu gyou-sei hou-jin.
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independent administrative entities in 2004. Section 3.1.7 will dis-
cuss these university reforms.
A few private universities are highly regarded researcher cen-
ters. Subsection 3.1.6 will summarize technology transfers from
such institutions.
3.1.2. Sponsored Research Agreements with Industry
It has been difficult for corporations to support research in
Japanese universities in a manner that creates incentives for effec-
tive technology development. The main legal/administrative
problems involve:
" limitations on the IP rights sponsors can obtain;
" barriers to the smooth disbursement of corporate research
support; and
" restrictions on the use of such funds to employ and moti-
vate people.
Thus, the technology-transfer issues that confront Japan in part
reflect IP issues that were current in the United States in pre-Bayh-
Dole, pre-FTTA era. But they also reflect legal and institutional
barriers to university-industry cooperation that have not existed
for decades in the United States.
This Subsection discusses these problems, some of the meas-
ures that have been devised to cope with them, recent reforms, and
some of the social and institutional factors that affect the effective-
ness sponsored research. It first analyzes formal contractual
agreements, i.e., Commissioned or Joint Research Contracts. Next,
it discusses "Donations," which in theory are charitable gifts but
are, in fact, a widely used informal mechanism for companies to
sponsor research in universities.
3.1.2.1. Commissioned and Joint Research Contracts
If a company intends to support research in a national
university based upon a written research protocol, or if it wants
contractually based rights to data or intellectual property, then it
must enter into either a "Commissioned" or "Joint Research"
contract with the university administration. 95  The principal
95 These are specific types of contracts embodying specific administrative re-
strictions and obligations. The transliterated Japanese term for Commissioned
Research is jutaku kenkyuu and for Joint Research is kyoudou kenkyuu, which is an
abbreviation of the formal term, "Joint Research with Private Sector Entities and
the Like." Japanese: minkan nado to no kyoudou kenkyuu.
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difference between these two types of agreements is that company
researchers can work in university laboratories under Joint
Research Contracts, but not under Commissioned Research
Contracts.
3.1.2.1.1. IP and Data Rights
3.1.2.1.1.1. Overview
The guidelines governing Commissioned or Joint Research
Contracts are set forth in "guidance notifications" ("Notifications")
issued by the MEXT or its predecessor, the Ministry of Education,
Science, Sports and Culture ("Monbusho," the official Japanese
name),96 Notifications are neither laws nor regulations, but rather
administrative guidance indicating what government ministries
consider to be permissible behavior.97 The principal Notifications
96 In 2001, Monbusho and the Science and Technology Agency ("STA")
merged to form MEXT. Monbusho was responsible for most aspects of education
from kindergarten to advanced graduate level research institutes. Traditionally,
Monbusho left considerable authority in the hands of professors and their univer-
sities. It was known as a relatively "bottom-up" ministry, at least as far as control
over university affairs was concerned. STA managed big budget national space
and nuclear energy programs as well as other R&D programs in areas such as
deep sea exploration, genomics, and brain research. STA laboratories had their
own research staffs, which with a few exceptions, were not closely involved in
graduate-level training. STA had the reputation of having a "top-down" style of
administration. As described below, it also tried to position itself as a technology
management agency for other national and local government R&D organizations.
The integration within MEXT of the contrasting cultures and missions of Mon-
busho and STA is still incomplete.
97 Since 1992, many of the Notifications related to university-industry coop-
eration have been compiled in a book, DAIGAKU TO SANGYOUKAI TO NO KENKYUU
KYOURYOKU JIMU HIKKEI, DAINIJI KAITEIBAN [ADMINISTRATIVE HANDBOOK FOR RE-
SEARCH COOPERATION BETWEEN UNIVERSITIES AND INDUSTRY] (1992) (in Japanese,
published by a semi-official publishing house, "Gyousei") [hereinafter HANDBOOK
FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION 1992]. The Fourth Edition, published in 2002, con-
tains substantially more information than the Third Edition published just two
years earlier, which in turns contains substantially more information than the Sec-
ond Edition published in 1997. These compilations, as well as postings on the
Internet under the home pages of major government ministries, make many (but
not all) of the important Notifications accessible to those who know where to look.
Nevertheless, the Notifications have taken on a life of their own and assumed
authority at least as great as that of regulations under U.S. law. This authority is
due largely to the practice of government officials at all levels rotating to different
positions approximately every two years. New transferees into positions related
to university-industry cooperation often have no previous experience in this area.
The Notifications provide their main guidance, just as they do for the persons
above and below them in the administrative hierarchy. Thus, bureaucrats at all
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governing Commissioned or Joint Research Contracts are:
* Notification No. 260 of 1970,98 which established the
administrative rules and some of the IP ground rules for
Commissioned Research Contracts;
* Notification No. 117 of 1978,99 which set forth two tests to
determine when a national university invention should
belong to the nation rather than to the faculty-inventor.
However, the applicability of this notification to company-
funded Commissioned or Joint Research inventions was not
clear until the issuance of Notification No. 163 of 1999;
administrative levels have strong incentives to comply with the Notifications.
During their tenures in a particular position, few bureaucrats develop enough
knowledge, conviction, and authority to make changes. The bureaucrats are in-
deed caught in their own web, able neither to understand all of the effects of the
Notifications nor to change them.
Changes are usually initiated from the outside-not by persons responsible
for university-industry cooperation, but rather by senior ad hoc advisory commit-
tees, reform minded officials in other ministries with powerful political backing,
and new laws requiring a revision of existing Notifications. However, few out-
side government officials, university researchers, companies, or members of the
public or their elected representatives, grasp the complete web of rules created by
the various Notifications. Thus the complexity of the Notifications and the imper-
sonal way they are administered greatly reduces the obvious targets for change
for reform-minded outsiders. In other words, change is possible, but not easy.
Furthermore, implementing reforms (i.e., rationalizing the Notifications and re-
ducing the bureaucratic inertia that undergirds existing practices) is even more
difficult. See, e.g., infra note 135.
98 Jutaku Kenkyuu no Tori-atsukai ni tsuite: Kaikei Kachou, Daigaku Gaku-
jutsu Kyokuchou Tsuuchi Mon-kai-sou Nado 260 gou [Handling of Commis-
sioned Research: Monbusho Accounting-General Affairs Notification No. 2601
(Apr. 30, 1970) (amended by Notification Nos. 115 of 1988 and 184 of 1997), in
DAIGAKU TO SANGYOUKAI TO NO KENKYUU KYOURYOKU JIMU HIKKEI, DAINIJI KAmI-
BAN [ADMINISTRATIVE HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION BETWEEN UNIVERSI-
TIES AND INDUSTRY] (2d ed. 1997) (in Japanese, published by Gyousei) [hereinafter
HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION 1997].
99 Kokuritsu Daigaku nado no Kyoukan nado no Hatsumei ni kakawaru
Tokkyo nado no Tori-atsukai in Tsuite: Gakujutsu Kokusai Kyokuchou, Kaikei
Kachou Tsuuchi Mon-gaku-jutsu nado 117 gou [Handling of Patents Relating to
Inventions of National University Faculty: Monbusho Science Notification No.
117] (Mar. 25, 1978) (amended by Notifications No. 138 of 1987, No. 163 of 1997,
and No. 163 of 1999), in DAIGAKU TO SANGYOUKAI TO NO KENKYUU KYOURYOKU JIMU
HIKKEI, DAINIJI KAITEIBAN [ADMINISTRATIVE HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION
BETWEEN UNIVERSITIES AND INDUSTRY] (4th ed. 2002) (in Japanese, published by Gy-
ousei) [hereinafter HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION 2002], available at
http://www.mext.go.jp/a-menu/shinkou/sangaku/index.htm.
For a version prior to the amendment by Notification No. 163 of 1999, see
HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION 1997, supra note 98.
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" Notification No. 195 of 1983,100 which established the
administrative structure and some of the IP rules governing
Joint Research Contracts;
• Notification No. 172 of 1984,101 which established
procedures for licensing inventions arising under
Commissioned or Joint Research Contracts;
* Notification No. 163 of 1999,102 which modifies No. 117 of
1978103 and specifically addresses Commissioned or Joint
Research inventions;
" Notification No. 230 of 2000,104 which permits transfer of
ownership of Joint Research inventions to the sponsoring
companies, provided they pay "appropriate compensation"
to the national treasury and the transfer is expected to
result in development of the invention; and,
* Notification No. 292 of 2001,105 the latest in a series of
Notifications revising and replacing No. 260 of 1970
pertaining to Commissioned Research Contracts.
In addition, two laws, which on their face have little connection
100 Minkan nado to no Kyoukou Kenkyuu no Toriatsukai ni tsuite: Gakujutsu
Kokusai Kyokuchou, Kaikei Kachou Tsuuchi Mon-gaku-jo nado 195 gou [Han-
dling Joint Research: Monbusho Science Notification No. 195] (May 11, 1983)
(amended by Notifications No. 172 of 1984 and No. 186 of 1997), in HANDBOOK FOR
RESEARCH COOPERATION 2002, supra note 99, at 278-82, available at http://www.
mext.go.jp/ajmenu/shinkou/sangaku/index.htm.
101 Jutaku Kenkyuu oyobi Minkan nado to no Kyoudou Kenkyuu ni
kakawaru Tokkyo nado no Jisshi nado ni tsuite: Gakujutsu Kokusai Kyokuchou,
Kaikei Kachou Tsuuchi Mon-gaku-jo nado 172 gou [Licensing of Patents Related
to Commissioned Research and Joint Research: Monbusho Science Notification
No. 172] (May 8, 1984) (amended by Notification No. 186 of 1997), in HANDBOOK
FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION 2002, supra note 99, at 434-35, available at http://www.
mext.go.jp/amenu/shinkou/sangaku/index.htm.
102 "Kokuritsu Daigaku nado no Kyoukan nado no Hatsumei ni kakawaru
Tokkyo nado no Tori-atsukai in Tsuite" no ichibu Kaisei ni tsuite (tsuuchi): Mon-
gaku-jo nado 163 gou [Notification Partially Revising Handling of Patents Relat-
ing to Inventions of National University Faculty: Monbusho Science Notification
No. 1631 (Mar. 24, 1999) (in Japanese) (copy on file with author).
103 HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION 2002, supra note 99.
104 Kokuritsu Daigaku nado ni o tsukeru tokkyo nado no soshiki-teki na
kanri, katsuyou no suishin ni tsuite (tsuuchi): Mon-gaku-jo nado 230 gou [Promot-
ing the organizational management and usefulness of patents from national uni-
versities: Monbusho Science Notification No. 2301 (Dec. 27, 2000) (in Japanese)
(copy on file with author).
105 Jutaku Kenkyuu no Tori-atsukai ni tsuite: Kenkyuu Shinkou Kyokuchou,
Kaikei Kachou Tsuuchi 12 Mon-ka-shin nado 292 gou [Handling of Commis-
sioned Research: MEXT Science Notification No. 292] (Mar. 30, 2001) in HAND-
BOOK FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION 2002, supra note 99, at 331-46.
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with sponsored research in universities, also have important impli-
cations for Commissioned or Joint Research contracts:
1) The Finance Law' 06 § 14 states: "All revenue and income
must be included in the national budget."
2) The General Accounts Law' 07 § 2 states: "The director of
each ministry or agency should pay income under his
jurisdiction into the national treasury. The money cannot
be used directly."
MEXT and the Ministry of Finance ("MOF") have interpreted
these two laws to mean that even if research funds come from
private companies, because the research takes place in national
universities where it is used for public service, these funds cannot
be regarded as private funds. Rather they must be included in the
appropriate (national) budget income and expenditure accounts 08
Coupled with the above provisions of the Finance and General
Accounts Laws, the above mentioned Notifications have the fol-
lowing principal effects:
1) Commissioned or Joint Research contracts can be
negotiated directly between between national universities
and corporate sponsors 09 However, the basic terms of
these contracts are set by MEXT.110
2) Funds must be disbursed through the MOF which deducts
30 percent as "overhead" to augment the national higher
education budget. No overhead payments are distributed
directly to the university or the inventor."'
3) Inventors probably should report all potentially
commercially valuable Commissioned or Joint Research
106 Zaisei Hou [Financial Law], Law No. 34 of 1947, available at
http://www.houko.com/00/FS-SE.HTM (last visited May 7,2003).
107 Kaikei Hou [General Accounts Law], Law No. 35 of 1947, available at
http://www.houko.com (last visited May 7, 2003).
08 HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION 2002, supra note 99, at 2.
109 Notification No. 260 of 1970, in HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION
1997, supra note 98; Notification No. 195 of 1983, in HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH Co-
OPERATION 2002, supra note 99; Notification No. 292 of 2001, in HANDBOOK FOR RE-
SEARCH COOPERATION 2002, supra note 99.
110 Kyoudou Kenkyuu Keiyaku Sho Uoint Research Contract] in HANDBOOK
FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION 2002, supra note 99, at 119-43; Jutaku Kenkyuu Kei-
yaku Sho [Commissioned Research Contract] in HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH COOP-
ERATION 2002, supra note 99, at 164-74.
111 Written communication from University of Tokyo (Mar. 19, 2002) (on file
with author). HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION 2002, supra note 99, at 34-35.
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inventions to their university's "Invention Committee."
112
4) Any patentable or commercially useful inventions should
be owned or co-owned by the university as the
representative of the nation.113 The complex basis for this
far-reaching conclusion is discussed in the next subsection.
5) However, corporate sponsors of Commissioned Research
can prenegotiate the right to receive a portion of the
university's ownership right to any resulting patentable
inventions.114 The prenegotiated terms may also allow the
company, once it receives assignment of a portion of the
university's right, to pay the majority of patent prosecution
costs and to control the patent application process. Alterna-
tively, the company can request from the university presi-
dent a 10-year renewable preferential license,115 which is es-
sentially an exclusive license with development and royalty
payment obligations and government "march in" rights
(i.e., compulsory licensing rights in emergency situa-
tions).116 Not surprisingly, most companies opt to negotiate
for co-ownership.17
6) Corporate sponsors of Joint Research can also prenegotiate
similar co-ownership rights. If one of the sponsor's
employees is a co-inventor, co-ownership is automatic, and
the sponsor and university can jointly decide upon the
patent application strategy and allocation of ownership
rights.1' 8
112 Compare Notification No. 195 of 1983, in HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH COOP-
ERATION 2002, supra note 99, at § 5(6)1, (requiring the reporting of inventions made
under Joint Research Contracts), with Notification No. 260 of 1970, in HANDBOOK
FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION 1997, supra note 98; Notification No. 292 of 2001, in
HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION 2002, supra note 99; and Notification No.
172 of 1984, in HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION 2002, supra note 99 (em-
bodying a strong collective presumption towards the reporting of Commissioned
Research inventions).
113 Notification No. 163 of 1999, supra note 102.
114 Notification No. 292 of 2001 in HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION
2002, supra note 99, at 331-46.
115 Japanese: yuu-sen jisshi ken.
116 Notification No. 172 of 1984 in HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION
2002, supra note 99, at 434-35.
117 Records of the University of Tokyo's Invention Committee indicate that
since at least 1997, the University has not received any royalties for preferential
licenses (on file with author). Oral communications in 2002 with the Committee
secretariat indicate that probably no such licenses have been issued.
118 When all inventors are university personnel, the sponsor has no explicit
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7) In the case of commercial sales, the company is obligated to
pay royalties to the national treasury, although none of
these royalties will flow directly to the university or the
inventor."19
8) Under Article 73(1)(3) of Japan's Patent Law,120 the
approval of all co-owners is necessary for any licenses or
assignments to third parties. A nonexclusive license' 2'
needs only the prior approval of the university's property
management office, 122 with later notification to MEXT. A
preferential license requires approval of the university
president.123 However, full exclusive licenses' 24 must be
approved in advanced by the MEXT Minister.125 Discussions
with university scientists, company officials, and managers
of venture capital funds indicate that the restrictions and
right to obtain co-ownership. For more detailed information, see Joint Research
Contract, in HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION 2002, supra note 110; Notifica-
tion No. 260 of 1970, in HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION 1997, supra note 98;
and Notification No. 292 of 2001, in HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION 2002,
supra note 105. Nevertheless, University of Tokyo Invention Committee records
and conversations with company representatives suggest that sponsors of Joint
Research almost always obtain the right to jointly apply for patents. Also, com-
panies say that they prefer the IP rights provisions of Joint Research as opposed to
Commissioned Research contracts. The Author is not sure whether most of the
jointly-filed Joint Research patent applications list both university and sponsor
inventors, or whether listed sponsor inventors actually merit designation as in-
ventors.
119 Notification No. 260 of 1970, in HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION
1997, supra note 98; Notification No. 195 of 1983, in HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH CO-
OPERATION 2002, supra note 100; Notification No. 172 of 1984, in HANDBOOK FOR RE-
SEARCH COOPERATION 2002, supra note 101; and, Notification No. 292 of 2001, in
HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION 2002, supra note 105.
120 Tokkyo Hou [Patent Law], Law No. 121 of 1959, § 121, available in English
at http://www.jpo.go.jp.
121 Japanese: tsuu-jou jisshi ken.
122 Japanese: jimukyoku kanzaika. Written communication from University of
Tokyo, Office of Cooperative Research, to the Author (Jan. 21, 2002) (on file with
author).
123 See infra note 139.
124 Japanese: doku-sen tsuu-jou jisshi ken, which allows the licensor to retain a
use right, or sen-you jisshi ken, under which the licensor yields even use rights and
which must be registered in the Japanese Patent Office. Patent Law, supra note
120, at § 98.
125 Written communication from MEXT (Feb. 12, 2002). The more stringent
approval requirements associated with higher degrees of exclusivity derive from
the National Properties Law (§§ 2, 3, 21) and the Finance Law (§ 9) which require
approval and appropriate compensation for any alienation of national property.
See infra note 128; Financial Law, supra note 106.
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uncertainty regarding third-party transfers is the most
problematic aspect of Commissioned or Joint Research from
an IP perspective. Restrictions on the transferability of
exclusive IP rights are particularly onerous for startup
companies.
9) Under Article 73(2) of Japan's Patent Law,126 each co-owner
of a patent has the right to exploit the invention without the
consent of the other co-owners unless otherwise prescribed
by contract. Although the Author knows of no case of a
Japanese university competing with one of its patent co-
owners, the possibility of such competition is of concern to
some companies contemplating Commissioned or Joint
Research with universities as well as venture funds
considering investing in such companies.
127
3.1.2.1.1.2. Details of ownership and invention reporting
This Section provides details on ownership of inventions made
in Japanese universities. Despite the centrality of ownership to
technology transfer, ownership remains the most complicated and
ambiguous aspect of Commissioned or Joint Research. Readers
who are short of time or who wish to accept the above summary of
ownership at face value may skip this Section, perhaps returning to
it while reading Section 3.1.3 on licensing.
Prior to 1978, there was a presumption based upon the Na-
tional Properties Law' 28 that all inventions made in national uni-
versities belonged to the nation. Furthermore, such inventions
should be patented and licensed nonexclusively by central gov-
ernment bureaus-with the limited exception noted under (5)
above, enabling sponsors of Commissioned Research to co-own in-
ventions.129 However, as corporate interest in university discover-
126 Patent Law, supra note 120, at § 73(2).
127 There is no precedent for a university signing a noncompetition contract
with a company sponsoring Commissioned or Joint Research. Any such contract
would require time-consuming approval from senior MEXT officials. However,
under Notification No. 172 of 1984, the president of a national university probably
could grant a preferential license of the university's rights to the sponsor, under
which the university president could probably commit his university to not
commercially exploit the invention. Notification No. 172 of 1982, in HANDBOOK
FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION 2002, supra note 101.
128 Kokuyuu Zaisan Hou [National Properties Law], Law No. 73 of 1948,
available at http://www.houko.com/00/01/S23/073.htm.
129 Notification No. 260 of 1970, in HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION
1997, supra note 98.
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ies grew during the 1970s, pressure mounted, as it also did in the
United States, to lower barriers to university-industry cooperation.
Japanese academics had always retained copyright over copyright-
able materials. Some officials in Monbusho reasoned by analogy
that national university faculty members should retain IP rights to
their patentable discoveries. Discussions with the MOF resulted in
a compromise under which an invention that met either of the fol-
lowing criteria would be designated as a "National Invention," the
ownership of which would automatically belong to the nation: 130
1) the invention arose as a result of research performed using
special funding from the nation for projects aimed at the
development of practical applications; or
2) the invention arose as a result of research performed utiliz-
ing special research facilities (such as nuclear power re-
search facilities and particle accelerators) established for
use in government-sponsored research and under a specific
research project aimed at developing practical applications.
If neither criteria applied, the faculty inventor could maintain
ownership. This compromise was embodied in Monbusho Notifi-
cation No. 117 of 1978.131
A literal reading of Notification No. 117 might imply that
Commissioned or Joint Research Projects funded only by private
companies would not meet either of the criteria for classification as a
National Invention and therefore would not have to be reported.
However, as noted above, MEXT and the MOF have interpreted
the Finance and General Account Laws 32 to mean that project-
specific private sector funds must be included in the appropriate
national budget income and expenditure accounts. It follows that
these funds have to be dispersed first from the company to the
MOF, which then disperses the funds to MEXT, which then
disperses the funds to the universities.
Notification No. 163 of 1999133 amended Notification No. 117 of
1978 to explicitly address ownership of Commissioned or Joint Re-
search inventions. The two criteria for classifying an invention as
130 See infra note 142 (regarding whether transfer of ownership to the nation is
self executing).
131 Notification No. 117 of 1978, in HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION
2002, supra note 99.
132 See Financial Law, supra note 106. See also General Accounts Law, supra
note 107.
133 Notification No. 163 of 1999, supra note 102.
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belonging to the nation now read as follows:
1) The invention arose as a result of research performed using
special research funds provided by the nation for a specific
research project aimed at developing practical applica-
tions -including Joint Research funds, Commissioned Re-
search funds, and MEXT Grants-in-Aid, but excluding gen-
eral research expenses such as faculty research allowances
and Donations.
2) The invention arose as a result of research performed using
special large-scale facilities established specially by the na-
tion, such as atomic reactors, nuclear fusion facilities and
atomic article accelerators (but excluding general purpose
equipment such as computers); and under a specific re-
search project aimed at developing practical applications.
The main change is the explicit classification of Commissioned
or Joint Research, as well as Grant-in-Aid, inventions as "National
Inventions," provided they arise under project-specific funds that
envisaged practical applications of the research results. 34
Notification No. 117 of 1978 and No. 163 of 1999 also obligate
each national university to establish an "invention committee," as
well as procedures under which faculty members report inventions
to their university president. The president, acting upon the advice
of the invention committee, will decide whether the reported in-
ventions should be designated as "National Inventions" on the ba-
sis of the above two criteria.135 In order to implement Notification
134 In addition, some Notifications convey a strong presumption that all
Commissioned or Joint Research inventions should be classified as National In-
ventions, although the government can transfer a portion of its rights to private
sponsors. See Notification No. 260 of 1970, in HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH COOPERA-
TION 1997, supra note 98, at § 2(2); Notification No. 292 of 2001, in HANDBOOK FOR
RESEARCH COOPERATION 2002, supra note 105, at § 2(2); Notification No. 195 of
1983, in HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION 2002, supra note 100, at § 5(6)4;
Notification No. 172 of 1984, in HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION 2002, supra
note 101.
135 University administrators also play a significant behind the scenes role in
the work of the Invention Committees. Committee meetings are usually held
once or twice a year and deal with policy issues and a review of statistical data.
There is hardly ever discussion about specific inventions. Instead, reports of in-
ventions have already been dealt with at the department or center level. Usually
department level administrative personnel ask the inventor to fill out a short
questionnaire that asks in general terms about sources of funding, whether the
funding was project-specific and whether the invention is patentable. The inven-
tor's answers determine whether she can retain ownership. Answers are hardly
ever questioned. The process is pro forma. The administrative staff responsible
for processing the inventor's answers are usually not familiar with the intricacies
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No. 117 of 1978, some universities, such as the Tokyo Institute of
Technology and Tohoku University, enacted strict internal rules
that require reporting of all inventions made with project-specific
government funds, as well as all inventions arising under Commis-
sioned or Joint Research Contracts.136 However, the University of
Tokyo's internal regulations permit faculty members to judge whether
their inventions fall under one of the criteria for classification as a Na-
tional Invention. If a University of Tokyo inventor feels confident
that these criteria do not apply to his invention, he is not required
to report.137 Several other national universities follow the Univer-
sity of Tokyo's lead with respect to invention reporting.
Thus, on balance, it becomes clear that national universities,
acting on behalf of the nation, should have an ownership interest
in all Commissioned or Joint Research inventions, even those
funded entirely by private sector corporations. However, as the
above discussion indicates, this conclusion is not always obvious to
university researchers, corporate collaborators, private investment
funds, or even university administrators. Although most realize
that the government maintains at least partial ownership, the Au-
thor has found uncertainty and occasionally fundamental misun-
derstanding concerning ownership among some university admin-
istrators and corporate executives. Even senior university and
government officials responsible for university-industry coopera-
tion have difficulty explaining the basis for the government's own-
ership interest. In summary, the laws and Notifications that estab-
lish the government's ownership interest:
* lack clarity and are administered in a pro forma manner by
rank-and-file university administrators (if unusual situa-
of invention ownership. They simply follow set procedures to comply with appli-
cable Notifications. This is another example of how the complex web of adminis-
trative guidance Notifications turns the technology transfer process into a pro
forma bureaucratic exercise that ensures surface-level compliance with rigid rules,
and thereby forecloses meaningful debate by persons with ostensible responsibil-
ity to oversee and improve the process. See HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH COOPERA-
TION 1992, supra note 97.
136 Toukyou Kougyou Daigaku Hatsumei Kisoku [Tokyo Institute of Tech-
nology Invention Rules] (1978) (on file with author); Touhoku Daigaku Kyoukan
nado Hatsumei Tori-atsukai Kitei [Tohoku University Rules for Handling Faculty
Inventions (1978)] (on file with author).
137 Toukyou Daigaku Hatsumei Kisoku [University of Tokyo Invention
Rules] Nos. 3-5 (1979) (amended 1993); Toukyou Daigaku Hatsumei Kisoku Sai-
soku [Regulations Implementing the University of Tokyo Invention Rules] (1984)
(amended 1989) (on file with author).
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tions arise, higher-level bureaucrats are hesitant to make
precedent-setting decisions);
" fail to provide incentives for any university or MEXT office
to monitor Commissioned or Joint Research inventions; and
" create an uneven or weak obligation to report inventions,
leading to the absence of data to assess the effectiveness of
technology transfer.
The implications of these shortcomings are addressed below.
3.1.2.1.1.3. Third-party transfers: Additional
considerations
A corporate sponsor that co-owns a Commissioned or Joint
Research invention need only obtain approval from the president
of the co-owning university in order to issue a preferential license
to another company.138 A preferential license is similar to a typical
exclusive license from a U.S. university or a sublicense. 139 In
theory, obtaining approval from a university president need not be
difficult or time-consuming. Nevertheless, this Author knows of
only two cases of royalty-earning transfers of rights to
Commissioned or Joint Research inventions. One involved a
license of a Joint Research invention from a major national
university to an affiliate of the sponsor, a regional gas company.
The other involved a Joint Research invention co-owned by the
sponsoring company (Company A) and a major national university
that company A wanted to transfer to another company (Company
B). The mechanism to affect this transfer was not a preferential
license. Rather, the university's TLO requested assignment of the
university's/nation's ownership interest under Notification No.
230 of 2000.140 Then the TLO planned to assign or exclusively
license this interest to Company B. Negotiating the transfer from
the university to its TLO took two years. Frequent consultations
between university administrators and central MEXT bureaucrats
138 Written communication from MEXT to Author (Apr. 2002). This message
cited Notification No. 172 of 1984 as authority, even though this Notification
speaks only about the authority of a national university president to issue a pref-
erential license for the university's/nation's interest. Notification No. 172 of 184,
in HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION 2002, supra note 101. Evidently, this
authority is now recognized within MEXT as the basis for authorizing the
university president to approve a preferential license of the sponsor's interest to a
third party.
139 See infra § 2.1.2.
140 Notification No. 230 of 2000, supra note 104.
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probably occurred. The transfer was finally approved in June 2002.
The "fair value" of the nation's/university's interest was
ultimately assessed at less than $400, which the TLO paid to the
MOF's national university account. During the negotiations, the
fact that a licensee, company B, had been identified had to be
officially disguised.
This example shows the ardous process entailed in transferring
the nation's co-ownership interest in company-sponsored
Commissioned or Joint Research inventions. Despite the facts that
(a) Notification No. 230 of 2000 allows the sponsoring company to
receive the government's ownership share if it pays appropriate
consideration, (b) the value of the nation's interest was ultimately
decided to be trivial, and (c) Notification No. 230 does not require
approval by central MEXT Authorities, the process took numerous
peison-hours and indeed involved central MEXT officials. This
case provides a clue as to why there are few transfers to third
parties of the nation's co-ownership rights. Even an application for
a preferential license would meet unexpected delays as university
administrators at the department level and the president's office
debated the request and consulted with central MEXT bureaucrats.
The next subsection examines another likely reason: the ability to
avoid the designation of "Commissioned" or "Joint Research"
invention.
3.1.2.1.1.4. Practical implications
Even though clear understanding of technology transfer laws
and Notifications is rare, there is a pervasive impression that
classification as a Commissioned or Joint Research invention
means commercialization will be difficult. Therefore, there is a
widespread incentive to avoid this classification. The following are
some of the methods commonly employed:
1) The research scope of Commissioned or Joint Research
projects is defined narrowly, so as to increase the likelihood
that inventions that do occur are arguably outside the
intended scope of the project. If an invention arises, it is
often attributed to other sources of R&D support, usually
Donations or "Kouhi," because Notification No. 117 of 1978
and No. 163 of 1999141 permit inventors to retain ownership
141 Notification No. 117 of 1978 in HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION
2002, supra note 99; Notification No. 163 of 1999, supra note 102.
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over discoveries arising under such support. Then the
inventors will directly transfer the inventions to the
sponsors, often without a contract, as decribed below in
Section 3.1.3.
2) University researchers involved in Commissioned or Joint
Research projects with private companies deliberately do
not report discoveries to university invention committees,
nor apply for patents themselves. Sometimes they avoid
carrying out experiments that would constitute reduction to
practice. Instead, they make their research data available to
the sponsoring company so that the company can pursue
parallel research and file patent applications. Usually the
company includes the key university researchers among the
inventors named on its patent applications.
No one voiced concern that later someone may trace the
university inventors' source of funding to a Commissioned or Joint
Research project, and then assert that the Nation should have an
ownership interest in the patent or that the purported owner does
not have standing to sue an alleged infringer. However, it may be
unwise to ignore this risk, if the defendant in a future infringement
suit seeks to undermine the plaintiff's rights to a valuable
invention that actually arose under Commissioned or Joint
Research. 42
142 As under U.S. patent law, the right to apply for a Japanese patent origi-
nally rests with the inventors. Patent Law, supra note 120, at § 29. However,
Monbusho Notification Nos. 117/163 of 1978/1999 states in § 1(1) that "in princi-
ple, a national university invention becomes the property of the nation in the
event that either of the conditions listed this Notification applies" may effect a self-
executing transfer of the inventors' rights to the nation. Notification No. 117 of
1978 in HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION 2002, supra note 99; Notification
No. 163 of 1999, supra note 102. In other words, even if the inventions were not
reported to the appropriate invention committee, it may automatically be a na-
tional invention if it meets one of the criteria in Notification Nos. 117/163. Con-
ceivably this may even be the case if the inventions were reported, but the inven-
tion committee erroneously decided that the inventor should retain IP rights.
Whether Notification Nos. 117/163 has such self-executing power is unclear. As
noted in the above text, Notifications do not have, on their face, the force of law.
But even if this formal characterization is accepted, it could be argued that Notifi-
cation Nos. 117/163 is a service regulation or other stipulation that effects an
automatic transfer of patent rights to the university and the nation under Japanese
Patent Law. Section 35(2) of this law recognizes that a service stipula-
tion/regulation can provide-in advance-that the right to obtain a patent or the
patent right shall pass to the employer. Patent Law, supra note 120, at § 35(2).
However, if the issue of national versus inventor ownership can be resolved
in the inventor's favor, then the lack of a formal transfer agreement from inventor
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Do available statistics provide evidence of extensive under-
reporting of Commissioned or Joint Research discoveries?
Unfortunately, nationwide data, which show a dramatic increase in
Commissioned Research funding and in patent applications for
Commissioned or Joint Research inventions, shed little light on this
issue, because they do not separate privately funded from
government-funded projects, nor do they include licensing data.143
Data from the University of Tokyo show that in 1998, private
companies provided about 300 million yen (approximately 2
million USD) for Commissioned Research (135 projects) and about
550 million yen (approximately 3 million USD) for Joint Research
(approximately 100 projects) in the University of Tokyo, reflecting
a steady upward trend for both types of research. 144 However, the
number of University of Tokyo patent applications attributable to
privately sponsored Commissioned or Joint Research inventions
does not show an upward trend. Instead, between 1996 and 2000,
it averaged about three per year. 45 This suggests that the number
to sponsor should not undermine the validity of the assignment. Japanese Patent
Law §§ 33 and 34 create a rebuttable presumption that assignments of inventors'
patent application rights are valid, even without a written assignment agreement.
An inventor can challenge this presumption during examination proceedings at
Japan's Patent Office ("JPO"), but only prior to publication. Patent Law, supra
note 120, at §§ 33, 34. Publication of the application eighteen months after the fil-
ing date is a novelty bar against the inventor or any alternative assignee filing a
competing application.
143 See infra § 3.1.3.2 for a discussion of government-funded Commissioned
or Joint Research.
144 Unpublished data from the University's Office of Cooperative Research
(1999) (on file with author).
145 2001 data from the University of Tokyo's Invention Committee show that
for the five-year period 1996-2000, fifty-six Commissioned Research inventions were
reported to the Invention Committee with the intention of filing patent applica-
tions. The Invention Committee data does not identify the sponsors. However,
they do indicate whether patent applications were filed either: (a) solely in the
name of the University of Tokyo, or (b) jointly with either the sponsor or an inven-
tor who intended to assign his rights to the sponsor. Since industry sponsors al-
most always want to co-apply for patents that may have commercial value, the
number of jointly-filed patent applications, seven, is an upper limit on the number
of applications for inventions arising under privately sponsored Commissioned
Research. During this same period, the total number of Joint Research inventions
by University of Tokyo faculty was nine. All of these applications were filed
jointly by the University of Tokyo and the sponsors, private companies in most
cases. Thus, for the five-year period 1996-2000, the total number of Japanese pat-
ent applications for University of Tokyo inventions arising under Commissioned
or Joint Research was sixty-five (fifty-six Commissioned and nine Joint), of which,
at most, sixteen arose under industry-sponsored research and were of commercial
interest to the sponsors, for an average of three industry-sponsored Commis-
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of patents per project (or unit of funding) is falling, which in turn
suggests either under-reporting of inventions or declining
innovativeness of such research.
In contrast, anecdotal surveys suggest that, at least in certain
technical fields, the number of patents filed by companies that list
university researchers as inventors is quite high.146 Taken together
this data corroborate what the Author hears consistently in
discussions with university scientists, namely, that many
patentable discoveries arising at least in part under Commissioned
or Joint Research are not attributed to such research. Rather,
because of the perceived limitations on IP rights, researchers take
advantage of various opportunities to attribute inventions to
funding sources such as "Donations" where the government has
no ownership rights, or to the sponsoring companies' own
research.
3.1.2.1.2. Administration and Flow of Funds
As noted above, Commissioned or Joint Research funds must
be disbursed via the MOF. Over the past two years, restrictions on
the disbursement of these funds have been rationalized. By virtue
of the 2000 Law to Strengthen, Industrial Technology, 147 projects
can be approved and funding can begin any time during the year,
not just at the beginning of a fiscal year (April 1) as was the case
before passage of this law. Thanks to this law and Notification,
14
contracts for multiple-year projects up to five years can be
negotiated. Before the advent of multiple-year contracts, a
separate contract for each fiscal year had to be concluded. MOF
bureaucrats had to approve each year's contract, and the approval
process usually took several months. Therefore, if a company sent
Commissioned Research funds to the MOF on April 1st, it might
have been June or July before the MOF would disburse the funds
to the recipient university. Each year there would be a "black-out"
window from mid-February until at least June during which funds
were not available. Now, the only significant "black-out" window
sioned or Joint Research inventions filed annually.
146 See discussion infra § 3.1.2.2.
147 Sangaku Gijutsu Ryoku Kyouka Hou, Law No. 44 of 2000, (in Japanese),
available at http://www.houko.com (last visited May 7, 2003).
148 Monbusho Notification No. 11-1 of 2000, Pertaining to Flexibly Handling
Commissioned Research Agreements and the Like, Director of the Science and Interna-
tional Affairs Bureau, Research Assistance Division, (Mar. 31, 2000).
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is at the beginning of the project when the MOF approves the
entire multiple-year project. However, Commissioned or Joint
Research funds still must be earmarked for each year and must still
be disbursed year by year. Delays of up to a month occur as the
MOF bureaucrats approve each yearly project.
In theory, the 2000 Law to Strengthen Industrial Technology
allows rollover of unused funds to subsequent years. However,
discussions with university administrators suggest that MEXT and
MOF officials still require that the company and university
researchers justify why actual expenditures did not meet budget
projections, and rollovers are still rare. As a result, wasteful end-
of-fiscal-year spending still occurs as researchers try to use up
funds earmarked for each fiscal year.
3.1.2.1.3. Personnel Expenses
Another limitation on the use of Commissioned or Joint
Research funds concerns personnel expenses. The long black-out
periods prevented use of these funds to pay salaries or stipends. In
addition, there were concerns that students and postdoctoral
researchers should not become de facto employees of companies
and their work on company-funded projects should not interfere
with their academic studies. Fee-for-service payments were
permitted, if line items for personnel expenses were included in
Commissioned or Joint Research contracts. However, at least in
the case of graduate students and postdoctoral researchers,
approval from the department or the center director was needed
and the maximum reimbursement was 1100 yen (about seven
dollars) per hour, twenty hours per week. 149 Only a few professors
used such funds for personnel expenses.
In March 2001, the MEXT issued a Notification that
substantially liberalized policies regarding use of Commissioned
or Joint Research funds for personnel expenses. 50  This
Notification created the designation of "university-industry-
149 Author's Conversations with University of Tokyo officials (May 2000) (on
file with author).
150 Kokuritsu daigaku nado ni tsuite kigyou tono kyoudou kenkyuu, jutaku
kenkyuu ni jugyou sure hijoukin shoku-in no tori-atsukai ni truite [Concerning
the Handling of Non-Permanent Employees Engaged in Joint or Commissioned
Research with Companies in National Universities], Notification No. 12-276,
MEXT Research Promotion Bureau, (Mar. 29, 2001) (also designated as Notifica-
tion No. 12-243 from the Personnel Office of the Minister's Secretariat, MEXT) (in
Japanese) (copy on file with author).
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cooperation researchers," which can apply to secretaries,
technicians, graduate students, and postdoctoral researchers
working on Commissioned or Joint Research in national
universities. It allows such persons to be paid as nonpermanent
employees. However, they can accumulate retirement benefits
under the national social insurance system and be reimbursed for
daily commuting expenses, important considerations for most
employees. Internal University of Tokyo implementing rules limit
the amount of employment hours to eight per day or thirty per
week, whichever is less.
The practical effects of this Notification are still unclear. As of
January 2002, in the University of Tokyo's entire engineering
department, only one researcher was being paid under the
authority of this Notification, although this number may increase.
The Notification has the potential to enable companies to mobilize
support staff and young researchers for company-sponsored
projects. On the other hand, various social and institutional factors
may limit the number of talented young researchers eager to
participate in sponsored research with no guarantee of eventual
permanent employment.' 5'
151 First, career opportunities for Ph.D.-level researchers are more limited in
Japan than the United States and numbers of Ph.D.s per capita are lower. Unlike
the United States where small, often venture capital-financed companies play a
major role in technology innovation, large companies still dominate most of
Japan's high-technology industries. Most of these still prefer to hire bachelor's or
master's degree graduates whom they will train to meet their specific in-house
research needs. They usually regard Ph.D. graduates as too focused on narrow
basic science issues. Partly as a result, the number of new science and engineering
Ph.D. graduates from U.S. universities has been much greater than from Japanese
universities, the difference in 1995 being sevenfold. NAT'L SCi. BD., supra note 4;
Kneller, Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 2. Second, career considerations in
Japanese universities create fewer incentives for graduate students to seek
industry funding. The tenured academic civil service reaches down to levels
equivalent to postdoctoral researchers in the United States. Moreover, the
Japanese system is a narrow hierarchy, modeled on the traditional German
"department chair system." The Japanese academic hierarchy, known as a kouza,
typically consists of one professor (kyou-ju), one associate/assistant professor (jo-
kyou-ju), one assistant professor/instructor (kou-shi) and one or two "assistants."
Assistants are roughly equivalent to research associates at the Ph.D. candidate or
postdoctoral level in the United States-although they occassionally identify
themselves as "Assistant Professors" in discussions with foreigners. As
mentioned above, none of these persons can supplement their salaries with
research project funds. Also, the creation of new kouzas as well as personnel
appointments within a kouza need to be approved by MEXT officials. Therefore,
the number of nonstudent university researchers is relatively static. In addition,
the research focus and employment/promotion prospects of young researchers is
primarily influenced by the kouza head. See SAMUEL COLEMAN, JAPANESE SCIENCE
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3.1.2.2. Donations
In the past and even today, the most common method for
companies to support research in national universities has been
"Donations," although total Donation levels have been gradually
decreasing since 1993. In the late 1990s Donations accounted for
about 85% of total industry-sponsored reseach in national
universities.152 Donations are officially regarded as charitable
contributions. Unlike Commissioned or Joint Research funds
which must flow through MOF, Donations are made directly to a
professor's university research account. Usually, the university
takes five to ten percent as overhead. The approval process for
Donations under 5 million yen per year (30,000 USD) is simple -a
brief written notification to the administrative office of the relevant
university department followed by notification to the faculty at one
of the twice-monthly faculty meetings. Larger Donations require
approval by senior university officials and are rare.
19-44 (1999). Thus, availability of outside funds influences research focus less
than in the United States.
Postdoctoral research is not part of the normal science career track, as it is in
the United States. In a country that still values lifetime employment and where
benefits and status are closely linked with length of service in a particular
organization, postdoctoral university research is usually regarded as a non-career-
enhancing backwater for persons incapable of obtaining stable longterm
employment-unless one already has a career-track position in an outside
organization. In 2001, for all fields of science, mathematics, engineering and
medicine, there were only eighteen "over doctors" in the University of Tokyo-
Ph.D. holders who did not have long-term employment in either the University or
outside organizations. Over-doctor, Over-master Personnel Survey, UNIVERSITY AN-
NOUNCEMENTS No. 1226, Dec. 12, 2001, at 7 (official University of Tokyo bulletin).
In summary, long-term employment opportunities are more limited for young
university Ph.D. researchers in Japan than in the United States, and therefore the
increased short-term funding opportunities for Ph.D. students and postdoctoral
researchers created by the above Notification may not attract many additional
university researchers to industry-funded research.
152 Donations to national universities in 1996 totalled 48.4 billion yen (300
million USD), Kokuritsu Daigaku Kyoukai [Association of National Universities],
available at http://www.kokudaikyou.gr.jp. That same year, total industry-
sponsored research in Japanese universities amounted to 57 billion yen (360
million USD). Kenneth Pechter, Measuring the University-Industry Linkage in Ja-
pan (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Tokyo) (on file with au-
thor). In the case of the University of Tokyo, 1998 Donations amounted to 5.4
billion yen (approximately 32 million USD), while Commissioned or Joint
Research funds from private companies amounted to 300 and 550 million yen
(approximately 2 and 3.5 million USD), respectively. OFF. COOPERATIVE RES., UNI-
VERSITY OF TOKYO (Oct. 18, 1999) (on file with author).
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Donations traditionally provided more flexibility than
Commissioned or Joint Research funds with respect to, hiring of
personnel. Following liberalization of the use of Commissioned or
Joint Research funds, the systems appear similar, but in fact it is
still considerably easier to hire secretaries, technicians, and
research assistants with Donation funds. Nevertheless, as in the
case of Commissioned or Joint Research funds, it is still rare to use
Donations to pay stipends for Ph.D. candidates and postdoctoral
researchers, 153 and any salary supplementation by faculty members
is prohibited.
The main difference between Donation and Commissioned or
Joint Research R&D funding concerns rights to data and IP. It is
illegal to condition Donations on promises to perform research
according to a specified protocol, provide the donor with research
data, or transfer IP rights to the donor because they are regarded as
charitable contributions for tax and other official purposes, and
because of prohibitions in the National Properties Law 54 and
Finance Law 55 against alienating national property. Unlike
Commissioned or Joint Research inventions, however, the
government has no claim to IP rights. Indeed, Notification No. 163
of 1999156 excludes Donation inventions from classification as
National Inventions by explicitly stating that Donation inventions
are outside the scope of the key first criterion of Notification No.
117 of 1978.157 According to these two Notifications, faculty
inventors retain IP rights to Donation inventions and can pass
153 In 1996, the University of Tokyo permitted the use of Donation Funds to
compensate postdoctoral researchers under age thirty-six for up to twenty hours
per week. University of Tokyo Internal Rules.Applying to Personnel, Employing
Researchers in University of Tokyo Research Facilities (Sept. 10, 1996) (revised
Sept. 12, 2000) (on file with author). Since December 2001, the university
abolished the age limit on compensable time to thirty hours -the weekly limit for
postdoctoral researchers. It also established a separate classification "research
fellow" that permits persons under age thirty-six to receive salaries from
Donations for up to forty hours of work per week, regardless of their academic
degree status. OFF. COOPERATIVE RES., UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO, NOTiFIcATIoN: THE
SYSTEM OF UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO RESEARCH FELLOWS (2001) (on file with author).
However, as of January, 2002, no graduate students or postdoctoral researchers in
the University of Tokyo's engineering department were employed using Donation
Funds.
154 National Properties Law, supra note 128.
155 Financial Law, supra note 106.
156 Notification No. 163 of 1999, supra note 102.
157 Notification No. 117, in HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION 1999, su-
pra note 99.
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these rights as they please to whomever and under whatever terms
they choose. They do not have to report the existence of such
inventions nor their transfer to anyone; a written assignment
document is not necessary for a valid transfer of the inventors'
rights.1m
The only data available on the extent of technology transfer via
Donation funds is anecdotal, and includes not only inventions
arising under them, but also inventions arising under other types
of R&D funding.15 9 This data suggests that a great proportion of
university technology is transferred informally into the industrial
sector. For every Commissioned or Joint Research invention
reported to national university invention committees,
approximately nine inventions are passed informally to industry
and usually without being reported to the invention committees.
In the field of genetic engineering, nearly forty percent of Japanese
patent applications filed by Japanese companies list at least one
Japanese university researcher among the inventors, suggesting
that, at least in some fields, a signficant proportion of company-
filed patents are based in part on university discoveries.
Despite the prohibition against placing conditions on Donation
Funds, it is a common practice for the donor company and donee
professor to sign a two-page memo, obo-e-gaki in Japanese, setting
forth their shared understanding of their mutual obligations.' 60
Generally the obo-e-gaki defines the nature of the research, its
duration (typically one year), and the amount of support (not more
than 5 million yen). It also requires the donee to keep experimental
data confidential. The donee is required to report the results
rapidly and exclusively to the donor, and allows the donor to
approve all manuscripts prior to publication. It forbids the donee
from accepting Donations from other donors for the same project.
It states that, in principle, the donor will file any patent
applications, naming the donee as the inventor, but if the donee
approves and the nature of the invention warrants, the donor may
add one or more of its employees as co-inventors.
Although both university researchers and companies acknowl-
edge that these terms are probably unenforceable, such obo-e-gakis
158 See text accompanying note 142 supra (discussing validity of nonwritten
assignments).
159 See supra, § 2.1.2 (discussing licensing). See also Kneller, Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights, supra note 2, at 313; Mowery, supra note 17, at 315.
160 Redacted sample in Japanese (on file with author).
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continue to be signed. This practice reflects the desire of donor
companies to add certainty to a process that legally cannot be
made certain. It also suggests that faculty members and companies
still perceive that Donation Funds have advantages over the
Commissioned or Joint Research funds. For professors, the advan-
tages include more flexible funds that undergird a network of cor-
porate relationships, offering employment opportunities for their
students. For companies, the advantages include not only the
prospect of receiving full IP rights to university inventions, but
also the creation of a network of relationships with university pro-
fessors that provides information and a source of capable young
employees. Nevertheless, companies increasingly express concern
about the lack of certainty in their ability to obtain IP rights to Do-
nation-funded inventions and Japanese tax authorities disallowing
Donation fund payments as business expenses. Therefore, compa-
nies often prefer the certainty of the more limited rights provided
under Commissioned or Joint Research contracts.
From a "systems" perspective, the Donation fund system based
on university-industry collaboration has at least four significant
shortcomings:
1) The boundaries of Donation-sponsored research are
ambiguous, and therefore donors can expect assignments of
many inventions that arise mainly under other sources of
support, including government-funded projects.
2) Donor companies receive university information and IP
rights with no legal incentives to further develop these
discoveries. Obo-e-gakis hardly ever contain benchmark or
due diligence clauses requiring development commitments.
They contain no obligation to pay the inventors nor their
universities royalties, much less obligations to pay the type
of substantial up-front and annual renewal fees common in
exclusive licenses those by U.S. TLOs. Although such fees
are sometimes cited as evidence of excessive greed on the
part of U.S. TLOs,161 the high royalties and stringent
development obligations embodied in U.S. universities'
exclusive licenses serve an auction function helping to
ensure that only companies that are able and committed to
making a good faith effort to develop an invention receive
161 See, e.g., Richard Florida, The Role of the University: Leveraging Talent, Not Tech-
nology, 15 ISSUES IN SCl. AND TECH. PoL'Y 67, 69 (1999) (arguing that fees act as crea-
tive disincentives to inventors).
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exclusive rights to the invention. This auction function is
absent under the Donation system.
3) No data is available on what inventions are attributed to
Donation Funds or what the eventual fate of those
inventions are, and thus it is difficult to monitor the
existence of industrially relevant discoveries and the
effectiveness of technology transfer.
4) A typical obo-e-gaki lets the donor control research data and
publications. At least by U.S. standards, these would be
unacceptable restraints on academic freedom. Yet because
university researchers are placed in the position of
negotiating alone and "under the table" with companies,
they are in a weak position to bargain for greater academic
rights. Thus a system that intended to empower
researchers and provide a safety valve to the strictures
accompanying Commissioned or Joint Research ends up
making them cede fundamental academic rights to donor
companies.
5) The informal pass-through of IP rights to donor companies
is biased against small companies, especially startup
companies in several ways. First, it favors transfers to large
companies rather than startup companies since they are
more likely to provide Donation funds and hire students.
Second, startup companies need a clear unambiguous chain
of title to IP rights in order to obtain private venture
funding. Because many inventions attributed to Donations
in fact arose primarily under other sources of funding and
because of the related fact that contractual transfers of
Donation inventions are discouraged, a cloud of
uncertainty surrounds the chain of title to inventions
attributed to Donations. Third, informal pass-through of IP
rights to donors can result in related technologies being
disseminated to several companies, technologies that if
appropriately bundled, could have formed the core of a
successful startup company.
3.1.3. Licensing and Assignments
3.1.3.1. Overview
The previous discussion concerning sponsored research
already outlined the basic principles regarding the transfer of
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existing inventions from Japanese universities. In particular, in
order to determine who should have ownership and transfer
rights, it is necessary to determine the source of R&D funding for
the invention.
According to Notification Nos. 117 of 1978162 and 163 of 1999163
and the discussion in Section 3.1.2.1.1.2 above, if an invention
arises under Donation funding or under a professor's standard
research allowance (Kou-hi),164 the inventor may retain ownership
and there are no restrictions on how the rights are transferred. If
an invention arises under a Commissioned or Joint Research or
MEXT Grants-in-Aid (kaken-hi) project, or if the inventor chooses to
assign her invention to the nation, it is classified as a "National
Invention." As noted in Section 3.1.2.1.1.1, if a National Invention
arises under Commissioned or Joint Research sponsored by a
private company, that company can prenegotiate with the
university to co-own the invention or it can receive a preferential
license from the university president.165  But, if a National
Invention arises under government project-specific funding (i.e.,
under a government-funded Commissioned, Joint Research or a
Grants-in-Aid project), in most cases the invention is 100%
government owned and the Japan Science and Technology
Corporation ("JST")166 a public corporation chartered by the
162 Notification No. 117 in HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION 1997, Supra
note 98.
163 Notification No. 163, supra note 102.
164 The size of a professor's standard research allowance, Kou-hi funding, in
Table 1 (infra, note 167) probably overestimates its importance in funding innova-
tive research. At least in the Author's experience, a significant proportion (30-
50%) of Kou-hi funds are not available for discretionary use. Instead, they have
already been earmarked by university administrators and senior department pro-
fessors for "common" uses such as water, electricity, general office and laboratory
supplies, laboratory journal subscriptions, and occasionally for a laboratory secre-
tary or computer assistant. Again, in the Author's experience, in a prestigious re-
search center with many additional sources of research funding, it is rare to have
to use Kou-hi funds to purchase even computers or standard office/laboratory
equipment. It would be credible for a professor who is not receiving much other
funding to claim that an invention arose under Kou-hi funds. But for a researcher
from a laboratory blessed with substantial amounts of additional funding, a claim
that an invention can be attributed mainly to Kou-hi support should be regarded
with skepticism.
165 See supra text accompanying notes 116 and 125 (summarizing the terms of
a preferential (yuu-sen) license and how it is distinguished from other types of li-
censing.
166 Japanese: Kagaku Gi-jutsu Shinkou Jigyou Dan,
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Science and Technology Agency ("STA"), is responsible for
patenting and licensing the invention.
This system of ownership and licensing is summarized in Table
1 along with estimates of the magnitude and percentage of each
type of funding.167
167 Table 1: Ownership of National University Inventions and Transfer Au-
thority as Determined Source of Funds
Type of Who owns Licensing( Nationwide % total
funding/project inventions? assignment 1998 funding, funding
authority billion yen* (%s excluding
_ (million USD) Kou-hi)
Standard Inventor Inventor-no 143 ($850) 46 (0)
research restrictions
allowance
(Kou-hi)
MEXT Grants- Nation/Univ. if JST, nonexclusive 84 ($510) 27 (50)
in-Aid (kaken-hi) applied research license only
Inventor Inventor-no
otherwisea restrictionsA
Donations (kifu- Inventor Inventor-no 42 ($250) 13 (25)
kin) restrictions, but
transfers of future
rights illegal
Government- Nation/Univ. JST, nonexclusive 36 ($220) 12 (21)
Sponsored license only
Commissioned
Research
Company- Company Co. + Univ. Pres., 1.4 ($8.5) 0.4 (0.8)
Sponsored Nation/Univ if nonexclusive or
Commissioned (if by preferential
Research prenegotiated license
contract) Co. + U. Pres. +
MEXT Minister, if
exclusive license
Otherwise 100% Univ Pres. can Rare
Nation/Univ grant company
preferential
license
Government- Nation/Univ JST, nonexclusive 1 ($6) 0.3 (0.6)
Sponsored Joint license only
Research
Company- Company Co. + Univ Pres., 3.3 ($20) 1.1 (2.0)
Sponsored Joint Nation/Univ if nonexlusive or
Research (if by preferential
prenegotiated license
contract) Co. + Univ Pres. +
MEXT Minister, if
exclusive license
Otherwise 100% Univ Pres. can Rare
Nation/Univ grant company
preferential
license
*Estimates are for funds directly available for research (i.e., net of overhead) in
National Universities only. See Appendix 1 for calculation methods and data
sources.
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Since STA merged with Monbusho in 2001 to form MEXT, JST
has been within the MEXT organizational structure. JST has one
office in downtown Tokyo and another in an outlying suburb.
Neither office is close to a major university or the main MEXT
offices. In 2000, JST applied for 226 Japanese patents and 116
foreign patents on National Inventions from national universities
and MEXT research institutes, and it was granted seventy-eight
Japanese and thirty-four foreign patents. The same year, it issued
three licenses, all nonexclusive. For the five-year period between
1996 and 2000, JST annually filed on average 134 Japanese patent
applications, received sixty-one Japanese patents, and issued 1.6
licenses -all nonexclusive. 168 Although at least one JST official has
said it has the authority to grant preferential licenses to National
Inventions, 169 in practice JST hardly ever does so officially. The
reasons appear to lie both in the National Properties 70 and Finance
Laws,17' which require appropriate compensation for alienating
national properties, and in a widespread conviction among JST
officials that it is inappropriate to allow a l'rivate entity to obtain
preferential rights to taxpayer funded national property. As
mentioned in Section 3.1.2.1.1.1, all royalties were paid to the
general account for national universities in the MOF-none were
distributed directly to the inventors or their universities.
The overwhelming impression among companies, university
scientists, and most government officials is that the JST-National
Invention system is not effective in the case of discoveries that
require further development and where some degree of exclusive
IP rights is necessary to provide private companies with sufficient
incentives to invest in such development. In such cases,
classification of a government-funded invention as a National
Invention is equivalent to the technology slipping into a black hole.
This understanding accounts for well-practiced and officially-
tolerated efforts to avoid the National Invention classification.172
Alt is difficult to attribute inventions to a project not envisaging practical applica-
tions. See infra § 3.1.3.3.
168 Data available at http://www.st.go.jp/jst/support-.htm (last visited
May 7, 2003).
169 Personal communication between Japan Science and Technology Corpora-
tion ("JST") and the Author (1999) (on file with author).
170 National Properties Law, supra note 128.
171 Financial Law, supra note 106.
17 The following example shows both the rigidity of JST's licensing policy
and its hesitant attempts to add some flexibility. A professor at a major national
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The following sections provide more information on
government-funded Commissioned or Joint Research inventions,
MEXT Grants-in-Aid, and finally the emergence of university-
affiliated technology-transfer organizations, which are beginning
to give universities a stake in technology management.
3.1.3.2. Government-Funded Commissioned and Joint Research
Government-, as well as privately funded, Commissioned Re-
search in national universities has increased steadily and dramati-
cally since 1994 when it totaled 7 billion yen (approximately 42 mil-
lion USD). In 1999, it totaled 45 billion yen (approximately 270
million USD).173 If University of Tokyo data are representative of
the universities as a whole, then approximately 90% of these funds
are from government-affiliated organizations or programs.174 Such
organizations include government-chartered investment corpora-
tions such as MEXT's JST and the New Energy Development Or-
ganization ("NEDO") of the Ministry of Economy Trade and In-
dustry ("METI" -formerly the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry) and GRI's such as the National Institute of Infectious
Diseases under the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare
("MHLW"). Special government programs that distribute funds as
Commissioned Research include the interministerial "Millennium
Project" to promote advances in genomics and regenerative medi-
university made an invention with important potential applications in the fields
of optics and wireless communication. Although it apparently did not arise under
project-specific government funds, the inventor chose nevertheless to assign his
rights to the nation, and JST assumed responsibility for patenting and licensing.
In 1999, JST licensed the invention to the holding company of a major Japanese
industrial manufacturer for 85 million yen (approximately 530,000 USD). The
previous year, JST's total revenue from licensing university inventions was 44
million yen (approximately 280,000 USD). Hyouka kijun motomeru sangaku renkei:
"jitsuyouka" tsuyomaru yousei [University-Industry Cooperation Seeking Valuation
Standards in the Quest to Promote "Practical Usefulness"], NIKKEi KEISAI SHINBUN [JA-
PAN ECONOMic TIMEs] (Dec. 10, 1999) (in Japanese) (copy on file with author). This
may still be the largest royalty amount ever received by JST for a license of a uni-
versity invention. The license was nonexclusive, but JST told the licensee that JST
would not license the invention to a competitor without the licensee's permission.
Subsequent discussions with JST officials revealed that JST was sensitive that its
attempt to convey some degree of exclusivity would become public. They did not
seem concerned, or cognizant of the possibility, that the exclusive rights they tried
to convey may have been unenforceable or subject to challenge.
173 Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry ("METI") data (June 2001) (on
file with author).
174 Office of Cooperative Research Data (Oct. 1999) (on file with author).
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cine and MEXT's Mirai Kaitaku (Pioneering Research for the Fu-
ture) Program. Indeed almost all large-scale government-funded
R&D projects in universities are classified as Commissioned Re-
search.175
Although all government-funded Commissioned Research in-
ventions are owned by the nation if judged to have commercial
applicability, 176 the precise allocation of ownership rights depends
upon which ministry funded the research. In the case of funding
from MEXT or its affiliated corporations, patenting and licensing
authority lies solely with JST. This is also true in the case of pro-
jects funded by METI, the Ministry of Public Management, Home
Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications ("MPHPIT"), the Environ-
ment Ministry, the National Police Agency and the Defense
Agency. These ministries and agencies automatically apply the so-
called "Japanese Bayh-Dole Law" of 1999 (officially the Law of
Special Measures to Revive Industrial Vitality) 177 to permit Com-
missioned or Joint Research contractors to claim rights to any re-
suiting inventions. Traditionally, because national universities do
not have independent legal status, JST manages all patenting and
licensing for inventions arising under research commissioned by
these ministries and agencies. Other ministries, such as the
MHLW and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
("MAFF") usually insist on retaining at least partial ownership
over any inventions arising under research they commission, and
occasionally insist that their own bureaus manage patent applica-
175 Obligations to pay overhead appear unclear. Direct communication from
the University of Tokyo and METI suggests that many government funding agen-
cies need not make any overhead payments for Commissioned or Joint Research.
However, the HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION and Notification No. 292 of
2001 suggest that the special investment corporations, such as JST and NEDO,
under each of the major science and technology ministries should pay 30% over-
head on the projects they sponsor, although this percentage can be reduced in
case the investment corporation has budget problems. See HANDBOOK FOR
RESEARCH COOPERATION, supra note 97, at 35. See also Notification No. 292 in
HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION 2002, supra note 105. It appears that any
such overhead payments can be made directly to the university. The university
can then distribute a portion of the overhead payments to the center or depart-
ment conducting the research. Direct communications from the University of To-
kyo to the Author (Mar. 19, 2002). Conversations between METI and the Author
(May 14, 2002) (on file with author).
176 See supra § 3.1.2.1.1.2.
177 Sangyou Katsu-ryoku Saisei Toku-betsu Sochi Hou [Law of Special Meas-
ures to Revive Industrial Vitality], No. 31, § 44 (1999) available at http://law.e-
gov.go.jp/cgi-bin/idxsearch.cgi (last visited May 7, 2003).
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tions and licensing. Rights to government-sponsored Joint Re-
search inventions are generally allocated in the same way.
JST patent applications for National Inventions from national
universities, consisting mainly of inventions arising under Com-
missioned or Joint Research, increased from thirty-five in 1996 to
226 in 2000.178 University of Tokyo Invention Committee data sug-
gests that most of these applications are for government-sponsored
projects. 179 Very few, if any, of the government-sponsored inven-
tions have been licensed under royalty-earning licenses.18°
It appears that the policy underlying this phenomenon of in-
creasing patent applications of government-funded inventions is
similar to the policy of the U.S. government before 1980 as de-
scribed by Eisenberg. In other words, JST, while acting on the rec-
ommendation of university invention committees, applies for pat-
ents on government-funded inventions, but with little intent to
actually license them. It is simply a means of dedicating the inven-
tions to the public and ensuring that anyone can use them.
However, if some degree of exclusive IP rights is necessary to
provide incentives for private investments to improve or market
such inventions, either the source of funding must be obscured, or
the invention must not be reported, in which case relevant data
needs to be passed informally to a particular company that hope-
fully will complete development. Such an environment of obfusca-
tion is inimical to the open reporting of inventions,181 to putting
most transfers on a contractual basis, 182 and to any "champion"'183
arising to promote the development or utilization of promising
early-stage discoveries. Discussions with university researchers
suggest that although misattributing government Commissioned
or Joint Research inventions to Donations or Kou-hi happens fre-
178 See http://www.jst.go.jp/jst/support-.htm (last visited May 7, 2003).
179 See supra text accompanying note 145 (explaining University of Tokyo's
invention committee data).
180 See supra § 3.1.2.1.1.3; supra note 172 (discussing the limited royalty earn-
ing licenses).
181 Such open reporting of inventions is necessary for the collection of data to
assess the number and types of university discoveries.
182 Putting transfers on a contractual basis is necessary for the collection of
data to assess technology transfer and to help ensure fairness in the selection of
transferees. It enables the inclusion of due diligence and royalty payment provi-
sions that provide incentives for transferees to make their best efforts to develop
the discoveries.
183 A "champion" in this context is usually a university TLO, independent
technology broker, private venture capital company, or startup company.
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quently, some researchers are discouraged by the legal barriers to
commercializing government-funded Commissioned or Joint Re-
search and simply write off such discoveries or ignore the com-
mercial implications of such research.184
3.1.3.3. MEXT Grants-in-Aid (Kaken-hi)
As Table 1 indicates, MEXT Grants-in-Aid are the single largest
source of project-specific funding for university R&D. These are
the bread and butter of Japanese university research support,
roughly equivalent to NIH R01 grants for investigator-initiated
research proposals or standard NSF grants. Until 1999, many
Japanese university researchers assumed that these Grants-in-Aid
were outside the scope of the two criteria in Notification No. 117 of
1978 for determining when an invention should be classified as a
National Invention,185 although many felt that this was a "grey
area." From 1985 through 1998, on average only one Grant-in-Aid
invention per year was classified as a National Invention by the
University of Tokyo's Invention Committee, and probably none of
184 The following anecdote illustrates the frustrations that were encountered
by a company trying to develop. a government-funded national invention and an
inventor who was honest about attributing the invention to government funding.
In 1998, a scientist at a major national university working partly under Commis-
sioned Research funding from Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
("MAFF") made two inventions, both related to immunology and ways to treat or
prevent infections in humans or agricultural animals. A Japanese venture capital
company contracted with the inventor for assignment of the inventor's ownership
rights. It then paid out of pocket five to ten million yen (30,000 to 65,000 USD) to
apply for Japanese, European, and U.S. patents. The venture capital company
planned to leverage additional private capital to carry forward the development
to the point that these discoveries were attractive to pharmaceutical companies.
The company, however, did not realize that the Japanese government had an
ownership interest in these inventions, believing instead that ownership was di-
vided initially between the inventor and the university as an entity that could in-
dependently negotiate transfers of IP. The inventor reported these inventions to
the university's invention committee and noted that they were made in part with
MAFF funding. A complicated negotiation process between the university and
MAFF ensued. The result was a complex division of ownership percentages be-
tween MAFF, the university, and the venture capital company, with MAFF allo-
cated the largest share in each invention. The patent applications were amended
to clearly show the nation's ownership interest, but the government refused to re-
imburse the venture company's application costs. MAFF made clear to the ven-
ture capital company that their approval would be required for any licenses or as-
signments of the inventions. To this date, the venture capital company has found
no other sources of financing to pursue development, and these discoveries are
languishing.
185 See supra § 3.1.2.1.1.2 (detailing ownership of university inventions).
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these were licensed. However, in one fell swoop Notification No.
163 of 1999 clarified this grey area by specifying that all Grant-in-
Aid inventions are National Inventions, at least all those where the
award was for research for applied purposes.86
The reasons for implementing Notification No. 163 are still
unclear, especially since it came just one year after a law
supporting the establishment of TLOs that denied the TLOs
authority to manage National Inventions, described below. So at
the same time the government was trying to support these
fledgling organizations, it severely limited the range of inventions
they could manage. The director of one of Japan's leading TLOs
stated that his TLO will not accept an invention if the inventor says
it arose under Grant-in-Aid funds, even if the inventor maintains
that the Grant-in-Aid project was for basic research only. In other
words, if a commercially valuable invention arises under a MEXT
Grant-in-Aid, most TLOs feel it would be risky to argue that the
project had purely basic research objectives and the inventor
should retain ownership rights.
Nevertheless, available statistics suggest widespread, officially-
condoned obfuscation of the funding source of Grant-in-Aid
inventions. Appendix 1 shows that the probability is extremely
low that the small number of University of Tokyo Grant-in-Aid
inventions, relative to the amount of Grant-in-Aid funding, could
be due to chance.1 87 There seems to be no clear reason why Grant-
in-Aid research is less likely to produce patentable inventions than
other forms of research, especially Kou-hi or government-funded
Commissioned or Joint Research. Thus the most likely explanation
for the discrepancy noted in Appendix 1 is that Grants-in-Aid in-
ventions either are not transferred at all, or are classified as Dona-
tion/Kou-hi inventions and transferred directly to companies or to
TLOs. Therefore, in issuing Notification No. 163 of 1999, it appears
that Monbusho/MEXT took an ideologically motivated step to
uphold the principle of national ownership of taxpayer funded
inventions, only to then condone or acquiesce to wholesale
disregard of that principle.188
186 Id.
187 If this analysis were carried out in 1998, the year Notification No. 163 was
issued, the discrepancy would be even greater. As it happened, the number of
Grant-in-Aid University of Tokyo inventions rose to ten in 2000, but then fell to
six in 2001. Preliminary data for 2002 suggests nine for that year.
188 In this table, Row I shows the actual year 2001 numbers for the University
of Tokyo patent applications according to source of purported funding for the in-
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3.1.3.4. TLOs - Disadvantaged Children
In an ownership system characterized by a murky and shifting
boundary between state and inventor ownership, Monbusho and
vention; applications filed by the University's TLO being a proxy for inventions
arising under standard research allowance (Kou-hi) and Donation funding. Row 2
shows the expected number of patent applications for each funding category
based upon the overall national R&D funding proportions shown in Table 1.
University of Tokyo Patent Applications in 2001 by
Source of Invention Funding
Kou-hi and Industry- MEXT Govt spon- Total One-
Donations sponsored Grants-in- sored dimen-
(approxi- Commis- aid Commis- sional
mated by # sioned or sioned or chi-
TLO applica- Joint Re- Research square
tions) search probabil-
ity (P)
Actual 113 3 5.5 15.5 138 --
Expected 82.2 2.1 37.3 16.4 138 P<.0001
assuming
all Kou-hi
available
for re-
search
Expected 34.6 3.9 69.1 30.4 138 P<.0001
excluding
all Kou-hi
Just from scanning Rows I and 2, it is clear that the greatest discrepancy be-
tween actual and expected values is the low number of Grants-in-Aid inventions.
The probability that this discrepancy between the observed and expected values
could be due to chance is less than 1 in 10,000. In other words, there must be
some cause for this discrepancy other than mere chance. Indeed, comparison of
Rows 1 and 2 probably underestimates the difference between observed and ex-
pected numbers of patent applications. A significant proportion of Kou-hi funds is
not directly available for research. If Kou-hi funds are completely excluded, the
observed-expected discrepancy becomes even more extreme, as shown in Row 3.
Moreover, most TLO officials believe that the number of invention reports they
receive still greatly underestimates the total number of inventions made in their
universities.
One possible explanation for the actual-expected discrepancy is that Grants-
in-Aid research is less likely to produce patentable inventions than other forms of
research. While this may arguably be compared to Donations and industry
funded Commissioned or Joint Research, it is hard to imagine why Grants-in-Aid
research would be less likely to result in inventions than Kou-hi or government-
funded Commissioned or Joint Research. Thus this data is statistical evidence that
a significant percentage of Grants-in-Aid Inventions (and perhaps also govern-
ment-funded Commissioned orJoint Research inventions) either are not trans-
ferred at all or are classified as Donation/Kou-hi inventions and transferred di-
rectly to companies or to TLOs.
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MITI attempted to graft university-affiliated TLOs' 89 basically as
appendages to individual inventor ownership. Together, these two
ministries sponsored legislation passed in 1998190 to encourage the
establishment of univerity TLOs. The principle points of this
legislation and related guidelines are as follows:
1) They set forth a procedure for approval of each TLO by the
Ministers of both MEXT and METIJ. 91
2) Approval allows METI, through the Industrial Structural
Improvement Fund,192 to support each TLO via direct
subsidies (currently limited to 20 million yen,
approximately 120,000 USD, annually per TLO) and
guarantees of bonds issued by the TLO.193 However, these
funds cannot be used for permanent staff salaries nor for
patent application and maintenance payments to outside
contract and patent attorneys, the two largest categories of
expenses for U.S. TLOs.
3) An approved TLO can return royalty earnings to the
inventor and the university "via Donations or other
means."'194
4) An approved TLO can license National Inventions only if it
obtains permission of the Minister of MEXT.195 The Author
knows of no such approvals to date, although the case
described in Section 3.1.2.1.1.3 was to the same effect.
189 In Japan, as well as in the United States, TLO has become a generic term
for a university technology licensing/transfer/management/development or-
ganization. MIT's organization is called the MIT Technology Licensing Office
("MIT TLO"), and this is probably the main origin of the generic abbreviation.
190 Daigaku nado ni Okeru Gijutsu ni Kan-suru Kenkyuu Seika no Minkan
Jigyou e no Iten no Soku-shin ni Kan-suru Hou [Law to Promote Technology
Transfer to Private Companies of University Technologies Related to the Research
Results] No. 52 (Apr. 20, 2000) [hereinafter TLO Law], available at http://www.
mext.go.jp/a.menu/shinkou/sangaku.
191 Id. at § 4.
192 Sangyou Kiban Seibi Kikin is a fund established jointly by METI and the
Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (a predecessor to today's MPHPT ) in
the 1980s with proceeds from the partial privatization of Nippon Telephone and
Telegraph Co. ("NTT"). See http://www.isif.go.jp (last visited May 7, 2003).
193 TLO Law, supra note 190, § 6.
194 Tokutei daigaku gijutsu iten jigyou no jisshi in kansuru shishin, Mon-
busho-MITI Bulletin No. 1 [TLO Guidelines No. 1] (Aug. 5, 1998), available at
http://www.mext.go.jp/a menu/shinkou/sangaku/index.htm.
195 TLO Law, supra note 190, § 12.
[24:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol24/iss2/2
2003] UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY COOPERATION IN JAPAN 391
Thus, the legislation did not change the previously described
ownership structure. Barring special action by the MEXT Minister,
a TLO can manage only inventor-owned inventions and in those
cases only if the inventors voluntarily agree to transfer their rights
to the TLO.
The legislation did not give the TLOs a role in clarifying
whether an invention belongs to the nation or individual inventors.
In other words, the legislation did not attempt to integrate the re-
sponsibilities of the TLOs with those of the university Invention
Committees. As a rule, TLOs neither seek nor obtain confirmation
from the Invention Committees that the inventions they are man-
aging are not National Inventions. As mentioned above, the TLO
of the University of Tokyo routinely asks inventors about sources
of funding in order to screen out inventions that might be classified
as National Inventions; other TLOs probably do the same. How-
ever, unlike decisions by the Invention Committees, these determi-
nations have no legal effect, but to the Author's knowledge, they
have never been challenged.
The legislation also did not allow for the needs of TLOs to
make monetary transfers and to recruit competent staff within the
university administrative structures. If the TLOs were to be part of
their universities, their personnel would have to be MEXT civil
servant generalist-administrators subject to periodic transfers to
completely different jobs. Also, under the Financial and General
Accounts Laws,196 it would be problematic for the TLOs to receive
royalty payments and to transfer a portion of them to the inventors
and their universities.
For these reasons, most TLOs of National Universities were
established as for-profit companies whose stock was sold to
professors and other individuals willing to invest in them. The
TLO law permits TLOs to be for-profit corporations legally
separate from universities. The retained royalty income of such
corporations is subject to taxation just like that of any other for-
profit corporation. The TLOs elected to expose themselves to tax
liability in order to obtain freedom over personnel and financial
matters. Among National Universities, the most significant
exception to this model is the Tokyo Institute of Technology whose
TLO was established in 1999 as a special foundation within the
institutes. This sheltered it from taxation, but made it more
196 Financial Laws, supra note 106; General Accounts Law, supra note 107.
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difficult to recruit people from outside the government. Also, as a
foundation, it is not able to accept equity in startup companies in
lieu of royalties.
Finally, TLOs have no guarantee of institution-wide support
from their universities. A case in point is the University of Tokyo's
first TLO, which arose from the Research Center for Advanced
Science and Technology ("RCAST") and was the first Japanese
TLO approved under the 1998 TLO Law. This TLO struggled to
build credibility within numerous other centers and departments
(many semiautonomous fiefdoms) of the university, particularly in
key departments, such as those dealing with medicine and
engineering. In 2001, a second university TLO, based in the
Institute of Industrial Science ("IIS"), was approved by MEXT and
METI. IIS focuses on applied engineering research, which is also a
central focus of RCAST research. While the IIS buildings are less
than one hundred meters from the RCAST, these two institutions
fail to coordinate their technology management efforts because of
institutional and personal rivalries, as well as lack of commitment
from central university authorities.
In summary, the following factors handicap most TLOs:
1) If inventions were accurately attributed to main sources of
funding, TLOs would be able to manage only 25-60% of
university inventions, based upon the funding levels shown
in Table 1. Their ability to manage a larger percentage
depends upon officially tolerated misattribution of funding
sources.
2) Even if TLOs are legally able to manage particular
inventions, they are only able to do so if the inventors
voluntarily assign their inventions to the TLOs. Officials in
several major TLOs have stated that the percentage of
inventions that are unreported to either the TLOs or
Invention Committees is high. This is true even in
universities with stringent reporting requirements. Often
professors will assign their less attractive inventions to the
TLOs and patent their more attractive inventions
themselves or transfer application rights to companies that
provide Donations and employ their students (a.k.a. the
cherry-picking phenomenon).
3) TLOs have to make an unattractive choice between either
exposure to corporate income taxation or being subject to
burdensome personnel regulations and crippling
restrictions on their ability to manage monetary transfers.
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Most choose to escape the latter predicament, setting
themselves up as for-profit entities separate from their
universities.
4) TLOs cannot receive financial support from their
universities because their universities have neither
independent legal status nor budgetary discretion.
The vast majority of U.S. TLOs do not generate profits and a
majority of them receive financial support from their universities,
usually from discretionary funds under the control of university
presidents or vice presidents responsible for technology
management and development. At the same time, benefits in
terms of creation of new high-technology companies, jobs, and
(perhaps more debatably) products are substantial, 197 and the
number of U.S. TLOs that have become financially profitable, and
return royalties to their universities, is increasing. University
support of their TLOs is a long-term investment with potential
social as well as financial benefits.
There are several problems with the reliance of Japanese TLOs
on government support. As mentioned above, in Japan these
funds cannot be used for key TLO expenses. In addition, when a
president or vice president of a U.S. university decides to use
discretionary funds to support a TLO, the university as a whole
becomes committed to its success, and the funding helps to ensure
that the work of the TLO is in line with the overall goals of the
university. This alignment of goals does not happen when
Japanese TLOs receive unconditional subsidies from the Japanese
government.
Table 2 summarizes patenting and licensing activity of the
most active TLOs.198
19 See, e.g., BANKBOSTON, MIT: THE IMPACT OF INNOVATION (1997); Presenta-
tion by Lori Pressman and Don Kaiser at the American Association for the Ad-
vancement of Science Annual Meeting, Measuring Product Development: Out-
comes of Patent Licensing at MIT (describing the successful licensing of MIT
patents), at http://web.mit.edu/tlo/www/pubs.html (last visited May 7, 2003).
198 Table 2: Summary of TLO Patents and Licenses as of the end-of 2001
(listed in order of number of licenses since approval date*)
Affiliated Legal Status Date # Japanese # Foreign # Royalty
Universities of TLO Approved Patents Patents Earning Patent
(status of (yr/mo) Applications Applications Licenses
universi- (# approved) (# approved)
ties)
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Tokyo, for profit co 1998/12 362(2) 184 (1) 92
CASTI* (nat'l)
Tohoku for profit co 1998/12 109(6) 79(11) 73
(nat'l)
Kyoto, for-profit co 1998/12 261 (2) 29(2) 38
Ritsumei- (nat'l & pri-
kan, vate &
& other local)
Kansai uni-
versities
Tokyo Inst. Foundation 1999/8 269(10) 15(1) 38
of Tech. (nat'l)
Keio office in 1999/8 282(18) 48(0) 35
private univ
Nihon office in 1998/12 348(1) 64(2) 20
private univ
Kobe & Foundation 2000/4 85(0) 9(0) 20
local uni- (nat'l &
versities local)
Yamaguchi limited co 1999/12 109(2) 6(0) 15
& local uni- (nat'l &
versities local)
Waseda office in 1999/4 182(7) 24(2) 14
private univ
Hokkaido for profit co 1999/12 60(1) 19(0) 12
& local uni- (nat'l &
versities local)
Nagoya & foundation 2000/4 120(0) 18(1) 9
local uni- (nat'l &
versities local)
Tokyo, foundation 2001/8 63(0) 1 (0) 9
IlS*** (nat'l)
Kyushu For-profit co 2000/4 132(0) 9(0) 8
(nat'l)
Source: METI
* Twelve TLOs with fewer than four licenses are not listed.
-- Center for Advanced Science and Technology Incubation
Institute of Industrial Science
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol24/iss2/2
2003] UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY COOPERATION IN JAPAN 395
As of the end of 2001, total license revenue for all TLOs was
about 340 million yen (approximately 2.3 million USD). 99 As in
the case of U.S. TLOs, the Japanese TLOs have various formulas to
divide royalty revenue between inventors, the inventors'
laboratories or departments, the universities as a whole, and their
own operating accounts.
An in-depth assessment of the various TLOs is beyond the
scope of this paper. However, considering their handicaps, a
handful have made remarkable progress. They have found
managers and staff who are proactive in reaching out to
researchers (usually through meetings with heads of departments
and laboratories) and to potential licensees. They have actively
sought foreign licensees and even foreign advice on technology
management. To the Author's knowledge, the highest revenue-
earning licenses to date tend to be granted to foreign companies.
They have emphasized licensing, as well as patenting, although for
a variety of reasons they almost always file patent applications
before they begin marketing, unlike U.S. TLOs, which may delay
filing patent applications until they are relatively sure that have
licensees. Some have included due diligence provisions and
annual royalty payments in their licenses to ensure that the
licensees remain committed to development. Several have
participated in the formation of startup companies, licensing the
inventors' discoveries back to the inventors' new companies, just
as U.S. TLOs do when they assist in forming startup companies.
Some have even sought assignments of inventions from research
collaborators in other universities to create a package of related
inventions, which they then license exclusively to the startup
company. Finally, some have taken steps to clarify ownership
rights of inventions created by graduate students working in
startup company laboratories. 200
199 Direct communication from METI to the Author (Apr. 9,2003).
200 One example involves a materials science startup company with an off-
campus laboratory that attracts students from several universities. The TLO of
one of these universities helped resolve questions about ownership of inventions
by its students by contracting with these students for assignment of any
inventions made in the startup's laboratories. The TLO then licenses these
inventions to the startup company. In the case of inventions created by students
from other universities, there is lingering uncertainty whether they, their
professors, the startup company, or even the universities will have ownership
rights.
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Still, problems are evident. A widespread tendency prevails
among older faculty to manage their own inventions and to
transfer them to companies with which they have longstanding
ties. Some TLOs are obligated by the local corporations and banks
that support them to license preferentially to local corporations.
The majority of TLO managers still appear to have no technology
marketing and little technology evaluation experience. These
managers often take a passive approach to technology transfer,
believing their responsibilities are fulfilled when patents are filed.
The division, which often borders on rivalry, between TLOs and
their universities can give rise to bizarre, frustrating situations as
illustrated by the case described in Section 3.1.2.1.1.3. Finally, it is
common to hear influential persons, even in government and
universities, say that the main goal of TLOs is to make money, and
that they are failures if they do not. Much less frequently
mentioned are goals such as accelerating the development of
technologies to meet public needs and creating high quality jobs.
3.1.4. Consulting and Other Outside Work
Japanese university faculty have a long tradition of consulting
for private companies.20' At least since the end of World War II,
these relationships have not been based upon written agreements
providing for compensation because this would create outside
income, which is prohibited under the Civil Service Law and
Regulations.202 Honoraria for lectures and one-time written reports
have, however, been permitted. Much paid consulting occurs
under this guise. Also, the unwritten quid pro quo for consulting
services often includes Donations and employment of students.
No data exists on the prevalence of such consulting, much less on
how important it is as a mechanism of technology transfer that
201 See Takehiko Hashimoto, The Hesitant Relationship Reconsidered: University-
Industry Cooperation in Postwar Japan, in INDUSTRIALIZING KNOWLEDGE: UNIVER-
sITY-INDUsTRY LINKAGES IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 234, 235 (Lewis M.
Branscomb et al. eds., 1999) (acknowledging that "many university faculty served
as technical consultants for corporations in prewar Japan"); Hiroyuki Odagiri,
University-Industry Collaboration in Japan: Facts and Interpretations, in INDUSTRIALIZ-
ING KNOWLEDGE: UNIvERsITY-INDUSTRY LINKAGES IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES
252, 254 (Lewis M. Branscomb et al. eds., 1999) (describing specific examples of
academics providing advice and guidance to technical industries).
202 Kokka kou-mu-in hou [Civil Servant Law], Law No. 120 (1947), available at
http://law.e-gov.go.jp (last visited May 7, 2003); Jin ji in ki-soku [Personnel Regu-
lations] (1950).
396 [24:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol24/iss2/2
2003] UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY COOPERATION IN JAPAN 397
spurs innovation in industry. However, the Author knows of
anecdotal cases where such consulting was very important and
suspects it was one of the most important mechanisms of
technology transfer in the past and remains important today.
However, its effectiveness has been limited by some of the same
factors that limit the effectiveness of Donations.
203
In April 2000, the Japanese Diet passed the Law to Strengthen
Industrial Technology. 2 4 This landmark legislation not only
eliminated many irrational restrictions on industry-funded
Commissioned or Joint Research,205 but also opened the door for
national university faculty members to openly consult for private
companies and even to manage companies, so long as such work
was aimed at developing their university discoveries. Following
the passage of this law, administrative guidance notifications and
amendments to the Personnel Regulations 206 have steadily
expanded the scope of officially permitted "outside work" (ken-
gyou), although founder or senior manager/ director status is still
only allowed in companies aiming to develop the researcher's
university discoveries, in TLOs, or in auditing companies. Table 3
summarizes the various categories of approvable outside work and
available data on the number of approvals issued to national
university researchers. 20 7
203 See supra § 3.1.2.2. (discussing the shortcomings of the Donation system of
university-industry collaboration).
204 Sangaku Gijytsu Ryoko Kyouka Hou, supra note 147.
205 See supra § 3.1.2.1.2 at 373-74 (examining the major aspects of the Law to
Strengthen Industrial Technology).
206 Personnel Regulations, supra note 202.
207 Table 3: Categories of Outside Work (Ken-gyou) Permitted for National
University Faculty
Type of work Approval Required # of Approvals
Director of a for-profit company to University president, MEXT, and 71 as of March 2002
commercialize director's university National Personnel authority
research
Director of TLO University president, MEXT, and 31 as of March 2002
National Personnel authority
Auditor of a for-profit company University president, MEXT, and 13 as of March 2002
National Personnel authority
R&D in a company University president 45,347
Advisor on research/scientific activi- University president (but many of these
ties involve public, notfor profit companies)
Advisor on legal and managerial mat- University 
president
ters concerning a company I
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There appear to be few clear limits on outside work. There is
vague language to the effect that if a director of a for-profit
company finds she needs to devote most of her time to the
company and she cannot simultaneously fulfill her duties as a
faculty member, then she should take a leave of absence. In the
case of persons other than directors, it is clear that outside work
does not adversely affect their university responsibilities. 208 Also,
there is a general prohibition on doing outside work on behalf of a
company over one which has authority to award contracts. This
probably does not prohibit a faculty-director from simultaneously
having a Commissioned or Joint Research contract between her
university laboratory and her company, although this issue is
currently under discussion.20 9 Specific time limits on outside work
have been explicitly abolished, although it is still generally
expected that outside work will not take place between 9:00 am
and 5:00 pm on normal work days.210
Sources:
1) Shoku-in no ken-gyou no shou-nin oyo-bi kyou-ka no tetsu-zuki nado ni
tsuite [Approval of Outside Work for Civil Servants] (Mar. 29, 2002),
available at http://www.mext.go.jp/a-menu/shinkou/sangaku/ sanga-
kuc/sangakucl2_1.htm. See also Hashimoto, supra note 204; Odagin, su-
pra note 204; Personnel Regulations, supra note 202 (listing complimen-
tary statutes).
2) For the number of approvals in the first three categories, see
http://www.jinji.go.jp/kengyo/f-keng.htm (last visited May 7,2003),
3) For total number of approvals in the last three categories see the unpub-
lished data from the University of Tokyo,
4) MONBU KAGAKU SHOU, KENKYUU SHINKOU KYOKU, KENKYUU KANKYOU SAN-
GYOU RENKEI KA, GIJUTSU ITENN SUISHIN SHITSU, SANGAKU RENKEI JIMU NIU-
MON [MEXT RESEARCH PROMOTION BUREAU, UNIVERSiTY-INDUSTRY COOP-
ERATION OFFICE, UNIVERSrIY-INDUSTRY COOPERATION OFFICE GUIDE] (June
2001) [hereinafter SUMMARY NOTIFICATIONS] (duplicating an official
summary of various notifications related to university-industry coopera-
tion, especially outside work) (copy on file with author).
5) Kengyou ni kansuru mikou kaikabu, kengyou jikan-suu no tori-atsukai
ni tsuite (tsuu-chi) [University of Tokyo notification regarding unlisted
stock holdings and time limits for outside work] (Dec. 14, 2001) (copy on
file with author).
208 SUMMARY NOTIFICATIONS, supra note 207, No. 4.
209 Written communication from University of Tokyo to Author Uune 28,
2002) (on file with author).
210 Kengyou ni kansuru mikou kaikabu, kengyou jikan-suu no tori-atsukai ni
tsuite (tsuu-chi) [University of Tokyo notification regarding unlisted stock hold-
ings and time limits for outside work] (Dec. 14, 2001) (copy on file with author).
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Restrictions regarding stock ownership appear quite flexible.
A blanket restriction on holding non-publicly traded stock in the
company has been explicitly abolished.211 A University of Tokyo
notification spells out a few specific circumstances in which pre-
IPO stock ownership would be prohibited, but these are clearly
egregious conflict-of-interest situations (e.g., a professor-director
serves on a drug approval-evaluation committee that will review a
drug produced by his own company).212 In the case of a director's
outside work, holdings of substantial amounts of stock in a third
company may also have to be approved by the National Personnel
authority if that company has ties with the company in which the
researcher is a director.21
3
When university researchers apply for permission to do
outside work, they are required to estimate the amount of time
they will spend and the remuneration they will receive. The
university president must approve the application, which then will
be forwarded to the National Personnel Agency. In the case of
directors of for-profit companies and directors of TLOs and
auditors, the National Personnel Agency must also approve the
applications. The process usually takes a few months and most
approvals must be renewed every twelve months.
Approvals for directors and auditors are listed on the Internet
along with their estimates of time commitment and income.
Therefore, it appears that the policy of MEXT, other Ministries and
the National Personnel authority may be to delay issuing specific
guidelines until it becomes clear what sort of relationships are
evolving between companies and researchers in public institutions.
In the meantime, they seem to be permitting a steady stream of
outside work relationships. Barely a year after the enactment of
the Law to Strengthen Industrial Technology, close to fifty
researchers received permission to serve as directors of startup
companies. This suggests a commitment at multiple bureaucratic
levels to facilitate new company formations by university
researchers; that is consistent with a well-publicized government
goal of having 1000 university startup companies by July 2004.214
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 SUMMARY NoTIcATIoNs, supra note 207, No. 4.
214 The goal of having 1000 university-based venture startup companies
within three years was announced in June 2001 in the Interim Report prepared by
the Headquarters for Industrial Structural Reform and Employment Measures.
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3.1.5. Startup Formation
By mid-2002, about 435 university startup companies had been
formed, with roughly half from national universities and half from
private and local government universities. This represents a more
than three-fold increase over the number that existed at the end of
2000.215 However, in a more complete report on the 251 startup
companies tallied just half a year earlier, only seventy-seven (30%)
reported sales.216 Also, only nineteen of the 251 (8%) reported that
they received startup financing from private venture capital and
only four reported that such sources accounted for more than 25%
of their startup capital. Finally, only a portion of these companies
are research- and innovation-oriented. Only one of the university-
based life science startups, Anges MG, has had an IPO.217 One of
Japan's major investment and securities companies identified
twenty-nine university startup companies pursuing research
intensive innovation in biomedicine or biotechnology at the end of
2001.218
Although these numbers are small in comparison to the U.S.
figures, almost all of these companies have been established within
the past five years, suggesting that startup company formation is
the most dynamic aspect of Japan's technology-transfer system.
Despite some TLOs being active in startup formation, about 85% of
university startup companies are still formed by direct transfer of
IP rights from inventors to the companies.219 In order for these to
See Sangyou kouzou kaikaku, koyou taisaku honbu no secchi ni tsuite [Headquar-
ters for Industrial Structural Reform and Employment Measures] June 26, 2001)
available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2001/sangyoukouzou/
tyuukan/interim.html.
215 Hitoshi Kikumoto et al., Daigaku nado hatsu bencha ni kansuru chousa
gekka ni tsuite (chuukan happyou) [Survey of University Startup Companies
(mid-year survey)] (Oct. 2002) (unpublished paper on file with author) (updating
the report of the same title published annually by the University of Tsukuba.).
216 TSUKUBA DAI-GAKU-SENTAN GAKUSAI RYOU-IKI KENKYUU SENTAA, DAI-
GAKU NADO BENCHAA No GENJOU To KADAI IN KANSURU CHOUSA KENKYUU [Tsu-
KUBA UNIVERSITY-CENTER FOR ADVANCED INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH, UNIVER-
SITY VENTURES-SURVEY OF CURRENT SITUATION AND PROBLEMSI (2002) (copy on file
with author). This report, issued in March 2002, counted 251 startups.
217 The two other biomedical-focused startup companies that have had IPOs
since 2001, Precision Science and Transgenic, have relied on important advice
from university researchers.
218 Unpublished data from Nomura Research Institute (2002) (on file with au-
thor).
219 University Origin Start-Ups Aim at Eventual Listing, NIKKEI WKLY., Aug. 5,
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be valid transfers, the inventions must all have arisen under Kou-hi
or Donations. It seems that no one has dared to openly question
whether this, in fact, is the case.
Among startup companies' greatest challenges are inexperi-
enced management, inability of potential investors to assess the
merits of university discoveries, and reluctance on the part of large
Japanese companies to turn to them for new technologies. How-
ever, the traditional system of IP ownership from Japanese univer-
sities also poses problems. The following two cases illustrate how
startup companies must navigate between the Scylla of diffuse, un-
certain ownership of Donation/Kou-hi inventions and the Charyb-
dis of state ownership of Commissioned or Joint Research and
Grant-in-Aid inventions.
The first case involves one of Japan's most promising biomedi-
cal startup companies. Formed in late 1999, it was blessed with a
combination of advantages unique for a Japanese startup:
* a young energetic founder who is not only a respected sci-
entist, but also an entrepreneur inspired by working several
years in a leading U.S. university in the company of re-
searchers building their own startup companies;
* unique technologies that have clear medical applications,
which are the product of sound scientific research;
• a base in one of Japan's leading national university medical
centers;
" a large number of dedicated highly trained researchers;220
and
* one of the most able startup managers in Japan, whose ex-
pertise is now sought by other startup companies.
This company's main problem was that its core technologies
were based upon a series of patented inventions that the founder-
inventor had passed on informally to about five Japanese pharma-
ceutical companies under the informal transfer system described in
Section 3.1.2.2 above. In order to obtain private funding, the
startup company had to retrieve exclusive rights to these inven-
tions. The absence of such rights stymied initial attempts to raise
funds. Thanks to the manager's longstanding familiarity with sen-
ior pharmaceutical industry managers, the company managed to
2002, at 9.
220 Japanese physicians voluntarily bind themselves to many years of poorly
paid research in order to obtain a Ph.D. necessary for an academic medical career.
See COLEMAN, supra note 151, at 35 (discussing university politics).
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receive assignments-back of all patents covering its core technolo-
gies, but at a price: a percentage of its worldwide sales must be
paid to each of the five pharmaceutical companies.221 The com-
pany has since obtained both corporate and venture consortium
funding, its lead products are now undergoing human trials, and it
had a successful initial public offering of its stock in 2002. How-
ever, this company begins with a significant automatic tap on its
income. This case shows how the traditional system of professors
retaining rights to their inventions (under the supposition that they
arose under Donation or Kou-hi funding) and then conveying these
rights informally to one or more established companies is inimical
to forming a startup company aiming to develop these inventions.
The second case involves a company, established in 2001,
which was based upon bioinformatics and genomics technologies
from two major national universities and a private inventor. The
founders (two national university professors and an independent
scientist) are now trying to raise private capital and structure a
cooperative research relationship with two universities that will
enable the startup company to continue to cooperate with the
universities. They decided that funding university research via
Donations would not provide sufficient clarity to ownership of
future IP rights. However, their potential venture capital investors
were extremely concerned that inventions arising under a
Commissioned or Joint Research contract would be co-owned by
the government. Specifically, they were concerned about the need
to obtain permission from the university presidents for sales of
software products conveyed as nonexclusive licenses. They were
also concerned that any future alliance or merger of the company
involving exclusive transfers of IP may have to be approved not
only by the university presidents, but also by the Minister of
MEXT. In addition, some of the potential investors were also
concerned that under Article 73(2) of Japan's Patent Law, 222 the
universities would have a theoretical right as co-owners of any
Commissioned or Joint Research inventions to exploit the
inventions as they wished, even to the extent of competing with
the startup company for sales.223 The strategy finally agreed upon
was to sign Joint Research contracts with the universities, but to
221 Discussions with various pharmaceutical companies with Author (2001-
2002) (on file with author).
222 Patent Law, supra note 120, art. 73(2).
223 See, e.g., supra § 3.1.2.1.1, at 359-365 (discussing the competitive potential).
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carefully plan research activities under the contracts so that
research conducted in university laboratories would be limited to
routine research, while research that might give rise to inventions
would be conducted outside the universities with equipment and
supplies purchased with private funds. Not only does this scheme
impose administrative restrictions on the cooperative research, but
it also deprives university researchers of the chance to participate
in the most exciting aspects of the research. This example shows
how state ownership of university discoveries, even if it is only co-
ownership of industry-funded research, can hinder both
commercialization and scientific interchange.
These examples are not isolated cases. Rather they illustrate
the types of problems caused by the Japanese system of IP
ownership and transfer that pose challenges for many startup
companies.
3.1.6. Private Japanese Universities
As noted under Section 3.1.1, the vast majority of university
R&D occurs in national universities. Only a handful of private
universities, including Keio, Waseda and Sophia, are
internationally recognized research centers. 224 Some other private
universities perform sponsored research for nearby companies,
and a number of private medical schools conduct clinical trials
sponsored by pharmaceutical companies.
Three private universities, Nihon, Ritsumeikan, and Tokai,
require assignment to the university of all employee work-related
inventions. However, the definition of work-related inventions is
less restrictive than in the United States. Inventions made by
faculty of these universities using general (i.e., non-project-specific)
research funds are usually considered not work-related. In other
private universities, the circumstances under which employees
must assign their inventions to the universities are even more
limited.
In the case of company-sponsored research, universities and
sponsors can freely negotiate ownership and licensing terms. It
appears that universities can usually require employees involved
in company-sponsored research to assign their rights to the
university or the sponsoring company. In the case of government -
224 See TOMINAGA KEII, DAIGAKU HYOKA NO KENKYUU [A STUDY EVALUATING
UNIVERSmES] 82 (1984).
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sponsored Commissioned or Joint Research, the "Japanese Bayh-
Dole Law of 1999" applies.225 Under this law, some ministries have
elected to let all the organizations they commission to do research
claim all IP rights to resulting inventions. But other ministries
have elected to retain ownership of such inventions or at least the
option to retain ownership on a case-by-case basis.
Confusion over ownership rights of private university
inventions has occurred. In the late 1990s, a professor at a major
private university made an invention using Commissioned
Research funds from the "Pioneering Research for the Future"
Program of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science ("JSPS"),
one of the two main research funding/investment corporations
under Monbusho/MEXT. Apparently unaware of JSPS's
ownership interest in the invention, the inventor passed
information necessary to apply for a patent to a major engineering
company with which he had collaborated in the past. JSPS
invalidated the transfer and the company was forced to write a
letter of apology to JSPS. The company and JSPS later negotiated a
co-ownership agreement under which the company paid royalties
to the government. Neither the university nor the inventor has any
rights to the royalties.226
Apparently, in the case of inventions arising under MEXT
Grants-in-Aid to private universities, MEXT lets the universities or
inventors retain rights, unlike the case of Grants-in-Aid inventions
to national universities.227
3.1.7. Coming Changes
3.1.7.1. General
Japanese national universities are scheduled to become
"National University Corporations," 228 a type of "independent
administrative agency," 229 in 2004.230 This will be a major change,
225 See supra text accompanying note 172 (noting that some commissioning
agencies assert rights to Commissioned Research inventions while others let the
contractees claim rights).
226 Personal communication from university officials with Author (Apr. 15,
1998) (on file with author).
227 id.
228 Japanese: koku-ritsu dai-gaku hou-jin.
229 Japanese: doku-ritus gyou-sei hou-jin.
230 Planning for this change has been underway in earnest since 2000 and the
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but while its precise impact on ownership of IP rights and other
factors relevant to technology transfer is still under debate, it will
probably help correct many of the problems described above.
Recent reports by official advisory committees recommend that, as
a general principle, the University Corporations should own
inventions arising from university research.231 However, this
general principle leaves several details unresolved with respect to
IP:
1) It is likely that a residual category of National Inventions
will remain and that these will still be managed by central
government bureaus. MEXT has apparently agreed that
Grants-in-Aid inventions should be owned by the Univer-
sity Corporations. It has even agreed that inventions aris-
ing under Commissioned Research projects sponsored by
the JSPS (such as Pioneering Research for the Future pro-
jects) should be owned by the universities. However, JST
opposes abolition of the National Invention classification
and it particularly wants to maintain ownership over in-
ventions arising under some of its programs involving large
Commissioned Research projects. 232 Although the JST may
be reconciled to letting universities or inventors own even
these inventions, proposals are still under consideration to
transformation was originally scheduled for 2003. It is possible it will be post-
poned even further.
231 Kagaku gijutsu-gaku-jitsu shingi-kai [Science Advisory Committee of
MEXT] in Koku-ritsu dai-gaku hou-jin (ka shou) in okeru san-gaku-kan ren-kei no
ari-kata ni tsuite (shingi kai no gai-you); [Recommendations on Industry-
University-Government Cooperation in National University Corporations] (Dec.
11, 2001) available at http://www.mext.go.jp/b.-menu/shingi/gijyutu/gijyutu8/
gaiyo/011201.htm.
232 These programs include the Core Research for Evaluational Science and
Technology ("CREST") program, which funds large-scale biomedical research
projects and whose 2000 budget was 29 billion yen (approximately 180 million
USD). See http://www.jst.go.jp/crest/. The Precursory Research for Embryonic
Science and Technology Project is also included, which provides generous project
grants to young researchers, as well as the Exploratory Research for Advanced
Technology ("ERATO") program to fund pioneering innovative research, usually
in universities. See http://www.jst.go.jp/presto/. Ironically, JST and JSPS are
both research investment corporations under MEXT. Before the STA and Mon-
busho merged, JST was STA's investment corporation while JSPS was Mon-
busho's. Both JST and JSPS bring their parent corporation's administrative styles
and philosophies to the newly created MEXT. In addition, because JST has had
technology management responsibilities that extending even to other ministries, it
is reluctant to see responsibilities diminished in its home ministry, MEXT. See
discussion supra note 96. See also discussion supra § 3.1.2.1.1.1.
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let JST retain co-ownership over some of the inventions it
funds. In this case, JST will have veto power over any li-
censes. How JST might exercise this veto power is unclear.
Also unresolved is ownership of IP that will be commis-
sioned by ministries such as MAFF and MHLW, and minis-
tries that do not implement the so-called Japanese Bayh-
Dole law to automatically allow commissioned organiza-
tions to claim IP rights.233
2) Even if universities have the right to claim a large portion
of inventions, how they will manage the inventions and the
future role of the TLOs is still not clear. Although the Uni-
versity Corporations will have some independence over
personnel issues, they will largely inherit present adminis-
trative staff whose career paths and salary scales may still
be linked to the MEXT personnel system. At least in the
eyes of some TLO officials, these administrators would not
be suitable technology managers. Many TLOs do not want
to be absorbed into the administrative structure of the Uni-
versity Corporations because they feel their personnel and
technology management decisions would be bureaucrati-
cally constrained. So although the University Corporations
may end up with ownership rights, administrative person-
nel and procedures may change little, and many TLOs may
want to remain separate organizations. However if they
succeed, they may have to negotiate with their universities
for assignments of inventions, and the legal and financial
relationships with their universities will have to be worked
out. It seems clear that independent TLOs will be able to
receive either assignments or exclusive licenses.234 An al-
ternative mechanism under discussion is for the TLOs to act
as trustees for the IP of their universities, but current regu-
lations allow only banks and securities companies to act as
trustees of IP.235
233 Law of Special Measure to Revive Industrial Vitality, supra note 177.
234 Independent TLOs will also be able to receive sen-you licenses that func-
tion almost like assignments. See supra note 124 (describing various forms of li-
censes).
235 Trust Business to Handle Work Related to Intellectual Property, NIKKEI WKLY.,
Jan. 27, 2003, at 4.
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3) MEXT has recently authorized the establishment of "Intel-
lectual Property Centers"2 6 within all major universities.
The purpose of these centers is to improve the management
of university IP. It appears that many centers will be based
on the law faculties of their respective universities and will
not provide much expertise to either business or technology
issues- the two fields that are most important to U.S. TLOs.
It is not clear how the role of the IP Centers will be coordi-
nated with that of the TLOs. Unfortunately, it appears that
there is potential for conflict with patenting and licensing
authority. As noted above, some TLOs are hindered by
lack of support from their universities and are caught up in
a rivalry between groups within their universities. The
considerable expertise that some of these TLOs have devel-
oped may be squandered and technology transfer stymied
by a rivalry between TLOs and the new IP Centers that is
an extension of existing rivalries within their universities.
In the Author's opinion, the establishment of these centers
reflects a pervasive overemphasis in Japan on IP protection
as a component of technology transfer, and insufficient em-
phasis on the need to make such transfers attractive and
feasible from business and technical perspectives. In any
case, the establishment of these centers coupled with the
change to independent administrative status, probably will
increase pressure on independent TLOs to be incorporated
within their universities.
4) Partly out of concern over the issues in Items 1-3 above,
some faculty members are strongly advocating that inven-
tors in the new University Corporations be allowed to re-
tain ownership over some of their inventions. They argue
that if university administrations or TLOs cannot manage
inventions competently, or if the IP Centers and the TLOs
cannot work together, it would be better if inventors re-
tained ownership. As noted in Section 3.1.6, the concept of
"work-related invention" is narrower in Japanese universi-
ties than in U.S. universities. Thus, even if all the invention
categories listed in Table 1 are officially designated as be-
longing either to the University Corporations or to the na-
tion, simply maintaining a narrow definition of "work-
2M Japanese: Chiteki zaisan honbu.
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related invention" may allow inventors to retain ownership
over a considerable portion of their inventions.
Thus despite grounds for real optimism concerning the next two
years, the end result may still be a system where ownership and
management authority are both unclear and subject to manipula-
tion.
* Faculty members should no longer be civil servants.237 Pre-
cisely what control University Corporations will have over
salaries, promotions, etc. is not clear. It seems doubtful that
this change will directly alter the kouza system.
" Several position papers advocate increased flexibility in
employing researchers with outside research funds, other-
wise known as soft money. However, these proposals do
not advocate permitting full 'time permanent faculty (i.e.,
kouza members) to supplement their salaries with spon-
sored or government research funds. Rather, they speak of
increased flexibility to pay expenses for graduate students
and postdoctoral researchers and for hiring senior non-
permanent researchers using outside research funds.238
3.1.7.2. Predictions
Although it is risky to do so, the Author will offer his own pre-
dictions in order to clarify the above discussion. University Corpo-
rations will be able to claim IP rights to inventions made under
Grants-in-Aid and company-sponsored Commissioned or Joint Re-
search. In theory, they will also be able to claim Kou-hi and Dona-
tion inventions, but pressure from their faculty and the weakness
of many TLOs and university administrations may force them to
let inventors retain ownership. In some cases, government funding
agencies will let the University Corporations own the Commis-
sioned or Joint Research inventions, but, more often, they will re-
quire joint ownership and will preserve a veto over exclusive li-
censes. Rivalries between TLOs and the new legally oriented IP
Centers will be a significant problem in some universities and will
237 Kokuritsu daigaku nado no dokuritsu gyousei houjin ka ni kan-suru
chou-sa kentou kaigi [Committee to Examine the Transformation of National
Universities into Independent Administrative Entities], Atarashi "kokuritsu dai-
gaku houjin" zou in tsuite [Plan for the New National University Corporations]
(Mar. 26, 2002), available at http://www.mext.go.jp/amenu/koutou/houdou/
index.htm.
238 Id.
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contribute to pressure to let inventors retain ownership over some
of their inventions. In other words, ownership and transfer au-
thority will still vary according to source of funds, although uni-
versities will be able to claim ownership over a substantially larger
proportion of inventions than they, or their TLOs, currently claim.
The relationship between the TLOs and their universities will
be crucial to the success of technology management under the new
system. Most TLOs probably will remain separate from the Uni-
versity Corporations. If the TLOs, the new IP Centers, and the
administrative personnel in the University Corporations cooperate
closely, and if transfer of invention management authority to the
TLOs occurs smoothly, then there is a good chance that the TLOs
will become the clear focal point for technology transfer for the
new University Corporations. Under such circumstances, there
will be pressure from all parties for the TLOs to perform well, and
the TLOs will have both the means and the incentives to pro-
actively champion promising technologies. But if cooperation is
poor, or if the TLOs are perceived to be incompetent, then the in-
centive will be to obscure the inventions and incorrectly attribute
sources of funding in order to let inventors retain ownership
whenever possible. This, in turn, will mean that a large number of
transfers will still occur informally, with few development obliga-
tions and a continuing absence of data on inventions and transfers.
The record of cooperation is mixed so far and does not provide
grounds for great optimism.
As for personnel issues, it will probably be relatively easy to
pay stipends to graduate students and salaries to postdoctoral re-
searchers from sponsored research funds. The kouza system will
remain intact for the near future. But parallel to it, a new class of
nonpermanent "invited" professors, associate/assistant professors,
instructors, and special assistants will arise, who will be hired on
one-to-five year contracts and draw most of their salaries from
sponsored research funds and special government budget alloca-
tions. Transitioning to a permanent status will be difficult, except
perhaps for young "invited" researchers. Thus, a two-caste system
may evolve, with the lower caste consisting of those whose salaries
are paid by sponsored research funds and special government allo-
cations. Rather than the opportunistic behavior observed at all
levels of the U.S. academic hierarchy, the future Japanese system
may be characterized by the "invited" nonpermanent researchers
being preoccupied with finding permanent employment during
much of their research tenures.
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3.2. Japanese GRIs
This Article cannot give a complete account of technology
transfer from Japanese GRIs which in 1998 performed about 1.33
trillion yen (approximately 9 billion USD) of R&D as compared to
about 2.09 trillion yen (approximately 15 billion USD) performed
by Japanese universities.239 Instead it will focus on the following
three organizations:
* The Institute of Physical and Chemical Science ("Riken"), a
large multidisciplinary laboratory established as a special
public corporation under STA, now part of MEXT.
" The National Institute of Advanced Science and
Technology ("AIST"), a collection of research institutes and
centers, formerly directly under MITI, now an Independent
Administrative Institution associated with METI.
* The laboratories of the Ministry of Health, Labor and
Welfare ("MHLW"), among which the largest are the
National Cancer Center Research Institute in Tokyo and the
National Cardiovascular Center Research Institute in
Osaka.
Sponsored research and licensing at the MHLW laboratories
illustrate the "traditional" form of technology transfer from GRIs.
Among the major GRIs, Riken has the longest tradition of
independent ownership and management of IP. AIST was recently
transformed to an independent administrative institution. Thus
both Riken and AIST may provide a glimpse of what technology
transfer may be like in Japanese universities after they become
independent administrative agencies. 240
3.2.1. Riken
Riken is one of the STA's flagship basic science laboratories. In
addition to research in physics and chemistry, it is one of Japan's
leading research institutions in biology, particularly botany, brain
research, and genomics. In terms of resources, it is Japan's leading
center for proteomics research with facilities using nuclear
magnetic resonance to determine the structures of various proteins.
The facilities are unrivaled anywhere else in the world.
239 NATLSci. BD., supra note 4, at A-15.
240 Because the Author has less access to administrative and legal documents
related to GRIs, more of the information in this Section is based upon interviews
than in the case of the previous section dealing with universities.
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Under the 1958 law that established Riken, it has the authority
to own and manage inventions made in its laboratories.241 Riken
requires its inventors to report their inventions to a technology
management office within Riken. In the mid-1990s, Riken gave its
inventors the option to receive a half-ownership interest in their
inventions in order to encourage its employees to commercialize
their research results. Thus, a substantial proportion of Riken
inventions are co-owned by Riken and Riken inventors.
However, in the case of sponsored research, Riken strongly
urges its inventors to forgo the option of co-ownership so that IP
rights remain entirely within its laboratories. This allows Riken to
transfer IP rights more easily to the sponsoring organization or to
share rights with the sponsor. Thus, in the case of inventions by
Riken researchers arising under industry-sponsored projects, Riken
either shares patent application rights with the sponsor as a result
of a prenegotiated contract between the sponsor and Riken, or
retains complete ownership rights that it licenses to the sponsor.
Riken has the authority to issue exclusive licenses, but complete
assignments in an invention would require approval from the
MEXT Minister. In 2000, Riken received nearly 600 million yen
(approximately 4 million USD) in sponsored research from private
companies, approximately one-third under Joint Research
contracts and two-thirds' under Commissioned , Research
contracts.242
The same year, it received over 700 million yen (approximately
5 million USD) in Commissioned Research from government-
affiliated organizations. Riken also annually receives between 100
million and 1 billion yen in Grants-in-Aid from MEXT, often via
JST.243 JST/MEXT applies the Japanese Bayh-Dole Law 244 to
Riken.245 Therefore, ownership of Grant-in-Aid inventions, as well
as inventions from Commissioned or Joint Research funded by JST
and JSPS, remains with Riken and the inventors, or Riken alone if
Riken requests the inventors to forgo ownership. However, in the
case of inventions made under Commissioned Research from the
241 Rika-gaku kenkyuu-shou hou [Riken Law], Data from Riken's Office of
Technology Management (Mar. 2002).
242 Riken Law, supra note 241. Riken does not permit Donation-sponsored
research.
243 Discussions at Riken (Mar. 20, 2002) [hereinafter Riken].
244 Law of Special Measures to Revive Industrial Vitality, supra note 177.
245 Riken, supra note 243.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. [24:2
Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries or the Ministry of
Health, Labor and Welfare, ownership of inventions is divided
between Riken and the sponsoring agency on a case-by-case basis.
In 2000, Riken filed applications for 171 Japanese and 203
foreign patents.246  Approximately 40% were filed on inventions
246 Table 4: Riken 2000-Ownership and Numbers of Inventions by R&D
Funding Source
Type of Who owns Japanese Licensing( R&D funding, % total
funding/ inventions? patent assignment billion yen funding
project applications authority (million USD)
General Riken -86(50%) Exclusive OK, 66 ($410) 97
R&D sublicensing
budget approvable
Inventor and -17(10%) Probably most
Riken exclusive
MEXT Riken -0 Exclusive OK -0.5 ($3) 0.7
Grants-in-
Aid
Research Riken -0 Exclusive OK 0.7 ($4.4) 1.0
commiss-
ioned by
JSPS, JST &
ministries
that apply
Bayh-Dole
Research Riken and -0 Probably
commiss- sponsor nonexclusive only
ioned by
MAFF,
MHLW
Company- Riken -68 (-80) Exclusive OK, but 0.6 ($3.8) 0.9
Sponsored not assignment,
Commiss- sublicensing
ioned or approvable
Joint
Research
Total 171 (203) - -68 ($420) 100
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arising from industry-sponsored Commissioned or Joint Research.
This percentage is far in excess of the industry's percentage
contribution to Riken's total research budget.247 This suggests that
without the restrictions and uncertainty associated with national
co-ownership, industry-sponsored research will generate
inventions with commercial potential that both sponsor, and that
the laboratory will seek to patent. About 10% of Riken's
applications were filed jointly in the name of Riken and the Riken
inventor. About 50% were filed by Riken alone and arose from
Riken's internal R&D budget. Very few, if any, of these inventions
were attributed to project-specific government funds (i.e., MEXT
Grants-in-Aid or government-funded Commissioned or Joint
Research).248
At the end of 2000, Riken had licensed 208 inventions out of a
total of over 2000 patents, utility model patents, and pending
patent applications.249 Total royalties received that year were 32.3
million yen (approximately 200,000 USD). In the 2001 fiscal year,
total royalties jumped to about 75 million yen (approximately
500,000 USD), largely due to a single exclusive license to a U.S.
biotech nology company discussed under Section 3.4. About 10%
of Riken's licenses are exclusive licenses. 50 while the remainder are
nonexclusive. Riken has the authority to permit sublicenses.
Riken has so far granted about forty applications for its
researchers to engage in outside work (ken-gyou). As noted above,
outside work can include a range of involvement with private
sector companies from simply being a member of a company's
247 Riken's total budget for the 2001 fiscal year was 76.9 billion yen (approxi-
mately 500 million USD), composed of net personnel and administration expenses
of about 11 billion yen and probably net of Grants-in-Aid and Commissioned or
Joint Research funds. See http://www.riken.go.jp (providing the public with in-
formation about Riken) (last visited May 7, 2003). Therefore, it appears that in-
dustry Commissioned or Joint Research (approximately 600 million yen), gov-
ernment Commissioned or Joint Research (approximately 700 million yen), and
MEXT Grants-in-Aid (approximately 1 billion yen), together account for only
about 3% of Riken's budget.
248 Riken, supra note 243.
249 Statistics from Riken (Mar. 20, 2002) [hereinafter Riken Statistics].
2-o In Japanese, ittei kikan doku-sen tsuu-jou jisshi-ken are time-limited exclusive
licenses where Riken retains a noncommercial use right. The time limit is often
five to ten years with the option to extend. These are nearly identical to the pref-
erential licenses discussed above in relation to universities. They would also fit
within the common definition of an "exclusive license" as used in the United
States.
413
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
scientific advisory committee to being a president or founder of a
company.
As of March 2002, twelve Riken startup companies had been
formed. All are headed by Riken scientists who maintain their
Riken positions. The founders and other Riken researchers can
own stock in the companies. Riken graduate students and
postdoctoral researchers can work on research important to the
startup companies. Some of the inventions that form the core
assets of these companies arose as solely Riken-owned or Riken-
plus-inventor-owned inventions that were subsequently
exclusively licensed to the startup companies.251  However,
perhaps a majority of the core patent rights derive from Joint
Research contracts between the nascent companies and Riken,
which call for co-ownership of the inventions by Riken and the
startup companies. 2 2 This suggests that startup companies from
Japanese universities probably would leap at the chance to
leverage private capital to support research in university
laboratories under Joint or Commissioned Research, but for the the
fact that such inventions would be classified as "National
Inventions. 253
If a Riken startup company was to merge with another
company, Riken would need to approve the transfer of any jointly-
owned patents under Section 73 of the Japanese Patent Law,2 4 and
it would require the renegotiation of any exclusive licenses. Riken
officials suggested that while Riken would probably approve such
transfers in the case of a merger with a Japanese company, Riken
would be hesitant to do so in the case of a merger with a foreign
company. Nevertheless, as discussed below in Section 3.4, Riken
has shown that it is willing to license exclusively to foreign
companies if no Japanese companies are interested in a promising
Riken invention.
251 Most of these are five-year renewable time-limited exclusive licenses.
Riken Statistics, supra note 249.
252 Riken, supra note 243.
253 Another explanation is that the startup companies prefer the co-
ownership rights they can secure via Joint Research contracts as opposed to the
five year exclusive licenses they could secure by simply licensing Riken inven-
tions. In either case, this data suggests that the startup companies look favorably
upon Joint Research Contracts as a means to cooperate with Riken and secure sat-
isfactory IP rights.
254 See Patent Law, supra note 120, § 73 (explaining the rights of joint patent
holders).
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3.2.2. AIST
3.2.2.1. Pre-2001
The laboratories under AIST have long been the primary R&D
laboratories affiliated with MITI/METI. Prior to 2001, AIST was a
part of MITI and encompassed several administrative offices and
fifteen research institutes.255 Among these institutes was the
Electrotechnical Laboratory that played a major role in noted MITI
industrial policy -initiatives, such as the "Fifth Generation
Computer Program/Consortium," which created a revolutionary
supercomputer in the 1980s.256 In 1999, the total budget of all
fifteen AIST institutes was about 70 billion yen (approximately 450
million USD), of which roughly 60% was for nonpersonnel
research expenses.
As in the case of most other GRIs, AIST inventions were, as a
rule, National Inventions. However, private sponsors of
Commissioned or Joint Research could negotiate with AIST for co-
ownership of Commissioned or Joint Research inventions. In the
case of Commissioned Research, the default allocation was 100%
ownership to AIST/MITI, but the prenegotiated contract could call
for AIST to transfer a portion of its rights to the commissioning
company. However, the vast majority of sponsored research
agreements have been Joint Research contracts. Here, the basic
principle has been that ownership should be divided according to
each party's contribution. In case an invention was made entirely
by company employees, AIST could, in theory, grant the company
full ownership. However, this problem never arose for any
invention made in an AIST laboratory. 25 7 In 2000, about 180
patents were issued jointly to AIST and sponsoring companies. At
the end of that year an additional 600 joint applications were still
255 The Japanese name for the pre-2001 AIST was Kou-gyou Gijutsu In and the
AIST laboratories were collectively called Kou-gyou Gi-jutsu In Kenkyuu Jo.
256 ScoTr CALLON, DIVIDED SUN: MITI AND THE BREAKDOWN OF JAPANESE HIGH-
TECH INDUSrRIAL POLICY 1975-1993 46-51, 66-74, 97-104 (1995).
257 If company employees engaged in a Joint Research project with AIST
make an invention in the company's laboratories, the company almost always
retains 100% ownership of the invention. This is different from the case of
CRADA inventions made in company laboratories over which the U.S.
government does claim an ownership interest. See supra § 2.2.1 (discussing how
the "FTTA requires that the government retain a nonexclusive, irrevocable, paid-
up license to any CRADA inventions, including those made solely by employees
of the CRADA partner").
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pending before the Japanese Patent Office.258 Jointly owned
inventions accounted for approximately half of AIST's 7700 Japa-
nese and 1500 foreign patents at the end of 2000. This suggests that
if inventors do not have the option to retain full ownership by at-
tributing their inventions to Donation funds, many inventions will
be attributed to sponsored research projects within the industry.
In the case of AIST inventions made under its own research
budget, the AIST inventors could own up to 50% of their
inventions if they paid the patent application fees. It is not clear
how often this happened. Patenting decisions were made by
AIST's Research Administration Division while licensing was
handled by the Japan Industrial Technology Association, a MITI-
affiliated office in downtown Tokyo. In 2000, about 250 patents
were issued to AIST for inventions arising under its own R&D
budget, and at the end of that year, an additional 400 applications
were still pending before the Japanese Patent Office.259
By the end of 2000, AIST was issuing about thirty to forty li-
censes annually and had active licenses held by about 150 compa-
nies covering about 290 (3%) of its 9200 total patents. About half of
these were licenses of Joint Research inventions to the sponsors,
while half were for inventions arising under AIST's own R&D
budget. Total license royalties in 1998 were 82.4 million yen (ap-
proximately 500,000 USD).
At least in the case of the licenses for non-Joint Research
inventions, almost all were nonexclusive. In other words, the same
barriers to exclusive or preferential licenses applied to AIST
National Inventions that apply to university National Inventions.
However, if the AIST inventor were to recommend a particular
licensee, AIST would generally not issue a license to any other
company. The same process is noted in Section 3.1.2.1.1.2 with
respect to licenses of university inventions by JST. Companies
often complain that AIST's licensing offices are too slow and
bureaucratic in issuing licenses; that is, unless they become
involved themselves in recommending licensees through inventors
or laboratories. AIST rarely, if ever, granted permission for
258 Written communication from AIST (Oct. 26, 2001) [hereinafter AIST] (on
file with author).
259 Id.
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sublicenses or other IP transfers to third parties.260
In summary, under the pre-2001 system, technology transfer to
industry was burdened by some of the same limitations that
burdened technology transfer from universities, namely that (1)
many of AIST's own inventions were classified as National
Inventions and could only be licensed nonexclusively, and (2) even
inventions jointly owned by a Joint Research sponsor could not be
transferred to a third party. In one respect, the burden was even
greater because there was no option to classify inventions as
inventor-owned and then pass these inventions directly to
companies. Without this informal transfer option, Joint Research
contracts became the only mechanism for companies to obtain
some degree of exclusivity over discoveries originating in AIST
laboratories. This explains why the number of patent applications,
issued patents, and licenses are so impressive compared to the
26 Table 5: Old AIST in 2000-Ownership of Inventions and Number of
Japanese Patents and Licenses
Type of Who owns Licensing( Patents Patents Total Total
funding inventions? assignment issued pend- patents at licensed
project authority during ing at year end patents at
Year year end (foreign year end
patents)
General AIST on behalf Nonexclusive -250 400 -3850 145
R&D of nation only, but if (-750)
budget inventor
AIST/nation recommended
and Inventor* particular
licensee; AIST
would usually not
license any other
company; no
sublicenses
company- AIST/nation No transfers to 180 600 -3850 145
Sponsored and sponsor third parties (-750)
Joint
Research
(Commiss-
ioned
Research is
rare)
Total -430 -1000 7700 (1500) 290
royalties
-84 M\
(SOSM)
*Inventor needs to pay application fees.
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figures for all national universities combined 261 even though the
combined budgets and human resources of AIST are much smaller
than those of universities.
The pre-2001 AIST shows what the Japanese university system
probably would have been like if university inventors could not
retain ownership over any of their inventions. Instead of
inventions flowing informally to companies via the "inventor
retains ownership" route, the number of Joint Research agreements
would have proliferated. This is an indication of how great the
pressures are to get around a system of national ownership of IP
that requires any license of a taxpayer-funded invention to be
nonexclusive. It is another indication of the fundamental
incompatibility of a system of state ownership of IP rights that
forbids exclusive licenses with the realities of a functional
technology-transfer system.
3.2.2.2. Post-2001
As of April 2001, AIST was reorganized as an independent
administrative institution affiliated with METI.262 The new AIST
comprises twenty-two research institutes mostly located in
Tsukuba Science City outside of Tokyo, twenty-four research
centers with a narrower technology focus than the institutes, an
advanced computing center, a depository for patented organisms
and various research initiatives, collaboration teams and regional
collaboration centers, and administrative offices.263 One of these
offices, AIST Innovations, performs TLO functions related to
licensing.
Ownership of privately sponsored Commissioned or Joint
Research inventions is unchanged from the old system, except that
AIST co-owns inventions in its own name, rather than on behalf of
METI and the nation. As an alternative to co-ownership by the
sponsor, the sponsor can elect to receive an exclusive or
nonexclusive license of resulting inventions. If it elects an
exclusive license, it must pay patent prosecution costs. Third-party
transfers are now possible, but these need to be approved by
AIST's TLO, as well the AIST Intellectual Property Office.
261 See JST website at http://www.jst.go.jp. (last visited May 7, 2003) (stating
that only seventy-eight patents and three licenses were issued out of 226 Japanese
applications in 2000).
262 New Japanese name: San-gyou gi-jutsu sou-gou kenkyuu-jo.
263 See AIST website at http://www.aist.go.jp (last visited May 7, 2003).
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Ownership and transfer authority over government-sponsored
Commissioned or Joint Research Inventions is determined first by
whether the sponsoring agency applies the Japanese Bayh-Dole
Law to let AIST claim full ownership rights. If the sponsoring
agency does not, then ownership is decided on a case-by-case basis
according to the terms of the research contract.
As for AIST inventions arising from projects funded by its own
budget, AIST now owns all rights in its own name. Inventors no
longer have a co-ownership option. However, they are guaranteed
at least 25% of royalty income.264 Decisions on whether to apply
for patents are usually made by the directors of individual research
units. The actual application process is managed by AIST's
Intellectual Property Division, not the TLO, although the TLO can
have input regarding issues such as utility.265
The TLO, AIST Innovations, is responsibile for marketing and
licensing inventions and it can issue exclusive licenses. However,
all its licensing decisions must be approved by AIST's Office of
Intellectual Property. Thus, the relationship between AIST's Office
of Intellectual Property and AIST Innovations may be a harbinger
of the future relationship between the IP Centers in National
University Corporations and their TLOS, with the TLOs playing a
subservient role.
Under the pre-2001 AIST, permission for outside work
(including consulting) on behalf of a for-profit company was rarely
264 Currently 50% of royalty income is allocated to the TLO with the remain-
ing 25% to AIST as a whole. After the TLO becomes more financially stable, its
share is expected to fall to 25% with the other 25% dedicated to the inventors' re-
search unit. E-mail from Mr. Nagaiwa, AIST, to the Author (Oct. 10, 2001).
265 Table 6: New AIST-Ownership of Inventions and Management Author-
ity
Type of funding/project Who owns inventions? Licensing/assignment authority
General R&D budget AIST Exclusive license and sublicense
(inventors receive > OK
25% royalties)
Company-Sponsored Commissioned AIST and sponsor Third-party transfers subject to
or Joint Research AIST approval
AIST Exclusive license to sponsor OK
Research commissioned by gov't AIST Exclusive license and sublicense
agency that implements Bayh-Dole OK
Research commissioned by gov't Decided project by pro- Project by project
agency such as MAFF or MHLW ject
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granted. However, since the changes in AIST, 146 applications for
permission to engage in outside work have been approved. The
majority of these probably involve work in other government-
affiliated institutions or activities such as serving on the scientific
advisory board of a private company. As of January 2002, only
four AIST researchers were officially working in for-profit
companies to develop their AIST inventions.266 Special approval,
from the National Personnel Office, is needed for outside work
involving management of a company.
As of January 2002, five startup companies were formed based
upon AIST technologies.267 From subsequent Japanese press
reports and the Author's own discussions with venture fund
managers, it seems certain that more companies are being formed.
Venture capital funds regard some of these new startup companies
as good investments. These companies are either receiving
exclusive licenses to AIST inventions made under AIST's own
budget, or rights to co-own any AIST inventions arising under
Joint Research contracts with AIST.
3.2.3. MHLW Laboratories268
The MHLW has a number of stand-alone research centers in
addition to several major research institutes attached to specialized
MHLW hospitals. The largest of the MHLW's research institutes
are the National Cancer Research Institute with a budget for the
2000 fiscal year of 32 billion yen (approximately 200 million USD),
which is integrated with the National Cancer Center Hospital in
Tokyo. The National Cardiovascular Center Research Institute had
a budget for the 2000 fiscal year of 24 billion yen (approximately
160 million USD), integrated with the National Cardiovascular
Center Hospital in Osaka. All together, the MHLW owns and
manages about 270 hospitals nationwide, about 40 of which are
capable of participating in clinical drug trials.
As for AIST and Riken, corporate Donation support for
sponsored research is not permitted. All sponsored research must
be under either Commissioned or Joint Research contracts
negotiated between the sponsors and the individual institutions.
As in the case of national universities, Riken, and AIST, the
266 AIST, supra note 258.
267 Id.
268 Before 2001, MHLW was the Ministry of Health and Welfare ("MHW").
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sponsoring company can usually prenegotiate the right to co-own
any resulting inventions. Probably the majority of Commissioned
or Joint Research contracts between private companies and MHLW
institutions are for the clinical development of the sponsors'
proprietary drugs or medical devices-i.e., for human clinical
trials. In 1999, the pharmaceutical industry contributed 3.7 billion
yen (approximately 24 million USD) for clinical trials in MHLW
hospitals under Commissioned or Joint Research contracts. 269
However, the number of patents arising under Commissioned or
Joint Research contracts has been low-the cumulative total as of
March 2000 was less than ten.270
Inventions in MHW institutions made with the institutions'
own research funds were jointly filed by the inventors or the
institute directors. In other words, IPR was to be jointly owned by
inventors and their institutes. However, only a few institutes have
established formal reporting procedures and before about 1998
neither MHW researchers nor administrators paid much attention
to IP issues. Only within the past few years have some institutes
begun educational programs related to IP.
Table 7 summarizes patenting and licensing activities by
individual MHLW research institutes over the most recent two
years.271
The individual institutes tend to manage IP issues on their
own, although they have the option to let JST handle it on their
269 Discussion between MHLW and the Author (Mar. 2000) (on file with au-
thor).
270 Id. Unlike pharmaceutical companies sponsoring clinical trials in U.S.
academic medical centers which seek to patent a variety of novel methods to use
or administer medicines developed under their sponsored trials, pharmaceutical
companies sponsoring trials in Japanese academic medical centers rarely do this.
The Author is not sure whether this reflects a lower tendency by Japanese, as
compared with U.S.-European, pharmaceutical companies to seek method-of-use
pharmaceutical patents, or different styles of conducting clinical trials in Japanese
as opposed to U.S. medical centers, particularly a tendency by the pharmaceutical
companies to define protocols for Japanese hospitals so rigidly that there is little
chance the clinicians will invent any new methods of use.
271 Table 7: Recent Patenting and Licensin& by Individual MHLW Institutes
Patent Applications* Issued Patents* Licenses License Royalties in Yen
2000 38 9 4 6.5 M \ (-$40,000)
2001 79 6 5 3.1 M \ (-$20,000)
*Some of these applications were for Commissioned or Joint Research inventions
that were to be co-owned by the sponsoring company.
Source: MHWL Data (on file with author)
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behalf. All licenses must be nonexclusive and nontransferable.
There are initiatives within MHLW, however, to allow companies
that sponsor Commissioned or Joint Research in a MHWL institute
to receive preferential licenses in lieu of prenegotiated co-
ownership.
Since 2000, MHLW institutes have received large amounts of
government Commissioned Research funds under the Millennium
Project and other large government programs focused on genomics
and regenerative medicine. Most of these Commissioned Research
funds are dispersed as individual contracts with particular MHLW
institutes via the Organization for Pharmaceutical Safety and
Research ("OPSR"),272 a wholly owned MHLW corporation and
MHLW's equivalent of JST. OPSR also awards extramural research
contracts to GRIs under other ministries and also to universities.
Inventions that arise under such Commissioned Research generally
are managed by OPSR, except in the case of research
commissioned by OPSR in universities and non-MHLW GRIs, in
which case the IP management procedures of the recipient
institution are followed. In any event, if OPSR applies for patents,
it retains a partial ownership interest with the inventing institution.
If the inventing institution applies for patents, then it is bound to
transfer a partial ownership interest to OPSR.
Over the past two years, OPSR-funded research has produced
approximately sixty inventions for which patent applications have
been filed. Twenty of these have been filed by OPSR itself,
presumably because they arose in MHLW laboratories. Ten of
these applications arose under Millennium Project funds. Under a
combination ownership-license agreement, ownership rights for
these ten inventions and probably most future Millennium Project
inventions will be allocated 40% to the inventing institute, 40% to
OPSR, and 20% to a government-industry consortium, called
Genox Research, which was organized by the government to
develop and commercialize genome-related discoveries from the
Millennium Project. Under this agreement, the respective MHLW
institutes and OPSR exclusively license their invention rights to
Genox, but reserve the right to cancel the license.273 Development
272 Japanese: I-yaku-hin ki-kou. See The Organization for Pharmaceutical
Safety and Research ("OPSR"/Kiko) website at http://www.kiko.go.jp (describing
OPSR services) (last visited May 7, 2003).
273 This is a sen-yuu jisshi ken license. See Patent Law, supra note 120 (describ-
ing this type of license).
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and commercialization of these inventions by Genox is proceeding
slowly. So far, this is the only license OPSR has issued. OPSR is
the only MHLW organization with the authority to issue exclusive
or preferential licenses.
Apparently similar rules regarding outside work apply to
MHLW researchers as well as to national university and AIST
researchers. Responses by MHLW to the Author's queries did not
reveal whether any startup companies have been formed to
develop discoveries by MHLW researchers. Although many of the
MHLW hospitals and sanatoriums are expected to become
independent administrative organizations in 2004, the main
research laboratories will remain directly under MHLW control.
In summary, technology transfers from MHLW laboratories
still occur in a traditional manner. Despite having several large re-
search centers alongside major hospitals, levels of patent applica-
tions and licensing are low. Sponsored research within the indus-
try tends to be mainly for clinical trials that do not generate new
discoveries. One factor underlying this situation is the low level of
awareness of IP issues among researchers and administrators. An-
other possible factor is the inability, under most circumstances, for
companies to receive exclusive rights to MHLW inventions. The
inability of licensees to obtain exclusive rights may be particularly
discouraging because many of the discoveries that might emerge
from MHLW laboratories would be related to drugs or medical
devices. It seems doubtful that movements to centralize technol-
ogy management under OPSR are increasing incentives for col-
laboration with industry.
3.3. Conflicts of Interest
As Japan tries to liberalize its system of university-industry
cooperation, conflict-of-interest issues arise that are as significant
as those in the United States. The following discussion focuses on
universities. Rather than a thorough analysis, the discussion
highlights some the main features of this complicated and rapidly
evolving issue in Japan.
As the debate about outside work in Section 3.1.5 indicates, a
system now exists for university researchers to consult legally for
private companies and to be reimbursed, even by transferring
nonpublicly traded stock. Under this system, consulting
arrangements must be reported and entered into a public database.
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These are significant steps towards making consulting more
transparent and ethical.
Nevertheless, there are few guidelines about specific types of
relationships with industry that raise concerns, particularly issues
that are central to current conflict-of-interest debates in the United
States. During negotiations for Commissioned or Joint Research
contracts, the university scientists are not asked if they have
financial or management interests in the sponsoring company.
University administrative officials acknowledge that some cases
may be problematic, for example, holding significant amounts of
nonpublicly traded stock or haveing a management position in the
sponsor.274 Such cases are "under discussion."
Currently there are no special guidelines that apply when
researchers have financial interests in companies sponsoring
clinical trials. There are no affirmative obligations for university
researchers to disclose financial interests in the sponsor companies
to special ethics committees, institutional review boards ("IRB"), or
patients. Individual clinical researchers have told the Author that
they would voluntarily disclose such interests to their IRB, but this
is probably not a uniform practice.275
The seeming reluctance of the Japanese government to enact
guidelines at this early stage in the expansion of outside work and
startup companies is understandable. But until judicial guidelines
are in effect, the following risks will increase:
" Scientific objectivity will be undermined in situations
where the outcome of research might affect personal or
family financial interests.
" Patients' health may be at risk if conflict-of-interest
situations arise in the context of clinical trials.
" Researchers holding inside information will manipulate
information available to the public and sell their startup
company shares at their maximum.
" Graduate students will be urged to work on startup
company projects, even when such work is not in the
interest of their academic development.
All these problems are potentially compounded by the fact that
many of these startup companies are the recipients of IP rights in
274 Written communication from University of Tokyo, RCAST, administrative
office to Author Uune 28, 2002) (on file with author).
275 See supra § 2.1.5. for a comparison to the U.S. situation.
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university discoveries that may have been misappropriately
classified as belonging to the inventors.
The greatest danger is that a scandal involving many of these
issues will arise and the public will assume that technology
transfer as a whole is tainted and primarily for the benefit of
greedy faculty members. If the scandal involves a clinical trial in
which a patient is injured, and the patient's relatives and IRB
members claim they should have known in advance about the
conflict-of-interest situation, the outcome could be devastating.
Currently, conflict-of-interest issues are addressed
prospectively by university administrative personnel only in the
narrow context of applications for outside work. Because
administrative personnel rotate jobs every two years, it is difficult
for them to obtain substantial expertise in conflict-of-interest
issues. In addition, they often lack financial information on
individual researchers to proactively address potential conflict
situations and make individualized decisions. 276 As the Japanese
universities become independent administrative entities, they
should try to develop a long-term core group of persons with
expertise in dealing with conflict-of-interest situations.
3.4. Technology Transfer to Foreign Companies
There are few, if any, formal restrictions against transferring
university inventions to foreign companies. Not surprisingly,
however, conversations with individual scientists, government
officials, and heads of technology-transfer offices often reveal a
preference to transfer taxpayer-funded inventions to Japanese
companies. Nevertheless, many professors and licensing offices
are pleased to transfer rights to foreign companies. They note that
it is often more difficult to interest Japanese companies in
university technologies and that foreign companies are often more
generous in sponsoring university research, paying royalties, and
more committed to developing inventions. As noted above, some
of the highest royalty-earning licenses by TLOs are the ones
granted to foreign companies. Also, a recent Japanese press report
describes how Riken licensed diagnostic-related single nucleotide
polymorphism ("SNP") patents exclusively to a U.S. biotechnology
276 However, conflict-of-interest situations are not always monitored and
prospectively addressed in the United States either. See Cho, supra note 49
(explaining how many U.S. policies addressing financial conflict of interest lack
specificity and uniformity).
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company when no Japanese company showed interest. The
company agreed to more rapid development commitments and
higher royalty payments than most of Riken's Japanese licensees.277
However, METI recently released a new model contract for
government agencies to use when funding research under the
Japanese Bayh-Dole Law 278 that contains a "Japan manufacturing
preference" clause modeled on the U.S. manufacturing
preference. 279 Specifically, if recipients of government-sponsored
Commissioned Research want to transfer IP arising from such
research exclusively 280 to a third party and if that transfer includes
rights to the Japanese market, the commissioning ministry must
approve the transfer. However, if the third party promises that
manufacturing of any IP-protected products or manufacture using
any IP-protected methods will occur in Japan, this requirement is
waived. METI's recommended approval criteria are not set forth,
but in general it hopes to ensure that the nation's interest is
preserved in cases of transfers that will involve foreign
manufacturing.
As noted above, the Japanese Bayh-Dole law 28' applies to
government-funded contract research in universities, GRIs, or
private companies, but various ministries can exercise discretion
regarding its application. Currently, only METI, the Ministry of
Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunica-
tions, the Environment Ministry, the National Police Agency, and
the Defense Agency automatically allow organizations with which
they have Commissioned Research contracts to retain ownership of
any resulting inventions. METI has informed the other
government agencies of this change and has recommended that
they apply it too.
The immediate effects of this policy change are limited. It has
no effect on universities because, as discussed in Section 3.1.3.2
277 Kanako Sahara, Report: Riken ga Sa-do Wue-bu Sha ni Kyou-you: SNPs
Raisensu Kei-yaku no Ura [Riken Supplies Third Wave Technologies (TWT): Behind the
SNP License Contract], NIKKEI BIOTECHNOIoGY & Bus., Mar. 2002, at 80-81 (on file
with author).
278 See Law of Special Measures to Revive Industrial Vitality, supra note 177.
279 See 35 U.S.C. § 204(b) (stating the rules of transfer favoring the United
States).
280 The model contract uses a general term for "exclusive" license (hai-ta-teka).
It is not clear whether it would apply to preferential licenses as well as stronger
forms of exclusive licenses.
281 See Law of Special Measures to Revive Industrial Vitality, supra note 177.
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above, inventions arising under government Commissioned
Research can only be licensed nonexclusively and there are very
few such licenses. The most-affected GRI is probably AIST, whose
inventions arising under Commissioned Research from METI and
the other ministries and agencies listed above are now covered.
However, once universities become independent administrative
agencies, they will have the authority to license exclusively some, if
not most, government Commissioned Research inventions, and
therefore such licenses will be affected.
The question remains whether approval will also be needed in
the case of licenses of Grant-in-Aid or industry-financed
Commissioned or Joint Research inventions. Discussions with
METI and MEXT suggest that the answer is probably no.282
However, there is sentiment among some Diet and government
officials to require this on the grounds that Grant-in-Aid research is
taxpayer-funded and industry-sponsored researchers use taxpayer-
funded infrastructure and the work of government employees.
METI would prefer informal, flexible, case-by-case self-monitoring
by GRIs and University Corporations, rather than the issuances of
notifications or guidelines that would result in the central
ministries reviewing many individual license applications.
In any case, if universities, GRIs, and government ministries
adopt strict criteria to approve licenses involving overseas
manufacturing, or if the approval process takes too much time,
many foreign companies will be reluctant to cooperate with
Japanese universities or GRIs-particulary if Grant-in-Aid and
industry-sponsored Commissioned or Joint Research inventions
fall within the de facto scope of METI's recommendations. It may
also discourage some Japanese companies from collaborating with
universities, particularly those companies that are moving
manufacturing to China and other overseas locations.
As with other aspects of Japan's technology-transfer system,
the negative effects will be most severe for startup companies. If a
startup company's core technology is based upon exclusive
licenses subject to the Japanese manufacturing preference, any
strict or time-consuming approval process will substantially
diminish its attractiveness as an alliance partner or as an
investment opportunity for venture capital-unless its business
plan envisages manufacturing only in Japan. It may become
282 Discussions with METI and the Author (on file with author); Discussions
with MEXT and the Author (on file with author).
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especially difficult to form any startup company aiming to develop
biomedical products based upon patents subject to this
preference. 283
The reason that there have been few complaints from compa-
nies or U.S. universities that the Bayh-Dole U.S. manufacturing
preference forecloses licenses being granted to the best develop-
ment partners is probably due to two factors, neither of which ap-
plies to Japan:
1) Implemention of the preference is left largely to the
discretion of individual laboratories and until now
oversight has not been stringent. In contrast, in Japan
approval will have to come from the ministry level where
implementation probably will be stricter and more
bureaucratic.
2) Because most U.S. university exclusive licenses are granted
to startup companies that have no plan to manufacture
outside the United States (because of the early stage of most
technologies, but also because of the large size of the U.S.
market), U.S. universities have some political leeway to
license companies that will manufacture abroad if they
appear to be the most appropriate licensees.284 However,
most licensees of Japanese university technologies (with the
exception of those that are at such an early stage that any
commercial products will be covered by derivative patents)
will probably want to have the option to manufacture
abroad or to sublicense to a company that will want to
manufacture abroad.
The Author's own experience in technology transfer at NIH
suggests that national manufacturing restrictions or small business
licensing preferences have, on at least a few occasions, resulted in
the selection of licensees or CRADA partners that are not the most
283 Patent protection tends to be very important for the development of
biomedical products; early-stage university patents often still define a biomedical
startup company's core technology even after considerable development work has
been done.
284 See GENERAL AccOuNTNG OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES:
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: ADMINISTRATION OF THE BAYH-DOLE ACT BY RESEARCH UNI-
VERSITIES 13,14 (GAO/ RCED-98-126) (1998) (allowing companies that are the most
appropriate to gain licensing). The NIH has received only a few requests from
university grantees for waivers of the U.S. manufacturing preference and has
granted most of these. Written communication from NIH to Author (Jul. 18, 2002)
(on file with author).
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capable companies to develop drugs and medical devices for the
public's benefit.285
More broadly, all countries should be concerned that restricting
technology transfer according to the nationality of the licensee or
the site of manufacturing will lead to the mercantilization of
science and technology. In the long run this may have profound
negative consequences for free global investment,
internationalization of business partnerships, and international
scientific interchange.
An in-depth comparative analysis of national benefits
provisions is beyond the scope of this Article. However, the
approach of the United Kingdom may be a better model for Japan.
The U.K. government places a high priority on commercialization
of research from U.K. universities and GRIs to generate "maximum
benefits in the form of jobs and prosperity for the nation."
286
However, taking into account the U.K.'s international investment,
trading, and scientific cooperative relationships, a recent
government report recommends leaving decisions regarding how
to protect and exploit inventions to individual labs.287 In other
words, the government has articulated the goal of commercializing
publicly financed inventions for national benefit, but allowing
individual laboratories to determine how to achieve this goal and
what constitutes benefit to the nation.
But even if Japan were to adopt the U.K. approach, the delays
inherent in waiting for university administrators to decide which
licenses meet a flexible national benefits test may be so long as to
effectively foreclose licensing to all except the companies that will
285 For an example of how foreign participation in an important U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy CRADA triggered intense debate over how to satisfy the require-
ments of the U.S. manufacturing preference in the 1986 Federal Technology Trans-
fer Act, 37 C.F.R. § 404.5(2), and the larger issue of foreign access to publicly-
funded U.S. technologies; see David Lammers, U.S. Gives OK to ASML on EUV Ef-
fort, EETIMES (Feb. 24, 1999), available at http://www.eetimes.com (highlighting the
difficulty of cross-border technology transfer); George Leopold & David Lam-
mers, U.S. Official Raps German Role in Lithography Group, EETIMES June 2, 2000),
available at http://www.eetimes.com (discussing the difficulties faced by technol-
ogy consortiums).
286 OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OF HER MAJESTY'S TREASURY, THE GOV-
ERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE BAKER REPORT: "CREATING KNOWLEDGE, CREATING
WEALTH": REALIZING THE ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF PUBLIC SECTOR RESEARCH ESTAB-
LISHMENTS (2002), available at http://archive.treasury.gov.uk/docs/1999/baker.
html (last visited May 6, 2003).
287 Id.
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manufacture in Japan. Thus, it may be ironic that just as Japan
takes meaningful steps to do away with its bureaucratic system of
state ownership of IP rights and to give real technology transfer
responsibility to individual public laboratories, it implements
protectionist policies that may create significant disincentives for
companies, especially startup companies, to cooperate with those
laboratories. Nonetheless, METI should be commended for
modeling the Japanese manufacturing preference on the least
restictive of the U.S. "national benefits" provisions. As noted in
Sections 2.1.2, 2.2.1, and 2.2.2, U.S. laws pose more restrictions on
licensing to foreign companies or companies that will manufacture
abroad, especially with respect to technologies arising in U.S. GRIs.
4. SUMMARY DISCUSSION
4.1. Is There Really a Problem with the Japanese System?
If there are problems with the Japanese system of public-
private R&D cooperation and technology transfer, they do not in-
volve the lack of linkages. Numbers and rates of co-authorship of
papers in academic journals, where at least one of the authors is
from a university or GRI and one is from private industry, are
comparable to those in the United States.2 Even the total level of
private funding for university R&D appears comparable between
the two countries.289 The longstanding importance of Donations
and consulting agreements have been noted above. These and
other forms of academic-industry cooperation, many informal,
have also been noted by other authors.290
As for IP ownership and transfer and how they relate to tech-
nology commercialization, the diagram in Appendix 3 summarizes
in simplified form the key differences between the Japanese and
U.S. systems.
To recap several points illustrated by the diagram:
1) In contrast to the United States, where ownership rests with
universities, in Japan ownership may rest with either the
8 See Diana Hicks, University-Industry Research Links in Japan, 26 POL'Y SCI.
361, 377-379 (1993). Kenneth Pechter, Measuring the University-Industry Linkage
in Japan 124-227 (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Tokyo) (on
file with author).
289 Pechter, supra note 288.
290 Hicks, supra note 288. See also Odagiri, supra note 201 (documenting close
cooperation).
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inventors, the central government, or jointly with universi-
ties and industry sponsors of Commissioned or Joint Re-
search.
2) Only the first possibility, retention of ownership by the in-
ventors, allows for transferable exclusive rights, and thus,
only this is consistent with the needs of many startup com-
panies. However, the range of inventions that inventors
can officially control is constrained to between roughly
25%-60% of all university inventions.291 Increasing this
range requires obfuscation of funding sources.
3) In the United States, TLOs are involved in the management
of most inventions. In Japan, they are often left out of the
picture, even when the nation does not have an ownership
interest.
4) Japanese startup companies cannot leverage private capital
to continue university-based research. To do so would re-
quire that they enter into a Joint or Commissioned contract
with the university, under which the university would co-
own any inventions. So far, transfers of inventions co-
owned by the nation/university have been difficult. In
contrast, U.S. universities routinely give their startup com-
panies permission to sublicense core IP rights originally li-
censed from the universities.
Nevertheless, it could be argued that Japanese institutions have
developed creative and efficient ways around the exigencies of a
legal framework that, on its surface, upholds blanket principles of
national ownership and nonexclusive access to publicly-funded
technology. These methods allow inventors to retain ownership of
the vast majority of inventions and thus most inventions can be
commercialized and even passed to startup companies. Indeed,
the transfer of university discoveries directly from inventors to
companies under the guise of Donation or Kou-hi research results
occurs more quickly and cheaply than the negotiation process for
most licenses by U.S. TLOs. The fact that no organization, not even
JST, insists on serious investigation into sources of funding for in-
ventions attributed to Kou-hi or Grants-in-Aid can be seen as a vir-
tuous triumph of common sense flexibility over dogmatic adher-
291 Depending upon the extent to which Kou-hi funds support infrastructure
as opposed to specific projects, see supra note 167, Table 1 (sampling the degrees of
control).
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ence to the principle of national ownership and to the numerous
notifications. 292
However, the threat that many inventions could be classified as
National Inventions hangs like the Sword of Damocles over the
technology-transfer process. To avoid making the sword drop, it is
necessary to obfuscate the sources of funding for inventions and
often to hide the existence of inventions. Obfuscation enables all
concerned parties to carry on with a charade which is essential for
the system to work. But the necessity of obfuscation discourages
contractual transfers from inventors to companies, lest the contract
reveal the existence of the inventions and the fact that they may not
have arisen under Donation or Kou-hi funding. Companies that
provide Donations are happy to play along with this charade be-
cause they do not want contractual obligations to make royalty
payments or to meet development benchmarks.
This lack of contractual transfers is one factor that diminishes
the incentive to develop early-stage academic technologies. With-
out contractual obligations, recipient companies have weak obliga-
tions to develop the inventions or to pay royalties. Usually they
receive publicly funded inventions for "free." In addition, inven-
tors have no right, contractual or otherwise, to royalties. Neither
do universities, even though they ostensibly own National Inven-
tions on behalf of the nation.
The net result is that uncertain early-stage, yet potentially
promising academic inventions lack any "champion," any person
or organization with incentives to fight to increase their chances of
development and commercialization. In contrast, in the United
States, inventors, university TLOs, venture capital funds, and the
managers appointed by those funds often act in overlapping se-
quence as champions for early-stage academic technologies. All
have the legal and institutional authority to do so. 293 All also have
292 This evokes the common distinction made by Japanese people between
surface adherence to formal obligations and strictures, tate-mae, and what actually
occurs, hon-ne. In Japanese society, hon-ne that is different from tate-mae is often
acceptable, so long as surface appearances compatible with tate-mae are main-
tained. Nevertheless, the Author does not want to overemphasize cultural rea-
sons for the differences in the U.S. and Japanese technology-transfer systems. Al-
though cultural factors may be important, the main goal of this Article is to show
that many of the problems of the Japanese transfer system can be attributed to the
legal and institutional framework, and that this framework should be the focus of
reform efforts.
293 Inventors champion their inventions by advising their TLOs on possible
uses and licensees, and also occasionally by establishing or advising startup com-
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clear financial incentives to champion promising technologies -
incentives that available evidence suggests are important to make
the technology-transfer process work.294
Japanese TLOs are beginning to serve as champions for some
technologies, but they face hurdles that their U.S. counterparts do
not, such as those noted in Section 3.1.3.4. They must take part in
the charade to obfuscate invention funding sources. Also they are
often at philosophical and legal loggerheads with the administra-
tive staffs of their own universities.
In industries that rely primarily on large established companies
for technology innovation, the Japanese system might suffice.
Technology would be transferred from academic laboratories pri-
marily by informal mechanisms and good academic discoveries
would be developed. The lack of technology champions and de-
velopment incentives would be felt at the margin, i.e., in the case of
technologies that may have promise but do not fit the established
companies' business plans or are not deemed to be worth the de-
velopment effort and risk. The development of some promising
"marginal" technologies would be delayed or barred, but this
might also happen in the same industries in the United States, de-
spite entrepreneurial academic inventors and aggressive TLOs.
In industries where venture capital-backed startup companies
can play an important role in developing university discoveries,
the constraints inherent in the Japanese system may be devastat-
ing. The inability to receive any degree of exclusivity to govern-
ment-funded Commissioned or Joint Research inventions, the in-
ability to transfer rights to Commissioned or Joint Research
inventions that even the startup companies fund, and the uncertain
"actual" ownership of inventions alleged to be Donation or Kou-hi
inventions are incompatible with many startup companies' need
for clear, exclusive, transferable IP rights. Without clear, exclusive,
transferable IP rights, raising private capital and entering into
business alliances requiring transfers of exclusive IP rights be-
comes problematic. In addition, at least in the past, startup com-
panies could not compete with established companies for access to
Donation inventions. They did not have the cash to give many
panies aimed at developing their discoveries.
294 See RICHARD JENSEN & MARIE THURSBY, PROOFS AND PROTOTYPES FOR SALE:
THE TALE OF UNIVERSITY LICENSING 23-24 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 6698 (1998)) available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w6698 (last vis-
ited May 7, 2003).
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Donations to university professors and they could not offer stu-
dents stable employment. This latter situation is changing because
university researchers can now manage their own startup compa-
nies and pass rights to ostensibly Donation-funded inventions to
their startup companies, either directly or via their TLOs. But the
other barriers to startup companies listed at the beginning of this
paragraph remain. So, in Japan the ability of private venture capi-
tal and startup companies to act as technology champions remains
constrained.
How important are private venture capital and venture capital-
backed startup companies in promoting the commercialization of
publicly funded discoveries? This is an important question requir-
ing further inquiry, and the answer almost certainly varies accord-
ing to industry. The finding of Kortum and Lerner-that private
venture capital-backed companies in various industries are sub-
stantially more innovative than established firms in terms of patent
production -provides some evidence for the importance of ven-
ture capital-backed startup companies in promoting innovation
and economic development. 295
This Author's research comparing innovation between Japa-
nese and U.S./ European pharmaceutical companies shows that the
latter rely much more than the former on drug leads obtained from
startup companies.296 In the fields of cancer, cardiovascular and in-
fectious disease drugs, a significant majority of drugs in human
clinical trials originate in biotechnology startup companies.297 So at
least in the field of drug development, large U.S. and European
pharmaceutical companies have decided it makes business sense to
leave early-stage innovation up to startup companies and academic
institutions. But in Japan, the number of biomedical startup com-
panies is very small, 298 and most Japanese pharmaceutical compa-
nies develop most of their drugs entirely in-house.299
295 SAMUAL KORTUM & JOSHUA LERNER, DoEs VENTURE CAPITAL SPUR INNOVA-
TION? 36-37 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6846,1998).
296 Robert Kneller, Autarkic Drug Discovery in Japanese Pharmaceutical Compa-
nies: Insights into National Differences in Industrial Innovation, RESEARCH POLICY
[hereinafter Kneller, Autarkic Drug Discovery] (forthcoming) (on file with author).
297 Detailed results from Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Asso-
ciation of America ("PhRMA"), PhRMA Annual Membership Survey, 2001 and
2002 survey data. Id.
298 Supra § 3.1.5.
299 Somewhat surprisingly, they have been able to maintain a respectable
stream of new pipeline drugs relying on traditional in-house methods of pharma-
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In the field of information technology ("IT"), the Author had
identified only two IT startup companies from Japanese academic
institutions as of the end of 2000. Moreover, while Unix, Netscape,
Lycos, MPEG, and many other IT companies originated in U.S.
universities or were developed with significant input from U.S.
university researchers, very few Japanese innovations in IT can be
traced in a similar manner to Japanese academic laboratories.300
Although comprehensive cross-industry data is lacking, avail-
able information suggests the following first hypothesis: Certain
industries can benefit more than others from academic research.
These industries will be more innovative and competitive in coun-
tries that have effective technology-transfer systems including for-
mal (contractual) technology-transfer mechanisms. 301
Available data also suggests a second hypothesis: In some in-
dustries, venture capital-backed startup companies have an advan-
tage over large, established companies in developing new tech-
nologies, including academic discoveries.302
Finally, the analysis of this paper suggests a third hypothesis
that links the first two: Formal mechanisms of technology transfer
are particularly important for startup companies in industries
where startup companies need clear, transferable, exclusive IP
rights to academic discoveries. If such industries are also indus-
tries where startup companies have an innovation advantage over
established firms, these industries will be more competitive in
countries with effective formal mechanisms of academic-industry
technology transfer.
These hypotheses remain to be confirmed over a range of in-
dustries. But if they are, they might explain why many U.S. com-
panies are more innovative compared to their Japanese counter-
ceutical R&D. However, for cutting edge biomedical technologies, they are turn-
ing mainly to U.S. biotechnology startup companies. Kneller, Autarkic Drug Dis-
covery, supra note 296.
300 Robert Kneller, University-Industry Cooperation in High Technology, JAPAN
INC. at 26-27 July 2000), available at http://www.japaninc.net/article.php?
articlelD=379 (last visited May 7, 2003).
301 A related hypothesis is that formal contractual mechanisms are important
incentives for academic researchers and administrators to champion technologies
by participating in the technology-transfer and development process. The find-
ings of JENSEN & THURSBY, supra note 294, provide support, but further studies,
particularly in non-U.S. settings, would be helpful.
302 The findings of KORTUM & LERNER, supra note 295, provide support, but
further studies particularly of academic-based startup companies in non-U.S. set-
tings are needed.
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parts, for example, in biomedical and IT industries where U.S.
companies rely extensively upon academic research and where
startup companies play a prominent role in developing early-stage
discoveries. Biomedicine, in particular drug development, appears
to be an industry that relies on academic research where startup
companies are more innovative, and have a greater need for clear,
exclusive, and transferable IP rights. In this industry, the system of
university-industry IP transfer may have directly contributed to
U.S. competitiveness. It may be an industry where strong IP rights
may not be as important to startup companies, although it does
rely on academic research, and IT startup companies are more in-
novative than established companies. In the case of IT, the formal
system of IP rights transfer may not have directly contributed to
U.S. industry's success (although other aspects of the system of
university-industry cooperation certainly did). But it may have in-
directly contributed to success by creating incentives for university
researchers and administrators to effectively promote technology
development-largely by promoting startup companies. In con-
trast, industries such as automobiles and consumer electronics,
where Japanese companies are still world leaders in innovation,
appear to be industries that do not rely greatly upon R&D input
from universities or startup companies.3 3 Also these do not ap-
pear to be industries where startup companies play a major role in
innovation.
Despite the above being only hypotheses, the Author hopes
that this Article has shown, using an international comparative
analysis, how the legal framework determining IP rights can have
an important impact on the vitality of startup companies, the effec-
303 One factor underlying this phenomenon is the tradition of lifetime em-
ployment that still exists in many large technology-based Japanese manufacturing
corporations. The following two factors depend upon lifetime employment: (a)
the familiarity, loyalty, and insularity that employees acquire from rotating
through many parts of a firm during their careers and (b) the accumulation of tacit
knowledge within the firm and the ease with which this knowledge is shared
throughout the firm. Thus, in industries where innovation can occur best in-
house, the tradition of lifetime employment may give large established Japanese
companies a competitive advantage. See Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic
Model of the Japanese Firm, 28 J. oF ECON. LITERATURE 1-27 (1990) (detailing lifetime
employment); Guido Reger, How R&D is Coordinated in Japanese and European Mul-
tinationals, 29 R&D MGMT 71-88 (1999) (comparing various research and develop-
ment regimes); Eleanor Westney, Changing Perspectives on the Organization of Japa-
nese Multinational Companies, in JAPANESE MULTINATIONALS ABROAD: INDIVIDUAL
AND ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 11-29 (Schon Beechler & Allen Bird eds., 1999)
(discussing patterns of cooperation).
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tiveness of academic-industry cooperation, and the vitality of some
industries.
Of course, the legal and institutional framework of IP owner-
ship and transfer is not the only factor determining the effective-
ness of academic-industry cooperation. Other factors include the
ability of companies to sponsor research in academic laboratories
and the ability to mobilize and incentivize academic researchers for
projects that have possible commercial potential. These factors
were discussed above in depth because they are integral to aca-
demic-industry cooperation. But there are additional factors,
which can only be listed here:304
" The extent of public support for academic research.305
* The manner in which government support is distributed. 30 6
• Recruitment and promotion in academic laboratories.
" Labor mobility, specifically: (a) its affects on recruitment of
personnel for sponsored research and startup companies,
and (b) its relationship to the relative importance of (i)
building one's own marketable record of accomplishment,
and (ii) seeking long-term job security and patronage
within a single organization.
30 7
* Family and other social attitudes towards working for a
startup company, and social consequences in the case that
the startup company fails.
• The availability of government and private capital, as well
as related infrastructure (capital markets, attorneys, ac-
countants, mentors, etc.) to support startup companies.308
304 Most of these factors are dealt with in a forthcoming paper by the Author
on Japanese biomedical startup companies.
305 Undoubtedly one factor behind the growth of the U.S. biotechnology in-
dustry has been the generous, longstanding government support for biomedical
research, primarily from the NIH.
306 The U.S. system is based upon relatively transparent peer review centered
on competitive, merit-based awards by committees of scientists who are experts in
the field of the proposed research. These committees are sufficiently large and
balanced to prevent domination of the committee by a few prominent individuals.
The Japanese system is less transparent and does not have the same internal
checks that the U.S. system has and, as a result, awards are less competitive and
more based upon reputation of the applicant and/or his institution.
307 For more on this latter issue of career advancement by building one's own
individual record of accomplishments versus staying within one organization and
relying on patronage, see Coleman, supra note 151, at 34-5 (giving an example
from academic medicine).
308 Lack of private investment capital, however, is not presently a major bot-
tleneck to startup company formation in Japan. More details will be provided in a
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" Management of venture funds and startup companies.
* The extent to which established companies rely on in-house
R&D for innovation versus the extent to which they rely on
alliances with universities and startup companies-the
former probably being a characteristic of Japanese compa-
nies.309
" Tax laws that affect factors such as: (a) incentives for angel
investment in startup companies, and (b) the feasibility of
stock options as employee compensation.
" The existence of secondary markets for IP so as to decrease
the risk of investment in startup companies.
These factors are more important than the system of university
IP management. Indeed, it may be impossible for Japanese univer-
sities ever to be centers of dynamic research and innovation on par
with North American and U.K. universities, so long as Japanese
university careers depend upon insider patronage rather than ob-
jectively assessed individual merit and a competitive market for
research talent. On the other hand, if the IP management frame-
work is not changed to address the problems analyzed in this Arti-
cle, startup companies in Japan may never be as numerous or in-
novative as they are in North America and the United Kingdom.
Moreover, changing this framework may be relatively easy com-
pared to changing (a) deep-rooted practices of lifetime employ-
ment and consequently low labor mobility, (b) careers based upon
patronage, and (c) an apparently deep-rooted hesitancy to assess
applicants for jobs and research funding competitively and trans-
parently based upon individual merit.
4.2. Prospects for Japan
Since 1998, important reforms have been made to the Japanese
system of technology transfer from both universities and GRIs. In
the case of some GRIs, the reforms have gone farther than in uni-
versities. In Riken and AIST, for example, the legal framework ap-
pears essentially similar to that which applies to U.S. universities.
Their researchers can even establish and manage their own startup
companies, something their counterparts in most U.S. universities
may not do.
separate paper.
309 Kneller, Autarkic Drug Discovery, supra note 296.
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National universities are scheduled to become administratively
autonomous corporations in 2004. This change will probably result
in the universities being able to assert ownership over a considera-
bly larger range of inventions than they currently can. However,
their administrative staffs will not be able to manage these rights
effectively, at least in the short term. Some of the TLOs will be able
to do so, but there is no guarantee of smooth cooperation between
TLOs and universities. Also, ownership of IP may still depend on
the source of funding because a residual category of National In-
ventions may remain, and inventors may be able to retain owner-
ship of a significant proportion of their inventions. Thus misattri-
bution of funding sources and direct, noncontractual
undocumented transfers from inventors to companies may con-
tinue. This, in turn, will undermine TLOs, hinder startup company
formation, and ultimately slow development of promising tech-
nologies.
As for other challenges to effective university-industry coop-
eration, some high government leaders seem to understand the
fundamental problems of universities and are advocating in-
creased academic competition, freedom from bureaucratic control,
abolition of civil servant status for university personnel, allowing
dual employment in universities and industry, abolition of senior-
ity-based promotions, and merit-based competition.310 It remains
to be seen how these far-reaching proposals will actually be im-
plemented in the face of inertia, apprehension, and opposition
from some faculty and administrators.
One area in which reforms have been implemented swiftly is
the ability of researchers in universities and GRIs to participate in
outside work, even to the point of managing their own startup
companies. Preapproval and thereafter annual reporting are re-
quired, but otherwise, there are few limits on such work. This rela-
tively liberal policy may have merit in view of the disincentives to
change jobs or work in startup companies, due to low labor mobil-
ity and the system of lifetime employment.
Guidelines to prevent and manage conflict-of-interest situa-
tions will have to be developed soon. In addition, particular uni-
versity officials need to be trained and given authority to deal with
conflict of issues. There seems to be few if any grass-roots initia-
tives to develop appropriate methods to deal with potential con-
310 Omi, supra note 1.
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flict situations. Initiative probably will come from central govern-
ment bureaucrats.
Finally, as Japan implements its new preference for licensing to
companies that will manufacture in Japan, it should be careful not
to undo many of the beneficial effects of the reforms now under-
way. The dangers to Japanese startup companies have already
been mentioned in Section 3.1.7, particularly difficulties attracting
private investment if the private investors perceive that key tech-
nologies cannot be used outside Japan.
4.3. Lessons for all Countries
The number of ownership options for publicly financed aca-
demic inventions are limited. Either the inventors, state, research
institutions, or companies that sponsor research own and control
IP rights. The Japanese system embodies all these ownership
structures. Japan's experience with each of these ownership re-
gimes offers cautionary lessons for other countries contemplating
changes in their technology-transfer systems, even for the United
States, especially when Japan's experience is viewed over the past
thirty years and when it is compared with the U.S. experience over
the same period.
First, there are perils associated with government ownership of
publicly-financed academic inventions, if such ownership implies
either patenting and licensing by central bureaucracies or restraints
on exclusive IP rights transfers when further private-sector devel-
opment of inventions is required. The Japanese system of govern-
ment ownership has produced very few commercially useful pat-
ents. Government ownership is inconsistent with the needs of
many startup companies and even the needs of many established
companies contemplating development of early-stage academic
technologies. In Japan, government ownership of university in-
ventions is avoided whenever possible. In GRIs where it is impos-
sible to disguise government-owned inventions as Donation or
Kou-hi inventions, the number of licensed government-owned in-
ventions is very small. This suggests that without such bypass
mechanisms, government-owned inventions that require further
development will be difficult to commercialize.
This is not to deny the merit of public ownership of (or more
precisely, open access to) some publicly funded inventions. Indeed,
the types of publicly funded inventions to which exclusive private
rights should be granted, as well as the types of industries where
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innovation is encouraged by universities conveying exclusive
rights, are still matters of open debate. The Japanese experience
cautions against blanket prohibitions against granting exclusive
rights to such inventions and against the locus of decision making
being a central government bureaucracy. In the Author's own ex-
perience in technology transfer at NIH, close contact between tech-
nology transfer personnel and inventors was extremely important
to assess new discoveries and to guide decisions about patenting
and marketing. It is hard to conceive how bureaucrats in a central
office can be as effective as persons close to the research laborato-
ries.31' Finally, giving academic institutions the right to own pub-
licly-funded discoveries does not necessarily mean that rights to
these inventions will be exclusively held. The PHS/NIH policy
that PHS/NIH-funded inventions should be exclusively licensed
only if necessary to provide necessary incentives for develop-
ment312 is a policy that probably merits general application to pub-
licly funded discoveries arising in academic institutions.
Second, ownership by inventors may also be problematic, ab-
sent an entrepreneurial culture and the infrastructure to help in-
ventors make informed decisions about which companies to trans-
fer their invention and the terms of transfer. The Japanese
experience with this ownership system suggests that some inven-
tors will transfer discoveries to companies, but while the technol-
ogy is still at an early stage so that all the development initiative
will be left up to the company. Also, large established companies
are most often the recipients. However, the recent rise in startup
company formation in Japan suggests that as entrepreneurial cul-
ture spreads among academic researchers and as TLOs, incubators
and venture capital funds improve, individual inventor ownership
can result in effective technology transfer. However, it would be
more difficult to enforce any guidelines favoring nonexclusive li-
311 The history of the British Technology Group ("BTG") is germane to this
issue. BTG's predecessor, the National Research Development Corporation, was
created in 1949; in 1950, British Treasury Circular No. 5 granted it first rights of
refusal on inventions and other IP arising from publicly-funded research. These
rights were withdrawn in 1985 in order to give universities more flexibility in
technology management and because BTG felt its resources were being spread too
thin as the number of university technologies increased. Written communication
from U.K. Embassy in Tokyo (June 28, 2002). An assessment of BTG's technology
and IP management record during the period before 1985 when it was the sole
U.K. organization managing publicly-funded technologies would help resolve this
issue.
312 See supra notes 43, 85, 89 (discussing incentives to invent).
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censing under an "inventors retain ownership" system. Thus, al-
lowing inventors to retain ownership of their inventions is proba-
bly not the best solution for most countries because of both imma-
ture technology-transfer infrastructures and the public interest in
limiting exclusive transfers of publicly funded technologies to
where the exclusive rights are necessary to encourage develop-
ment.
Third, co-ownership can also be problematic. In Japan, co-
ownership between the nation and the sponsoring company is the
most frequent allocation of rights to industry-sponsored Commis-
sioned or Joint Research inventions. In Japan, co-ownership has
brought no financial benefit to academic laboratories, yet it has
greatly complicated licensing. A better alternative might be to let
the research institution or the inventor keep full control of the
rights. Then, if licensing should be restricted for policy reasons,
special guidelines should be implemented.
Fourth, it may be unwise to make control over academic IP de-
pendent upon the sources of funding for an invention. The Japa-
nese system shows that this allows frequent manipulation, which
may ultimately make IP rights less certain and the transfer process
less consistent. It may be better to allow research institutions (or
individual inventors) claim all IP rights. Thus the policy of most
U.S. universities to assert ownership over all industry-sponsored
inventions, almost all employee inventions, and most student in-
vention, overreaching as it may seem, may help preserve the over-
all effectiveness of the technology-transfer system.
Fifth, the U.S. manufacturing preference may not be the best
model to ensure that the development of taxpayer-funded discov-
eries results in benefits to the taxpayers and their nation. Due to
unique features of the U.S. economy, and because the preference
has not been rigorously enforced, there probably have been few
cases of sub-optimal licenses being selected due to the U.S. manu-
facturing or small business preferences. But when other countries,
such as Japan, follow the U.S. model, sub-optimal decisions may
become apparent quite soon. The sense of discrimination that this
might cause in the United States and developing countries may
engender more rigorous enforcement of the U.S. provisions and
those in developing countries. This could lead to a competitive
downward spiral in which countries treat scientific research as a
mercantile commodity to be hoarded within national boundaries,
with significant adverse consequences for business, science, and
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health. A more flexible "national benefits test" leaving decisions to
the laboratories is a better model.
APPENDIX 1: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SHOWING THAT THE NUMBER OF
GRANT-IN-AID INVENTIONS IS MUCH LESS THAN EXPECTED
In the table below, Row 1 shows R&D funding in each category
for the University of Tokyo in 2001. 313 Row 2 shows the distribu-
tion, according to purported funding source, of the 181 University
of Tokyo inventions on which Japanese patent applications were
filed in 2001. Here, applications filed by the University's TLOs are
a proxy for inventions arising under standard research allowance
(Kou-hi) and Donation funding. Row 3 shows the expected distri-
bution of the 181 inventions if the distribution had been propor-
tional to amount of funding.
University of Tokyo Patent Applications in 2001 by
Source of Invention Funding
Kou-hi and Industry- MEXT Gov't- Total One-
Donations Sponsored Grants-in- Sponsored dimensional
commis- Aid Commis- chi-square
sioned or sioned or probability
Joint Joint (P)
Research Research
1. Fund- 60.9* 1.8 22.7 7.2 92.6
ing (B)
2. Actual 155" 4 5.5- 16.5" 181
# of ap-
plications
3. Ex- 119 4 44 14 181 P<.0001
pected
applica-
tions as-
suming
all Kou-hi
avail, for
R&D
4. Ex- 40 8 101 32 181 P<.0001
pected
applica-
tions as-
suming
no Kou-hi
avail, for
R&D
* Consists of 51.8 billion yen of Kou-hi and 9.1 billion yen of Do-
nations.
313 See THE UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO, TOUKYOU DAIGAKU NO GAIYOU 2002 [SuM-
MARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO 2002] 47-48 (on file with author) (estimating the
breakdown between industry- and government-sponsored Commissioned or Joint
Research calculated in the same way as in Table 1 and as explained infa in Ap-
pendix 2).
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** Approximated by the number of patent applications filed by
CASTI (132) and the IIS TLO (22) in 2001 (source: METI). Also in-
cludes one invention voluntarily transferred by the inventor to the
university/nation (University of Tokyo Invention Comm. data).
*** One of these inventions was designated as arising under both
Commissioned Research and Grant-in-Aid support, so the Author
assigned half of it to each of these categories.
Just by scanning Rows 2 and 3, it is clear that the greatest dis-
crepancy between actual and expected values is the low number of
Grants-in-Aid inventions. The probability that this discrepancy be-
tween the observed and expected values could be due to chance is
less than 1 in 10,000. In other words, there must be some cause for
this discrepancy other than mere chance. Indeed, comparison of
Rows 2 and 3 probably underestimates the difference between ob-
served and expected numbers of patent applications because a sig-
nificant proportion of Kou-hi funds are not directly available for re-
search. If Kou-hi funds (totaling 51.8 billion yen) are excluded, the
observed-expected discrepancy becomes even more extreme, as
shown by comparing Rows 2 and 4.
APPENDIX 2: DERIVATION OF FUNDING ESTIMATES FOR EACH TYPE OF
FUNDING/PROJECT IN TABLE 1
Standard research allowance (Kou-hi):
Source: KOKURITSU GAKKOU TOKUBETSU KAIKEI - YOSAN SHIT-
SUMU HANDOBUKKU: HEISEI 10 [1998 BUDGET HANDBOOK FOR THE
SPECIAL ACCOUNTS OF NATIONAL SCHOOLS] 205 (1999). In fact,
much of this is used for overhead expenses, so the 143 billion yen
(approximately 860 million USD) figure significantly overstates its
significance as a source of direct research support.314
MEXT Grants-in-Aid(Kaken-hi):
Official time series data are available at http://
www.jsps.go.jp/j-grantsinaid. This data includes Grants-in-Aid to
private and local government universities, as well as national uni-
versities. A partial breakdown by national, private, and local uni-
versities for fiscal year 2002 funding is available at the same URL.
314 See supra, note 174.
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This data shows. that of the total 2002 fiscal year ("FY") appro-
priation of 170.3 billion yen (approximately 1 billion USD), the al-
location of 132.7 billion yen between national, private, and local
universities was already decided as of April 2002. Of this 132.7 bil-
lion yen, 96.5 billion yen (73%) is budgeted for national universi-
ties. Of this 96.5 billion yen, 6.4 billion yen (6.6%) is for overhead
payments. Therefore, 90.1 billion yen of the 132.7 billion yen is di-
rectly available to support research in national universities.
As for the portion of the 2002 FY budget that had not been allo-
cated as of April 2002 (170.3 billion-132.7 billion = 37.6 billion
yen), most of this is for large project grants that are probably more
heavily weighted towards national universities than other grants.
The Author estimates that 85% of this amount, or 32 billion yen,
will be directly available to support research in national universi-
ties. Therefore, the estimated total Grants-in-Aid support for re-
search in national universities in 2002 FY is 122.1 billion yen (90.1
billion plus 32 billion) (approximately 740 million USD) net of
overhead deductions.
This 122.1 billion yen is 71.6% of the total 170.3 billion yen
Grants-in-Aid budget for the 2002 fiscal year. Using this discount
factor for FY 1998 gives an estimate of 84.5 billion yen (0.716 multi-
plied by 118 billion) (approximately 510 million USD) for the total
amount of direct Grant-in-Aid research support to national univer-
sities in 1998.
Donations (Kifu-kin):
Data from MET1315 shows a 1998 total of 45 billion yen (ap-
proximately 270 million USD). METI confirmed these funds are for
national universities only and there are no overhead deductions at
the national government level. However, universities and indi-
vidual departments have the option of taking deductions for com-
mon expenses/funds. The Author believes, largely on the basis of
his experience in the University of Tokyo, that total deductions
range between 5% and 10%. Applying an average discount of 7.5%
to the above figure yields an estimate of 41.6 billion yen (approxi-
mately 250 million USD).
315 Communication between METI and the Author (June 2001) (on file with
author).
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Commissioned Research:
Total Commissioned Research (government and private) in na-
tional universities in 1998 was about 38 billion yen (approximately
230 million USD).316 Data from the University of Tokyo in 1999
shows that total Commissioned Research in 1999 in that university
was 8.35 billion yen (approximately 50 million USD), of which 8.04
billion yen was from government-affiliated organizations and 310
million yen was from private companies. Assuming that the pri-
vate company funds were all net of a 30% overhead deduction, but
none of the government funds were subject to overhead, private
companies paid 440 million yen for Commissioned Research in the
University, in comparison to 8.04 billion yen paid by government
affiliates. In other words, the private and government proportions
were 94.8% and 5.2%, respectively. Assuming this ratio applies to
the nationwide total of 38 billion yen and then discounting the pri-
vate portion by the 30% overhead charge suggests that government
funds directly available for Commissioned Research in national
universities were about 36 billion yen (approximately 220 million
USD), while directly available private funds were about 1.4 billion
yen (approximately 8.5 million USD).
Joint Research:
Nationwide funding totals are not generally available. How-
ever, a personal communication from University of Tokyo officials
(May 17, 2002) indicates that the 1998 total for national universities
was 5.7 billion yen (approximately 35 million USD). University of
Tokyo data indicate that Joint Research funding paid to the Uni-
versity of Tokyo that year totaled 678 million yen (approximately
4.1 million USD), 524 million yen (approximately 3.2 million USD)
from private companies and 154 million yen (approximately 1 mil-
lion USD) from government-affiliated organizations. Assuming
that all the private-company funds were net of a 30% overhead de-
duction, but none of the government funds were subject to over-
head charges, private companies paid 748 million yen (approxi-
mately 4.5 million USD) for Joint Research in the university, in
comparison to 154 million yen paid by government affiliates. In
other words, the private and government proportions were 82.8%
and 17.2%, respectively. Assuming this ratio applies to the na-
316 Data from METI June 2001) (on file with author).
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tionwide total of 5.7 billion yen and then discounting the private
portion by the 30% overhead charge, private funds directly avail-
able for Joint Research in national universities were about 3.3 bil-
lion yen (approximately 20 million USD), while directly govern-
ment funds were about 1.0 billion yen (approximately 6 million
USD).
Unlike NSF data on R&D in U.S. universities, the above fund-
ing amounts/programs do not include funds for salaries or em-
ployee benefits (except for support staff hired primarily with Do-
nations and small numbers of graduate students3l7). Nor do they
include funds for construction, maintenance, or infrastructure sup-
port with the following exceptions: (1) Kou-hi funds do pay for a
portion of maintenance and nonconstruction infrastructure costs, 318
(2) 30% overhead is taken from Commissioned or Joint Research
funds for the national higher education budget account, and (3)
universities usually take 5 to 10% of Donation funds for common
uses. Thus, the levels of R&D support listed in Table 1 should not
be used to compare R&D support in Japanese universities with
universities in other countries.
APPENDIX 3: MATERIAL TRANSFER AGREEMENTS (MTAS)
MTAs are agreements to transfer nonpatented or nonpat-
entable research projects from one institution to another, primarily
for the purpose of research. Usually no royalties are involved.
Standard provisions state that ownership remains with the trans-
feror, that transferee will not use the material only for research not
involving humans, that transferees will be liable for any damages
involving its use of the material, and that transferees will acknowl-
edge transferor's contribution in publications, etc. As U.S. aca-
demic institutions have asserted ownership over all work products
of their employees, they have required that all transfers of research
materials that do not occur under license occur under MTAs.
In the United States, MTAs have become controversial because
they sometimes embody "reach through" clauses that require the
transferee to transfer back to the transferor IP rights in any discov-
eries the transferee makes using the materials, or to give the trans-
feror the right to take an exclusive license to such discoveries. Pri-
vate companies often include such clauses when transferring
317 See supra § 3.1.2.1.3.
318 See METI data, supra note 173.
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research materials to academic laboratories. Some academic labo-
ratories include such clauses when transferring materials to com-
panies or even other academic laboratories. Startup companies of-
ten include such clauses when transferring to companies or
academic laboratories. The concern that such reach through
clauses would limit the access of NIH-funded researchers to
needed research materials (especially research materials produced
with NIH funding) was one of the main reasons behind NIH's is-
suance of its 1999 Principles and Guidelines on Obtaining and Dis-
seminating Biomedical Research Resources. 319 Thus in the United
States, MTAs are not only a mechanism to transfer physical tech-
nology, but also serve as a mechanism for companies, and occa-
sionally, even to academic institutions, to protect and extend their
IP rights. One unintended consequence is that scientists often
complain that MTAs have made the process of sending and receiv-
ing materials more time consuming and bureaucratic than in the
past.
In contrast, Japanese universities, Riken, and some other GRIs
have left ownership of nonpatented research products in the hands
of inventors, although there has never been any notification or
similar official ruling to this effect. Increasingly, some professors
use a short MTA with standard clauses (not including reach
through provisions) when they send research materials to other
laboratories, but often no agreement is used. This practice makes
sense in situations where universities do not have independent le-
gal status and therefore cannot control nonpatented fruits of re-
search. The only other possible locus of ownership would be the
central government. Central government ownership, if accompa-
nied by the need for central government bureaucrats to authorize
or review transfers, would be a disaster.
However, the indictment by the U.S. Justice Department in
2001 of two Japanese biomedical scientists for violating the Eco-
nomic Espionage Act of 1996320 sparked interest in Japan regarding
the MTAs and control rights over nonpatented and noncopy-
righted fruits of academic research. The case involved a transfer
by scientists of cell lines and reagents from the Cleveland Clinic,
where he was an NIH-funded researcher, to Riken where he had
obtained a new job. It was noted that the scientist may not have
319 See supra note 39 (citing fears that universities issue too many exclusive
licenses).
320 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-39 (1996).
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known that the Cleveland Clinic owned the cell lines and reagents,
and that in any case, he probably could have had them transferred
to Riken under an MTA.321
A number of proposals are now under discussion. Some
would require reporting MTAs to either the sending institution or
to MEXT. Others would require MTAs to be used in all transfers of
research materials from the post-2004 University Corporations, and
would also give these corporations the right to assert ownership
over all nonpatentable research products.
MAM-jJthv',
S S$
B.ft
321 Robert Kneller, Letter, "Espionage" Charge May be Based on a Misunderstand-
ing of the Rules, 411 NATURE 991 (2001).
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